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P R E F A C E

Gerrit W. Gong

IN INTERNATIONAL AS IN PERSONAL RELATIONS, certain issues are best dealt with by leaving some things unsaid. In other cases, some things must be said, but at the right time and in the right way, for relationships to move forward. This volume marks an effort by international specialists and practitioners from Europe, East Asia, and the United States to determine what can and cannot be said, and what should and should not be done, with respect to issues of “remembering and forgetting” that shape and reflect strategic alignments in East and Southeast Asia.

Indeed, this volume analyzes how Japan, South and North Korea, China, Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, and the United States use memory and history to define their identities and their international relations. For example, as the chapters in this volume reveal, today’s international alignments between Japan and China or Japan and South Korea reflect sometimes volatile, technologically enhanced public opinion regarding deep-seated, emotionally charged issues of the past. Interpretations of history often force surprised and unprepared governments to deal with internal and external challenges to conventional views of memory and history on sensitive issues of national pride and international honor.

Although powerful, these are also subtle forces. In some cases, they sometimes appear to lie dormant, off the public stage, only to flare up unexpectedly with potentially far-reaching implications. For example,

in the context of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, two events challenged world public opinion regarding North and South Korea. In South Korea, according to the U.S. secretary of defense at the time, the concern that U.S. GIs fired on and killed South Korean civilians at the No Gun Ri bridge in that war could have precluded Seoul's ability to defend itself using U.S. troops stationed on South Korean soil. In North Korea, for the first time in a half century, the summit between South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il turned upside down 50-year-old images of North Korea and its top leaders, opening new debates about whether changes in form also mean Pyongyang is changing, or can change, in substance.

This volume's three sections explore how memory and history reflect larger issues and structures and their strategic implications. The first section examines the philosophical and practical roots of why and when memory becomes politicized (Stanzel), the divergent stereotypes of the United States held as part of global and local remembering (Sanger), and the factors that underlie East Asia's and Southeast Asia's "remembering and forgetting" issues and structures (Gong).

The volume's second section demarcates Sino-Japanese issues and structures by pairing chapters from Tokyo and Beijing (Okabe and Wu); Japanese-South Korean issues and structures by pairing chapters from Tokyo and Seoul (Izumi and Hahm and Kim); and Southeast Asian issues and structures with chapters from Jakarta (Sukma) and Kuala Lumpur (Baginda).

The volume's third section considers strategic implications of history and identity as memory and forgetting influence China's search for itself (Thurston) and the psychological aspects of Japan's security orientation (Muto). Important contributions in which the former ambassadors to the United States from Japan and from the Republic of Korea add their experiences and perspectives on issues, structures, and strategic implications of "remembering and forgetting" in East and Southeast Asia complete this volume.

This volume represents the third in a series generously sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation as part of an investigation of the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. The first volume in

this series, *The Role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific*, focused on global security trends, particularly as they influence Korean peninsula developments and thereby East and Southeast Asian, especially U.S.-Japanese, relations. The second volume in the series, *Southeast Asia's Changing Landscape*, focused on global economic and financial trends, particularly as they shape the causes and consequences of the Asian financial crisis as seen from the perspective of the countries hardest hit by the crisis.

A major project like this does not proceed without intellectual encouragement and financial support, including that of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, especially its president, Akira Iriyama, and its program officer, Dr. Sim-Yee Lau. The international conferences associated with this book series convened decisionmakers and specialists from different regions, backgrounds, and generations from East and Southeast Asia in Seoul, Bangkok, and Washington, D.C. These conferences were carefully conceived and executed by the dedicated members of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Asia Program. Over the past several years, these have included Karen Wong, Duncan Wrigley, Maratee Nalita, Stacey Murdock, Melissa Pitotti, Chie Igarashi, Robert Karem, Grace Chang, Mark Moore, William Oh, and Caroline Tranggono. Appreciation is also expressed to the CSIS Press and its director, Jim Dunton, and to project consultant Bernice Lee.

This volume is about asking the right questions, recognizing that answers are dynamic, not static. It is true that some things cannot and must not be forgotten. It is normal to remember things, particularly attitudes and actions, that must never be repeated. But it is also normal, over time, to forget—or at least to remember in a different way when the remembering continues over extended periods of time.

In some of these cases, the issue may not be so much remembering and forgetting as remembering and *not* remembering. When something cannot be forgotten but has been remembered and reconciled, when people are ready to move forward, such things can simply be “not remembered.” They are not forgotten. They simply cease to be the focus of conscious attention. They are remembered in a context of reconciliation within a passage of time.

To repeat, in cases where reconciliation has consciously occurred within the context of time's passage, history can reinvent itself. History can begin again, anew, on its old foundations but facing a new future. As it does so, it will transform national and international issues and decisionmaking structures. It will alter strategic alignments as remembering and forgetting concerns become pivotal points in charting the course of a new century.

Perhaps Nietzsche was right in saying, "In forgiving and forgetting, things that have happened can become undone." Or, as Volker Stanzel put it, "I wish that we not forget about the past, in order that the past may forget about us."



TREE of LIBERTY SOCIETY

PART ONE

ISSUES AND STRUCTURES



TREE *of* LIBERTY SOCIETY



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CHAPTER ONE

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

BUT WILL THE PAST FORGET ABOUT US?

Volker Stanzel

THE TITLE FOR THIS CHAPTER COMES FROM A RECENT WORK of popular culture; it is a phrase from the film *Magnolia*: “We may forget about the past—but will the past forget about us?” The film only paraphrases the well-known dictum by George Santayana: “Those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it.” Santayana obviously plays less to popular culture notions. He presupposes that repeating history is like hell, whereas the movie is less apodictic in that it asks a question without giving an answer. This is about as much as this chapter will try to achieve—ask questions. It will ask why in certain cases historical memory is employed for political ends, and why it is not in other cases. It will look at examples of the political usage of historical memory. Finally, it will try to determine what kind of connection there is between remembrance, forgiving, and forgetting. It will examine questions concerning Asia, but it will mainly draw on European experiences, because it would be preposterous to run the risk of treading carelessly in sensitive matters the author does not sufficiently understand.

The first question concerns myself. Am I not a case in point of the subject of this book? My father was born a member of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Portions of Czechoslovakia in which Germans constituted a majority were united with Germany by Hitler after the Munich Conference of 1938. Because Germans in Czechoslovakia desired to become a part of Germany, they supported Hitler.

VOLKER STANZEL is director of the Foreign Office in Germany.

After the war, the Czechs took the territory, and they took revenge. They passed laws that sentenced ethnic Germans to immediate expropriation and expulsion. Millions came to Germany without as much as a penny on them. The Czech laws are still in force today. What does my family's unjust and undeserved suffering mean to me today? Have I been deprived of something? Can I demand to be compensated—morally or materially—for the past suffering of my family? Conversely, my mother's side of the family comes from Frankfurt. My grandfather, because of his Christian beliefs, was "against Hitler," but he hardly can be said to have actively opposed him. He did not serve in the German army but continued to work in the town hall during Hitler's reign; he did not stand up when the Jewish temples burned. Ultimately, he too bears responsibility for what Hitler and the Nazis did to both Germans and non-Germans alike. What does that mean to me? Do I feel guilty? Do I feel the need to compensate Hitler's victims (morally, politically, or materially) for what was done to them?

I must admit that in neither way do I feel very much at all. Immanuel Kant said that repenting a deed is based on remembering it as a sensation of pain not dulled by the passage of time. In that sense, I do not repent the actions of my relatives. At the same time, I feel no sorrow for what happened to my family in Czechoslovakia; I bear no grudge. I grew up in a postwar West Germany that became more affluent by the year. Although they spoke often about their former home in present-day Czechoslovakia, my family never transmitted to me the feeling that we should rightly recover our lost home. They did not even pass down feelings of injustice for what had been done to them and which they had forgiven. The same is true of the tragic heritage of Hitler's Germany. During the 1950s and 1960s, the first extensive trials of concentration camp personnel were held in my hometown; such events made us acutely aware of what had happened during World War II. I understood very early on that the war was an inescapable political responsibility of a Germany of which I was a citizen. However, I never had the feeling that this had anything to do with the way I behaved to German Jews or non-German Jews with whom I had contact as a child. And I never felt the need or wish to be forgiven for the actions of my family or other Germans during the war.

Before falling victim to the temptation to pursue a lengthy self-analysis, let me shift gears. After World War II, a whole population was expelled from its homeland: Palestinians were expelled from their homes by the Israelis and found refuge in the camps of other parts of Palestine or, later, in other countries of the Middle East. After 50 years, these people still are aware of being refugees, of having their property expropriated, and of having suffered injustices for which they believe they must be compensated and that cannot be forgiven.

Recently in Europe we witnessed an amazing instance of unforgiven injustice. Some 600 years ago the Kosovo Albanians defeated the Serbs in a battle for Kosovo. Ever since then, the Albanians have settled there. The loss, however, has served over the centuries as a motivating factor that has helped to unify the Serbs. It gave—and gives—the Serbs a feeling of ethnic identity. After Yugoslavia fell apart, some Serbs felt it was time to erect an ethnically pure Serbian state. Many Serbs assumed that Kosovo would become a part of a new Greater Serbia and that Kosovar Albanians would simply have to leave the new state. Here, the megalomania of Slobodan Milosevich combined tragically with the ethnic nationalism of many Serbs. Because of the strength of ethnic nationalism in Serbia, there was little resistance to Milosevich's ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. We see a picture similar to the Palestinian predicament; the Serbians have kept a specific memory alive for many years, much longer, in fact, than the Palestinians have. Such an enduring memory became tragically important when the conditions for reprisal seemed right. Here, indeed, we might say even if the Albanians had forgotten the past, the past had not forgotten them!

We are examining a wide range of questions here. Why did the past play so little a role in the case of the Czechs and the Germans? Why did it play such a big role in the case of the Albanians and the Serbs or the Palestinians and the Israelis? Why is it that my aunt even today may break into tears when she speaks about the tragedy that befell her and other German minorities in Czechoslovakia, but would not even dream of demanding compensation for such injustices? And why, comparably, might a 70-year-old Palestinian woman pick up rocks to throw at the Israeli police, or a Kosovar Albanian woman

hurl insults at French soldiers protecting the Serbs on the other side of the street?

In a first effort to answer these questions, could it be that basic economics account for the difference? The Germans expelled to West Germany rose to an affluence they had never known before and would not have known had they remained in Communist Czechoslovakia. Palestinians, however, remain poor, and no one has made any great effort to assist them to develop economically. The Albanians were more affluent than the Serbs in Kosovo. The Serbs felt they were second-class citizens in a part of Yugoslavia in which they felt they should rightly be given precedence over the “foreigners” (the Albanians, who remained “foreigners” to the Serbs despite their control of Kosovo that extended over 600 years).

Here we come to another question: Does historical memory really still exist after 600 years, or even after only 60 years? What happens in our minds when time passes and memory turns into “history”? Can we simply assume that “remembering and forgetting” is unchanged by time, that is, with the passing of generations? In Europe, remembering the war increasingly becomes remembering how the war is remembered. We remember which words have been used before, which gestures, which arguments to remember the past. We do not remember the horrors of Verdun, but we remember the photograph of Chancellor Helmut Kohl taking the hand of President François Mitterrand at the graveyard of Verdun. We remember less and less the horrors of the last war, but we remember what an uproar it caused when President Ronald Reagan, upon the invitation of Chancellor Kohl, visited a World War II grave site in Bitburg where SS soldiers also lay buried. And those of us who have never been to war will remember vividly the scenes from *Saving Private Ryan*, or the holocaust scenes from a film like *Life is Beautiful*, which may or may not depict the truth of the atrocities committed at Auschwitz.

The generation that has experienced atrocities committed by another country passes away, but does the memory of those events die with it? If not, what strength does a memory have that has been transmitted to someone else? Is it kept awake by living circumstances? Is it a relation by hearsay, or a relation such as the passing of a torch? May

there be different memories with passing generations? How do the offspring of African-American slaves regard the “memories” that have been handed down to them, and how do the offspring of slaveholders regard their “memories”? Further, what about the memories of native Americans? How do memories change under the impact of different values that arise with the passage of time? My parents’ generation was raised under Hitler and went to war convinced their cause was justified. To them, May 8 will always remain a day of defeat. Later they learned to view Hitler as a criminal, but does that affect the way they feel about their youth? No, it does not. To my generation, however, conscious at an early age of the crimes Hitler committed, May 8 will always be the day of the liberation of Germany. On the basis of what kind of memory do we pass judgment? In what ways can memories that have been passed down from long ago be used?

There is an old story that elucidates much about motives of remembering and forgetting and that also illustrates the degree to which purely economic explanations may suffice. It is a story from the so-called Warring States period in China, that is, between 400 and 221 B.C. There, the king of Yue was defeated by a neighboring king and was then treated leniently by the victor, who permitted the former king of Yue to live comfortably. Yet, the former king refused to accept the humiliation of his defeat, and he hung a gall bladder over his desk and licked it every day so as to “taste the bitterness of defeat.” Indeed, he succeeded in not succumbing to comfort and affluence and eventually managed to make use of a suitable opportunity to go to war again and defeat his opponent. (It is not recounted whether he, in turn, allowed the defeated former victor to possess a gall bladder.)

With that story, and with the notion that there is more to remembering or forgetting than whether or not economic affluence diminishes the pains associated with memory, let me turn to Asia. Here, also, we know there are many instances in which memory plays a role in everyday politics. Not long ago, for example, U.S. secretary of defense William Cohen visited Vietnam. It was a visit that had been prepared for a long time. In an interview after his trip, Cohen made the point that he had been ready to visit Hanoi for a long time, but that Hanoi had not been ready to receive him. Even someone who does

not know much about U.S.-Vietnam relations will realize from Cohen's remark that there was something in the past that stands in the way of normal relations between the two countries even today. For Cohen, the Americans have now overcome that obstacle, but not the Vietnamese (so he says). Cohen, however, is not a disinterested third party; he is a representative of one side involved in and affected by the historical event. He cannot be expected to be neutral. His remark therefore is a reproach; it is a political use of memory. He accuses Vietnam of not yet having overcome the obstacle of the past, which stands between them. What is the purpose of his comment? Obviously, he turns Vietnam's historical memory against it. Granted, it is only a mild rebuke, but he clearly uses historical memory for purely political ends, and it appears unlikely that economic advantages had anything to do with Cohen's actions.

We all know what memory stands between the two countries. It is the memory of having been victimized. Extraordinarily, this is a memory both countries share, albeit in different ways. From Vietnam's point of view, in the 1960s the United States stepped into the shoes of the colonial power France and denied Vietnam its independence. From the point of view of the United States, North Vietnam acted in the tradition of Communist dictatorships in trying to rob South Vietnam of its freedom. In North Vietnam, there is the memory of the catastrophes wreaked upon the civilian population by American bombs; in the United States there is the memory of a whole generation of young people sucked into the Vietnam quagmire.

These are painful memories. Either side could easily "lick gall" and wait for an opportunity to retaliate for past humiliations. Politicians could pretend to have "licked gall" and demand compensation for damages incurred at the hands of their opponents. We indeed remember such efforts during the Cold War period, and reconciliation of these grievances has been excruciatingly slow. However, apart from the mild swipes taken by Mr. Cohen, and perhaps similar ones by his Vietnamese counterparts, today, 25 years after the war's end, both sides have refrained from explicitly using historical memories for political gain. Both countries seem to have opted to forget their grievances. Have they also opted to forgive?

The attempt to use history against a political partner (or adversary) is not rare. The last time President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to Japan, the trip had been carefully prepared, and Jiang had made it clear he expected a full apology for what Japan had done to China during the war. As it happened, the Japanese government refused to issue further apologies. Japanese officials argued that Japanese prime ministers had apologized in the past and that, in fact, during a previous visit to China the Japanese emperor had apologized for Japan's actions during World War II. This was more than enough from the viewpoint of the Japanese, but it clearly was insufficient from the perspective of Chinese leaders.

Such an excuse might have sufficed had not the Japanese prime minister in the same year used stronger words of regret to Korea than had previously been used in the case of China. Therefore, according to some observers, the Chinese leadership felt they deserved the same degree of apology as Korea. Conversely, the issue of Japanese apologies has always tended to weaken Japan's bargaining position relative to China in any bilateral dealings between the two states. Therefore, Jiang, like Cohen, may have wanted to use historical memory as a political instrument with which he could gain concessions from his Japanese partners. Economics do not appear to have been involved in Jiang's decision.

It is worthwhile to look at another instance of political usage of memory. In the 1950s, a delegation of the Socialist Party of Japan visited Mao Zedong. Mao in the course of the conversation said: "Forget what has happened between us. It was war. It is past now." Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek, the president of the Republic of China, formally decided not to press Japan for compensation or reparations of any kind after the war. Economics did not play a role in either case; China might well have received considerable material compensation from Japan. However, only much later, today, when China's economic situation has improved dramatically, does the past play a role it did not play before. Why? In the case of Vietnam and the United States or China and Japan, have leaders been licking gall bladders for many years?

The Sino-Japanese conflict (and similarly the Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Southeast Asian conflicts) over the role of remember-

ing the Pacific war is enormously complicated, both because they are not bilateral affairs and because the memory of victimization can be exploited in contradicting ways. If *kako no kokufuku* (dealing with the responsibilities of the past) is such a torturous matter in Japan, the reason may be twofold. For one thing, although the Japanese victimized others, there are Japanese who feel that they themselves were victimized much more horrendously by the American atomic bomb attacks. (Also, these attacks took place in Japan, while Japanese atrocities took place in faraway countries, something that probably makes a psychological difference.) In contrast, from the Japanese perspective, the Pacific war must be seen within the framework of the evolving Japan-U.S. conflict of the 1920s and 1930s for regional hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region. What America achieved by economic means, Japan tried to achieve by the same military means employed by the European colonial powers. From this perspective, when East Asian countries demand apologies from Japan, they misunderstand what Japanese atrocities were really about, and in a way—the hyperbole may be forgiven—even side with those who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When President Jiang last visited the United States, he made a commemorative stopover in Pearl Harbor and may have confirmed Japanese suspicions that Chinese leaders manipulate historical events for political gain. Thus, the philosopher Nishio has said that accepting the fact there had been comfort women is tantamount to accepting Japan's "terminal defeat." Needless to say, the non-Japanese East Asian perspective is entirely different. It is humiliating to be relegated to being a mere object of the American-Japanese rivalry because supposedly it is ever so more relevant. The tripartite complexity of the issue may explain why, after more than 50 years, the past in East Asia not only is something that politicians may easily turn into opportunist politics, but also is still something that can spur riotous demonstrations in China or Korea. Here, indeed, the past has not forgotten "us."

Sometimes, it so happens that memories from the distant past may lie dormant and then reappear. Let me look at a German example once more. Under Hitler, so-called enemies of the regime were forced to labor in factories: political opponents, German and non-German

Jews (many drawn from the concentration camps), Sinti and Roma, prisoners of war. After the war, West Germany compensated victims of Nazi persecution, including forced laborers. In the countries of the former Eastern bloc, these reparations were paid to governments rather than to individuals who had no chance to press their charges. In the West, forced laborers who did not receive compensation for other kinds of persecution constituted a small minority. Only after the end of the Cold War did it become possible for individuals in former Communist countries to press their charges. This set off a series of demands for compensation in the West as well. After years of negotiations involving claimants, companies formerly profiting from forced labor, and governments, the case of forced labor in Nazi Germany has only now been settled. A total of 10 billion DM, that is, U.S. \$5 billion will be distributed according to a complicated system, such as 22.51 percent to the Jewish Claims Conference, 21.29 percent to Ukrainian victims, and so forth. Here, it is clear that victims who had been neglected kept their memories alive until there was a time when they had the possibility to demand compensation, and, moreover, in the meantime they had not experienced an economic windfall that might have induced them to forget their terrible memories. Their rightful claims, however, had been forgotten by Germans (companies, the government, and the people alike) because general compensations had been paid.¹ It seems to make a difference whether atrocities in the past are remembered by the leaders of a country or by the people concerned. In the case of China-Japan and the United States-Vietnam, it was a matter of politicians remembering and turning their "memories" into politics. In the case of the forced labor victims, it was the people themselves who remembered. At the same time, the perpetrators had been neither governments nor identifiable individuals. Therefore, it was relatively easy to solve the problem without turning it into a matter of contention between the governments or the peoples concerned.

In the case of forced labor, the public in Germany conceded relatively quickly that there was a need for belated compensation. Remembering had a different effect only two years earlier. In 1998 an exhibition traveled around Germany. It was an exhibition of Nazi

atrocities in which the German army took part and that had not concerned actual war activities. The exhibition was followed by outrage: the German armed forces had always said that wartime criminal acts had been perpetrated by the Gestapo, the SS, and the SA, while the armed forces had remained "clean." Obviously, that had not been true. This discovery, however, was not accepted by many former soldiers (my father among them). Very often, the way we in Germany deal with our past is compared with the way the Japanese deal with their recent past. The above example shows that this comparison may be unfair. In the case of Germany, ordinary citizens and even soldiers were able to use Hitler and the Nazis as scapegoats: the Nazis were evil; the SS did the horrible things. The SA did—not me, not ordinary people, not ordinary soldiers. In the case of Japan there were no Nazis to blame. Atrocities like the Nanjing massacre were committed by ordinary soldiers. Remembering meant remembering one's own deeds or the deeds of people to whom one was close. The reaction of many Germans to the exhibition of army atrocities seems to prove that Germans also might have had a much harder time in coming to terms with their past had we not had the Nazis to blame.

The way the former members of the German armed forces reacted to the exhibition (and again that may be true as well to the way some Japanese react to books about Japanese wartime atrocities) confirms a well-known saying by Nietzsche: "I did that," my Memory says. "I could not have done that," my Pride says, and does not relent. Finally, my Memory gives in." We easily understand Nietzsche's point, because all of us probably have experienced our memory giving in to our pride. No one wants to suffocate from painful, embarrassing memories. We want to forget in order to start afresh. It is the fear of suffocating that induces the perpetrator of atrocities to push them out of his memory.

May we conclude from these observations that peoples (not people) live without memory, except if that memory is kept alive by certain factors? One's mind-set is determined by the conditions in which one lives. The victims of atrocities may forget—if not forgive—their experiences, if they become economically well off. The perpetrators of these atrocities have an interest in not suffocating

from their memories but to live on. They want to forget. In the case of international relations, however, as we have seen in the Japanese and Vietnamese examples, there is another factor that plays a role besides the feelings of the people directly involved. The memory of past suffering may be an instrument in the hands of politicians who prefer not to forget, but who want to keep memories alive as long as possible for political ends. Thus, they have a stick ready for any time it might come in handy to use against the perpetrator of atrocities. This is important. The nearer people are to the time of a painful memory, the more likely they are to request revenge, compensation, or an apology. The further away from that time they are, and if they are aided in forgetting by affluence and comfort, the less past hardships affect their decisionmaking. Not so in politics. It is too tempting, even if much time has passed, to make use of past guilt as an instrument with which to achieve a specific goal. At least as long as people may be mobilized, this "political" memory does not dim with the passage of time.

Having said this as a general rule, I have to admit that the degree of pain naturally plays a great role. Let us look at what happened in Austria with the appearance of Joerg Haider, the nationalist leader who managed to win almost 30 percent of the vote in the national elections and whose party thus achieved participation in a coalition government. The European Union's decision to impose sanctions on bilateral contacts with Austria came more than 50 years after the end of the Nazi rule, and it resulted not simply from the use of historical memory by European politicians, but rather was derived from Austria's neighbors' memory of the past. In Europe we have tried, I think it may be fair to say, to do what Nietzsche asked: "In forgiving and forgetting, things that have happened can become undone." If there is now a chance that, yes, the past may forget about us, it is only because we continue to manage to intertwine forgetting and forgiving.

I recall a statement the former ambassador of the Netherlands to Germany, later ambassador to the UN, has repeatedly made. He said that while for German children the lesson from the past is that Germany should never again initiate war, the lesson for the children of Germany's neighbors is that the best defense is a good offense. It was

an extremely slow process, but we have managed to draw the two positions closer to each other. When we discussed whether Serbian atrocities in Kosovo necessitated armed intervention, in Germany, like in our neighbors' countries, the arguments were influenced by the experiences of Auschwitz, which for Germans illustrate the need for zero tolerance of ethnic wars and the importance of immediate intervention. Remembering, forgiving, and forgetting of our own actions have become so intertwined that we now share a common purpose with our neighbors. Here we find what may be achieved once people begin to grasp fully what their history actually means, and that only once history is fully understood does it become a kind of productive remembrance. Active remembrance is what helps us overcome the dichotomy of fighting former conflicts over and over again in our memories or politics. Active remembrance may be a result of conscious political efforts, but mostly it is the result of the way a society deals with its memory. In Japan, for instance, witness the surprising fact that since the war, literature has become the major medium of remembrance.

Thus, we remember and relive our past through our memories; we turn memory into an element of international relations, and if we are successful it may be harmless or even—like in Europe—it may be the basis for more productive relations between peoples, or it may still do harm. After 600 years, Genghis Khan's atrocities do not induce a demand for revenge among the descendants of his former victims; however, the Albanian victory is still painful to bear for Serbian descendants after the same amount of time. Napoleon is not remembered as a villain in the countries that once suffered under him, but the British are still considered villains in present-day Ulster.

You might imagine the memory of the past as something you hang on your wall like a painting that conveys a warning to consider every time you look at it. It might be something with which to decorate your mind-set, it might evoke nostalgic longings—or it may taste as bitter as a gall bladder. Remembrance should, if used constructively, not be an object. It should be an action or a state of mind. It should also be the unrest gripping you when you see old ghosts from the past reappear—when, in Germany, we see young neo-Nazis beating up a foreigner, or when in Japan a government official states that Koreans

should have been grateful for the Japanese occupation, or when the mother of a boy killed in Tiananmen Square goes to a Beijing court, or when black churches are burned in the American South.

That inner unrest is not confined to one generation. It is the result of reflected memory, of active remembrance, of history understood. To recognize what went wrong in the past you do not have to have lived through it. It is a “lesson learned.” It will result in the ability to recognize dangers to civil, democratic societies, and in the resolution to stand up for their defense. In Europe we may call ourselves fortunate in having turned the old ghosts of past pain caused or suffered into friendly spirits guiding us to overcome the causes of past conflicts between our peoples. That is not something we could expect. When German soldiers in World War II marched into a small French town, the grandfather of a French friend of mine stood at the window and died from a heart attack on the spot. Hate was what we were used to between our peoples. As is well known, we have not always been fortunate (or skillful?) in dealing with our past. It is the hope of the author that the lesson we learned last century will last us for some time into the new one. I wish that we not forget about the past, in order that the past may forget about us.

The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author.

Note

1. A somewhat different story is the one of the Greek villagers, who, after observing the forced-labor debate, recently went to a Greek court and demanded that Germany be sentenced to pay compensation for damage done to their village during the war. Of course, they may have drawn their conclusions from the discussion over the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which was damaged by U.S. rockets during the Kosovo war and for which the U.S. government paid \$28 million in compensation.

CHAPTER TWO

REMEMBERING THE UNITED STATES

DIVERGING GLOBAL AND LOCAL MEMORIES?

David E. Sanger

THE WORLD RUNS ON STEREOTYPES, and the age of globalization has only worsened the trend. National stereotypes are, of course, the stuff of international interaction: they create the subtext of biases and prejudices that run through decisions as diverse as whether to lend money to Russia or whether to sanction Japan for hunting whales. The Cold War's end has meant that the power of stereotypes has risen: after all, they can be manipulated to offer nations a competitive edge, commercial or political.

By definition, stereotypes characterize—some caricaturize—generalities about countries and peoples. Stereotypes often have some basis in fact, at least some basis in past perceptions of fact. The crucial question of whether and how to change past images and past identities as countries and people forge new futures and new relations often arises as global and local realities confront each other.

Just think about this story, one that a colleague of mine at the *Times* and I have used frequently to describe how different nations of the world imagine their place, and their problems, in the global economy. It is the story of four gas stations.

We all know the American station. You pull up, pump the gas yourself, pay only \$1.50 a gallon. It's quick, it's efficient, it frees up America's labor for more useful work than pumping gas. Just don't

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expect any help or advice; your only interaction is likely to be with a glowing screen on the gas pump and a slot to take your credit card. The workers at the gas station sit behind bulletproof glass.

Then there's the European gas station. The gas costs \$7 a gallon, and the guy who pumps it works only 30 hours a week, and gets six weeks of vacation. He may not know much about cars, but at least someone's there to pretend he does. That is, if you are lucky enough to drive in when local laws don't require the station to be closed. If you run out of luck (or out of gas) you can always fill up on Monday. Except, of course, during August.

I used to live in Tokyo, where the gas stations are a real experience. The gas there is also \$7 a gallon, and four uniformed attendants rush out to clean your car while the gas is being pumped. They even empty the ashtrays, filling them with sweet-smelling pellets. But the economy has been dead in the water for nearly a decade, and everyone in Japan knows that one of the problems is that those gas station workers shouldn't be washing windows, they should be designing Japanese software for Windows 98. But the big Japanese electronics firms, which once hired with abandon, do not want to touch them: once they are members of the corporate family, they can never be downsized. And there is still precious little venture capital for them to start a business on their own. So they empty ashtrays.

And finally there is Russian gas station. The gas is only 50 cents a gallon. What a bargain! But it's all gone, because the attendants have sold it all on the black market for five bucks a gallon.

So there are all the stereotypes: The Americans prize their efficiency, the Europeans prize their lifestyle, the Japanese prize stability, even at the cost of letting new sectors of the economy flourish. And a funny thing happened to the Russians on the road to capitalism.

Right now, the American gas station is envied around the world. European and Asian politicians talk about reproducing America's economic magic, just as Americans picked apart the cogs of the Japanese miracle in the 1980s—when it still seemed miraculous. And yet, the American approach is deeply resented. Scratch just beneath the surface, and you discover that America is perceived around the world as using its primacy to impose American-style standards on the rest

of the world. And few doubt America's intent: It wants to create the world's markets and international rules in its image to bolster America's continued success.

Americans, of course, don't think that is their intent at all. In fact, they don't feel very powerful. When they think about the outside world these days—and they don't think about it often—it seems threatening, filled with terrorism or rogue states or unfair economic competitors. It hardly seems organized to their liking; indeed, it looks more chaotic than ever.

For many Americans, globalization and modernization are more synonymous than globalization and Americanization. America is changing too. And America's tradition of change, including as it relates to technology, may make the dislocations of past and future less jarring for many Americans.

But while Americans know that their economy has come to dominate the world, they don't view that economic power in the threatening context that non-Americans view it—an economy that is married to unchallenged military might and cultural hegemony. Americans, for example, look at world markets and see nothing but barriers to the free export of American goods. The rest of the world looks at those same markets and hears the sound of the Microsoft Windows operating system powering up on their PCs every morning. Americans view the global spread of the Internet as a wonderful advance but fear that it lets malicious viruses infect the country's networks. Non-Americans look at the Internet and see that half the world's e-mail addresses are in the United States, that the World Wide Web is written largely in English. All this may change, but for now the system seems like it is rigged to benefit Americans. Different historical memories and identities—by Americans about Americans and by others in the world about Americans—lie at the heart of these divergent perceptions. To change these perceptions may require making more open and transparent often different underlying historical approaches and perceptions.

This huge disparity of views about the nature and purposes of American power is the subtext of most of Washington's dealings with the world these days. Of course, it does not exist in an historical

vacuum. America has been the preeminent military power before, notably in the days after World War II. It has been a predominant economic power before: The long-brewing suspicions about American economic influence stretch back almost four decades, when Europeans warned of the spread of American multinationals. Long before the Internet existed, Canada complained that American television and magazines were smothering their culture, and Asians fretted over the spread of rock lyrics.

What's different now is the three-pronged combination of economic, military, and cultural power. Indeed, in various manifestations, the same revolution in information technologies seems to underpin U.S. economic, military, and cultural competitiveness. Now, as our electronic reach spreads around the globe, the suspicions of America's reach are even greater. The French have made a small industry of America-bashing on this point. Their biggest national hero in recent months is a fellow who torched a McDonald's and then turned his trial into a rant against the pernicious effects of foreign culture on things French. But the fears go far beyond French paranoia about the slow destruction of their culture.

This is, in short, the classic battle between "globalizers" and "localizers," and so far neither side has found much middle ground. In fact, they see the problem from opposite ends of the periscope. Americans see a puzzling anti-Americanism. The rest of the world envisions itself being forced to drive into American gas stations. To them, the "global" way seems to be the American way in disguise. And that seems threatening.

It is not just an inchoate fear. It quickly becomes very specific, and it is often used to explain the misfortunes of other nations. Not long ago a Japanese banker complained bitterly to me that Japan wouldn't have had a banking crisis if America had not forced its accounting standards down their throats. Why? He explains that under Japanese accounting practices, the banks could have kept the bad news to themselves until they solved the problem "privately." They would not have been forced to acknowledge that the price of the real estate on their books had dropped drastically, meaning that their assets were worth far less than they were admitting to shareholders and regulators.

Had this quiet fiction been allowed to continue, he argued, there would have been no banking crisis. Eventually, prices would have recovered. The problem would be gradually worked out, the Japanese way.

This, of course, seems laughable to Americans (and many Europeans). For years Japan has been insisting that it is a global player—and it is. Yet it did not want to play by global rules. But my banker friend's frustration is understandable when viewed in a longer historical context. Clearly to him the imposition of American accounting standards was an extension of the American rule making that defined the Occupation period that followed the end of World War II—the defining event for generations of Japanese. They were being forced to accept a system of someone else's making, to run their businesses by American rules instead of Japanese rules.

It was a particular shock because in the 1980s it seemed like a great reversal of fortune had taken place. Japanese rules reigned supreme. The rest of the world was beating a path to Japan's door to learn the secrets of its economy. Americans were fretting that they were being forced to adopt Japanese-style business practices. Many Americans were deeply unhappy about Japan's buying spree in Hollywood and the New York real estate market—there was even a suggestion that the Japanese purchase of an American baseball team would somehow change the game, siphoning the best players across the Pacific.

It wasn't just the Americans who were complaining: Southeast Asia both embraced and worried about the flood of Japanese investment. Naturally, memories of World War II were never far below the surface. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior minister, warned that expanding Japan's naval reach beyond its own waters was like giving "liquor chocolates to an alcoholic." In short, everyone was afraid that they were going to be forced to drive into the Japanese gas station, just as today they fear they are going to be pumping only American gas.

This is a useful reminder on several levels. First, the speed of Japan's fall from global preeminence is a reminder of how transitory economic power can be in a global economy. Second, it is a reminder that establishing global rules is a painfully slow process, and rarely can one nation dominate the rule making for long. Third, it is a testa-

ment to the power of historical memory: The Japanese hear about bank auditing rules and think about the Occupation; the Americans see Japanese investment around the world and crack nervous jokes about the next Greater Coprosperity Sphere.

But more important, these are battles between the localizers and the globalizers, between those who fear the loss of local autonomy and those who believe a global economy cannot thrive if it is run on different rules in every jurisdiction. It is a debate that is hardly limited to Japan and the United States. Importantly, while its surface manifestations are spoken of in terms of globalization, Americanization, and localization, what might really be at issue reflects deeper historical memories and perceptions that can give rise to widely divergent interpretations of the same events or issues.

It permeates every trade battle, every argument over whether the International Monetary Fund, which is viewed abroad as controlled by the U.S. Treasury, should be allowed to force a country to open its markets in return for aid. It is the subject of every battle inside the World Trade Organization. And sooner or later, historical memory and national stereotypes come into play in the seemingly arcane arguments over rules.

Look at today's China. It has agreed to sweeping openings of its markets to enter the World Trade Organization. That was the price of entering the club of trading nations. But before the ink was dry on its agreements with other nations about the terms of WTO entry, local governments and businesses throughout China were looking for ways to undermine the accord's affects on their business, or at least to delay the arrival of the foreign competition. Of course, they are motivated largely by competitive fears—China's car industry, for example, is terrified that the lifting of strict quotas on foreign autos and parts marks the end of their monopoly. They are probably right. But the arguments against foreign economic incursions are often cast in political and cultural terms.

This starts from the top. Conservatives in China's leadership fear, quite understandably, that an influx of competition from America or Europe or Japan will threaten the political stability of the Communist Party. It's a two-part argument. Part one has to do with the spread of

information technology. The Chinese leaders are acutely aware that President Bill Clinton sold the WTO deal to the American Congress partly on the argument that the spread of the Internet in China would diminish, and eventually wipe out, the Communist Party's ability to control its nation. President Clinton even laughed about it on several occasions, telling American audiences that if the Chinese believe they can control the Internet, he had two words for them: "Good luck." This argument was persuasive in the House of Representatives, which passed the China WTO legislation by a larger margin than expected. But one can only wonder how it resonated in the compound next to the Forbidden City, where China's leaders live.

The second argument against foreign investment is more urgent: the faster the competition arrives, the faster Chinese workers in uncompetitive industries will be cast out into the street. That is a fearsome prospect for a party whose sole legitimacy these days depends on continued economic growth. And they are right to worry. It is hard to keep workers employed at the grossly inefficient Mao Steel Works if China suddenly has to open its markets to far-lower-cost steel from abroad.

So how is China hoping to obstruct change? Partly by fueling the national distrust of Japan and the United States, dredging up a combination of ugly historical memories and current competitive urges. Japanese firms are often portrayed as giving Chinese consumers a raw deal; the reminders of Japan's occupation of China 60 years ago are never far from the surface. Just ask the Japanese car makers trying to get licenses to sell into the Chinese market. By comparison, the Americans have it easy. American cultural icons—movies, goods that offer a hint of New York style—are always big sellers. So, of course, is American technology. But as soon as American bombs accidentally wiped out the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the protestors in Beijing called for a boycott of American goods. And as soon as American imports threaten local Chinese industries, the backlash is sure to follow.

It is easy to dismiss such a backlash as the predictable reaction as a local economy goes global. Every country wants to preserve jobs; every country will make good political use of a cultural or economic "invasion" to justify protectionism. But as the Seattle protests in late

1999 showed, the backlash can quickly become hard to manage. Like a huge perceptual iceberg, such backlash may be founded on deep-rooted, long-term divergences in historical or current perception or memory that become manifest at key junctures where political, economic, security, or cultural values or approaches collide. After all, the deal to start a new round of global trade talks didn't collapse because of the protests in the streets; it collapsed because countries as diverse as India and France feared that the United States would use the negotiating process for its own economic advantage. Such parochial views outrage Americans, of course—American economic growth begins to slow, or global economic competition seems to favor someone else.

In the abstract, of course, Americans say that all they want is a “level playing field” in which the economy is globally competitive. Increasingly sophisticated about the workings of a global marketplace, they understand many more of the subtleties of creative destruction. While there is always hand-wringing about job upheaval, almost any sentient American (or one who, during the last administration, heard Bill Clinton on the evening news, repeating his mantra) knows that while jobs were eliminated, more than 20 million new ones were created.

But that reality does not insulate Americans from many of the resentments of the global economy that the rest of the world feels. The only difference is that abroad the troubles are blamed on Americans, and at home the troubles are blamed on foreign competition. Abstract concepts about the national benefits of American competitiveness recede when the rising level of imports force a factory closing. After all, the elimination of 200 jobs in one plant in Michigan creates a far bigger headline than the incremental addition of 1,000 new, high-tech jobs in factories across the country.

There is another wrinkle. Every factory closing fuels the stereotype of the global economy that is most prevalent in the United States: that this is an economy that benefits the rich and the mobile, but not ordinary workers. (That, of course, was the chant of the Seattle protestors—including Seattle port workers who, at first blush, would seem to have been the big winners from increased global trade.) This is not solely an American phenomenon. During the Asian financial crisis,

many Indonesians and Thai and others felt that the banks were bailed out, while the workers suffered. Mexicans felt the same in 1995, and to some extent, they feel that way today.

How does this melange of emotions—Americans feeling victimized by the global economy, and everyone else feeling victimized by America and the economy it dominates—affect international diplomacy?

First, it limits America's ability to mold events to its liking. This was evident during the Asian economic crisis. Many in Asia blamed the crisis on American pressure to open their capital markets prematurely, before regulatory structures were in place. In other words, they felt they were being forced to buy American gas when their vehicles were still running on kerosene.

Then, when the crisis occurred, Thailand and other nations complained that Washington was sitting by idly, letting them sink. Some suggested that Americans were happy to see Asia get a comeuppance. In Washington, naturally, the view was different. After the congressional uproar over the Mexican bailout, the U.S. Treasury felt that it was constrained to act, in part because another American-led bailout could worsen the Clinton administration's political problems on Capitol Hill. When it did act, it moved mostly through the IMF and the World Bank (after squashing an effort by Japan to set up an "Asian Monetary Fund"). Even after the money began to flow, the tension was exacerbated by a perception in Asia that the IMF's cure included medicine that seemed designed to make Washington, not Asia, feel better. The reforms included market openings for foreign (including American) goods and freer capital markets that would help Wall Street expand its reach.

All this led, naturally, to claims that America was attempting to develop a new form of financial imperialism. Washington, in Asia's view, was using the international institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO—to promote its own agenda. Almost no one in Washington saw it that way, of course. In fact, those same institutions were attacked in Congress as "out of control." The debate only subsided because the crisis itself subsided.

The Asian financial crisis exemplified how, at the height of its power, the United States is often constrained from using its influence.

Its very involvement raises suspicions about ulterior motives. That is one reason that the United States has taken such a behind-the-scenes role in the negotiations over the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Yet even with the United States keeping in the background, there have been renewed calls among students and others in South Korea for the United States to withdraw its troops—even before unification takes place. That is not likely to happen, and the South Korean government wants the American security guarantee to remain in place. But the emotion is telling. During the Asian crisis, many South Koreans feared their economy was vulnerable to American overinvolvement. Now, as the talks between North and South make surprising headway, there is a parallel fear that the United States will somehow try to maneuver events for its advantage.

This issue will rise again during the coming arguments over Washington's hopes for a theater missile defense that would guard against missile launches by rogue states. South Korea has long opposed the idea; it offers the South no protection against North Korea. The Japanese are lukewarm, fearing China's reaction. China sees the plan as another effort by the United States to gain nuclear hegemony, to say nothing of an effort by Washington to bolster Taiwan. Russia's opposition is clear, and the new president, Vladimir Putin, is doing his best to promote opposition in Europe.

None of this may dissuade the United States from going ahead. But it is critical to realize that much more is being debated than missile defenses. In the eyes of the world, theater missile defense is just the latest addition to America's economic, cultural, and military triple threat. And whenever in history countries have accumulated so much power so quickly, other countries have organized themselves to resist. There is no reason to believe that America's revival will evoke any different response.

CHAPTER THREE

A CLASH OF HISTORIES

"REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING" ISSUES, STRUCTURES, AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Gerrit W. Gong

THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR, AN ICY BIPOLAR POWER PARADIGM dominated the international political landscape, a thick layer of ideological tension covering many historical and cultural fissures. The Cold War's thaw brought not the end of history but its resurgence. Conflicts about the past now shape the future. In East Asia, 21st-century strategic alignments hinge on Cold War pasts involving Russia, Japan, China, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. At stake is not so much a clash of civilizations as a clash of histories. The battleground will be issues of "remembering and forgetting."

"Remembering and forgetting" issues are those that define what individuals and countries remember and when, as well as what individuals and countries forget and why. Transferring from generation to generation, "remembering and forgetting" issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give their countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that chart the future in the name of the past.

This chapter considers "remembering and forgetting" issues, structures, and strategic implications in three sections. The Issues section outlines five reasons why "remembering and forgetting" issues will be particularly important to Asia's strategic alignments. The Structures section analyzes some of the ways that "remembering and

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forgetting” issues are embedded within, and are thereby integral to, East and Southeast Asia’s political, economic, security, and cultural alignments. The Strategic Implications section details four aspects of how “remembering and forgetting” issues relate to the politics of reconciliation, technological change, global values (and class action lawsuits), and the concept of “normal country.”

ISSUES

“Remembering and forgetting” issues will be particularly important to Asia’s strategic alignments for five reasons. First, fundamental Cold War “issues of history” resolved elsewhere in the world, for example, Germany’s unification, have yet to be resolved in East Asia. This means changes in Asia related to remembering and forgetting concerns are likely to affect its basic structure. For example, Russia and Japan have no peace treaty or final resolution of the disputed Northern Territories; despite recent progress, North and South Korea have yet to establish a durable and permanent system of coexistence and peace; and Beijing and Taipei still confront issues rooted in history across the Taiwan Strait.

Second, Asia is rewriting its histories in ways that highlight “remembering and forgetting” divergences. These divergences sometimes connect Asia’s past pride and future achievements—a natural desire to recast history as one’s improving position allows. For example, some Asians in Singapore and Hong Kong proudly note that their per capita incomes exceed those in Great Britain, their former colonial power. Where most in the West have relegated colonialism to musty history books, many in Asia remember the struggle for national sovereignty and individual dignity. Even Hong Kong’s July 1, 1997, handover was celebrated in China and elsewhere as the end of the last formal vestige of European colonial rule in Asia.

To underscore, remembering and forgetting issues and structures lie at the heart of national identity and national objectives. They do so in part because, in defining national self-perception, these national “mystic cords of memory”—to recall Abraham Lincoln’s phrasing—form a creative nexus of past and future. And these points—past and

future—do not define a line; together with time, they suggest a multi-dimensional space that shapes national strategic alignment. Put another way, remembering and forgetting issues and structures help define perception, mobilization of national will and resources, and implementation of strategic orientation.

Third, the United States has a different sense of history than most countries in Europe or Asia. Often the American sense of history is too short; particularly in parts of Asia, memory may be too long.

The American tradition of continuing immigration gives the United States a melting pot, new-world identity, instead of a single old-world identity. American national myths suggest that Americans often look forward in ways that emphasize future more than past. U.S. decisionmakers, looking for new and better ideas and approaches, cycle through government in two-year congressional, four-year presidential, and six-year senatorial terms. The Silicon Valley notion that it is better to fund a start-up with individuals who have been bankrupt at least once rather than those without that learning experience is perhaps the extreme case of the U.S. penchant toward constructive destruction, a constant reinvention that provokes both bafflement and admiration from elsewhere around the world.

While the U.S. tendency to look forward can be liberating, it can also create divergent perspectives on issues of importance to others whose historical perspectives can be quite different. This goes well beyond assertions that Americans need more historical sense and greater ability to see issues as others do; it suggests that the notion of avoiding entangling alliances bespeaks a continental country that has seen itself reluctantly drawn into a balancing of power in Europe after 1871, with Germany's unification and rise, and, earlier, in Asia after 1868, with Japan's modernization and rise.

Where strategic alignments reflect historical memory, differences in American and Asian approaches to memory and history can highlight remembering and forgetting concerns.

Fourth, especially today, accelerated media free flow and pluralized public attitudes bring past issues to the attention of the public ever faster. The interplay of new technologies and abiding issues of perception and identity expressed in the language and vocabulary of

remembering and forgetting issues create new strategic challenges. These processes derive from the globalizing and democratizing qualities of evolving technologies, including the Internet, direct broadcast and cable television, and so forth. The tremendous storage and retrieval capabilities of current information technologies also transcend familiar parameters of time and space. A searing picture of a Chinese man in front of a tank can become part of an American public consciousness, thereby to be retrieved and invoked at any time, even as its interpretation may diverge through time with different audiences.

Not unexpectedly, the combination of democratization of information retrieval and discussion can bring issues forward in different historical and international contexts. For example, emotional South Korean concerns during a year of Korean War anniversaries focused on what U.S. troops may have done at the bridge at No Gun Ri during that war. While not new, this issue was not resolved earlier when more authoritarian Korean regimes did not allow it public voice or debate. Today, careful, more open discussion has underscored three elements: first, the need for mutually recognized context, that is, early battles in a fast-moving war with inexperienced U.S. troops trying to maintain difficult positions; second, the cathartic and potentially healing opportunity to establish historical facts (which are still being debated), for example, whether shots were first fired from beneath the bridge at No Gun Ri at U.S. positions; and, third, the necessary but sensitive process of determining what if any kind of recognition or compensation is appropriate.

Fifth, while the popular expression regarding significant financial and economic, political, and security trends will continue to shift, the most important of these will be expressed in terms of fundamental self-perception and orientation to history and the future—in terms of “remembering and forgetting.”

Thus, conventional wisdom speaks of China, Japan, the Koreans, and other countries in Asia taking longer historical perspectives. Yet, precisely for this reason, among the revolutions of the future, the most challenging will be the revolution in perception management. Unlike the revolutions in military affairs and financial affairs, the

revolution in perception management will depend most on nonmaterial psychological and perceptual factors. It will reflect divergent histories, cultures, and national purposes.

STRUCTURES

Remembering and forgetting structures exist within countries, shaping how issues of the past affect policy. For example, Japan's political establishment has limited the scope of Tokyo's apologies for World War II actions in part to maintain respect for Japanese citizens who fought and died in the Pacific war at what they considered their emperor's request. Remembering and forgetting structures also reflect the way "issues of history" help define relations, for example, between Japan and China, Japan and Korea, South and North Korea, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and so forth.

Indeed, potential strategic realignment in East Asia is structured by relationships often expressed in historical terms. Among them:

- *The role of the United States in the region.* This includes how different approaches and models of globalization reflect comprehensive national strength as evident in the revolutions in information technologies and their concomitant revolutions in military, financial, and political/perceptual management affairs.
- *Korean Peninsula relations.* Relations between the two Koreas, especially regarding the ability of North and South Korea to unify by whatever model in whatever time frame, still reflect lessons from German unification. Main challenges to Korean unification still include issues of truth and reconciliation relating to the Korean War, the responsibility (or not) of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and other senior North Koreans for the Rangoon bombing, ax murders, and so forth.
- *Relations between South Korea and Japan.* Particularly after the 1998 Kim-Obuchi blueprint for the twenty-first century, Seoul and Tokyo are seeking to establish a gradual strategic reconciliation relationship that gives a practical strategic edge to what some consider the otherwise overly idealist "sunshine approach."

- *Relations in Southeast Asia.* Memories linger of the Asian financial crisis and of leadership succession. These memories include questions of truth and reconciliation regarding Suharto and the Suharto family legacy. They also raise questions about the longer-term future of ASEAN (which some say has been destroyed by the financial crisis), including the domestic base (economic model, self-perception) of the various ASEAN countries and their alignment, including alignment with Japan, China, and the United States.
- *Chinese nationalism.* Issues of Chinese nationalism involve complex Chinese feelings of superiority and inferiority. Such concerns undergird China's earlier self-concept as the Middle Kingdom, China's struggles to modernize, and current quandaries such as Taiwan (taken by Japan after it defeated China in the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War) and theater missile defense.
- *The question of cultural reconciliation and identity in Taiwan,* particularly as it relates to cross-strait relations.
- *Relations between China and Japan.* The relationship between China and Japan is central to Asia's strategic alignments. China-Japan relations reflect divergent nationalisms rooted in formative experiences dating to the late-nineteenth-century clash of a Meiji-modernizing Japan and a still-weak Qing China. The reverberations of two countries that each saw itself as a victim (though in quite different ways) in a hostile international system are still manifest in contemporary undertones regarding the status of Taiwan within U.S.-Japan defense guidelines and possible approaches to theater missile defense.

Sino-Japanese competition has also evolved. It now includes a structural financial dimension, a play for influence in Southeast Asia, continuing competition on the Korean Peninsula, and modern concerns for alternative Taiwan's future.

The old Chinese strategy has run its course with Japan. The new Japanese generation is increasingly cynical about Chinese demands for compensation for history, often seeing such as evidence of Chinese weakness. This strikes those in China who bear

the scars of the Pacific war in living memory as evidence of bad Japanese faith. In other words, time is not healing but will increase the challenges of memory.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The first implication is that strategic alignments will increasingly turn on history. The past has become a negotiating tool, altering strategic alliances. Key relationships, such as those among China, Japan, North and South Korea, and the United States, are calibrated in part by the juxtaposition of history and strategic interest. Issues of history can thus become an international vocabulary to describe subtly shifting strategic alignments during coming periods of watershed change.

The second implication is that modern technologies digitally enhance memory and thereby broadcast the most passionate concerns and the most polarized perceptions. These are often remembering and forgetting issues that go to the core of individual and country identity and thereby channel strategic alignment.

New technologies make it possible to play and replay our worst nightmares, through broadcast media and cyberspace, with an expanding global and intimately personal reach. Local and global courts of public opinion adjudicate a new range of past grievances. In Asia and elsewhere, companies and countries should prepare to be surprised by the intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance that remembering and forgetting issues exhibit. It also means that policymakers can be ambushed by any event, invoking any version of history. If ever histories and issues of remembering and forgetting were the monopoly of the elite and their instruments of manipulation, those issues and choices are now open to all, and governments are incapable of blocking that tide.

The third implication is that countries and individuals are increasingly seeking redress or reconciliation for past wrongs, the process of which helps (or does not) structure their bilateral and regional alignments. This process demonstrates the increasingly important role of public opinion in bilateral policies, where deeply held public feelings

regarding issues of history can represent a sometimes unknown variable in relations, for example, between Japan and China.

“Issues of history” include continued concern regarding Japan’s “Rape of Nanjing” as part of its brutal wartime occupation of China as well as its earlier colonialization of Korea and Manchuria, China’s civil war, the February 28 incident in Taiwan,¹ allegations of the U.S. use of Agent Orange in Vietnam and the Philippines, demands for compensation from the United States for victims at No Gun Ri, depiction of World War II in Japanese textbooks, and Japanese restitution for forced laborers and “comfort women.”

As cosmopolitan standards of civilization globalize remembering and forgetting issues and values, the stakes for companies and countries increase as remembering and forgetting issues in one region inspire similar concerns elsewhere. And the stakes are becoming very high. These are economic, not military, resolutions, at once a measure of international integration as well as the depth of differences within and among countries.

The fourth implication is that remembering and forgetting concerns are shaping domestic debates in Berlin, Tokyo, and Beijing regarding what it means for Germany, Japan, or China to be a “normal country” in today’s international system. These domestic debates parallel international discussion regarding the regional role and bilateral relations among the great powers, involving Germany, Japan, and China with their neighbors and with the United States.

Let us elaborate on these four strategic implications in turn.

Strategic Alignments Turn on History: Politics of Reconciliation

Consider how central “remembering and forgetting” descriptions are in the subtle and not-so-subtle shifts in the structure of strategic alignment between Japan and South Korea. During Republic of Korea president Kim Dae-jung’s official visit to Japan in October 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi acknowledged that “Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule.” He further expressed in written terms “deep remorse and heartfelt apology.”²

President Kim accepted Prime Minister Obuchi's written apology. "Both countries," President Kim said, must "overcome their unfortunate history and . . . build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation."³

This explicit acknowledgment of past wrongs and the public effort toward historical reconciliation improved Japan-South Korean relations and broadened future Korea-Japan common ground. It subtly shifted Northeast Asia's strategic alignment by undermining the conventional wisdom that a uniting or united Korea must inevitably find its identity in a nationalistic anti-Japanese colonial past and must therefore tilt away from Tokyo and possibly from Washington. In contrast, Tokyo and Beijing have yet to reconcile fully. Just a month after President Kim Dae-jung's official visit to Tokyo, Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited Japan, receiving an "expression of remorse" but no written Japanese apology.

No doubt a shared desire not to repeat President Jiang Zemin's impasse on questions of history motivated Beijing and Tokyo to take a different approach when Premier Zhu Rongji visited Japan in October 2000. Even while playing down issues of history, Mr. Zhu stated Japan had not yet apologized.

The controversy surrounding potential U.S. military responsibility at No Gun Ri and North Korea chairman Kim Jong-il's surprise personal role in the South-North summit to rewrite Korean war memories both highlight the use of memory at a pivotal historical juncture to change fundamental public perceptions—in this case, the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Planned commemorations of this anniversary focused public attention in South Korea and among U.S. veterans groups on the simmering contention that in late July 1950 U.S. GIs fired on and killed South Korean civilians hiding under a bridge at No Gun Ri (and in some other locations). Especially in South Korea, some individuals have argued that earlier South Korean military governments refused to hear the truth regarding No Gun Ri and related issues, let alone determine any acceptable justice.

The No Gun Ri controversy underscores the need for context in public opinion debate. South Korean popular sentiment has recognized that the fog of war at the outbreak of the Korean War was real

and confusing for those trying to distinguish North Korean infiltrators from South Korean civilians. Koreans understand the U.S. commitment to South Korean freedom was paid for in the blood of U.S. soldiers who fought on the Korean Peninsula. Koreans admit how hard it is to judge yesterday in the context of what is known today. And many Koreans see the process of revealing past wrongs and injustices as a means of moving beyond them. Balancing recognition of past wrongs with compensation in its varying forms is important. However, compensation claims must be dealt with appropriately so as not to demean, misconstrue, or be manipulated by them.

It was, of course, no coincidence that Kim Jong-il chose the time immediately before the fiftieth Korean War anniversary commemoration to dramatize a new image of himself and of North Korea. Long-held South Korean perceptions were directly challenged by the widely broadcast scenes from the moment South Korean president Kim Dae-jung arrived on June 13, 2000, in North Korea's capital. There in Pyongyang was the red carpet and welcoming crowd, the prominent display of the Republic of Korea's national flag on President Kim's private aircraft, and, of course, North Korea chairman Kim Jong-il's in-person greeting hugs. Simply by personally appearing on the tarmac at Pyongyang to greet President Kim Dae-jung and by riding amicably together in the same car as part of the six hours the two senior leaders would spend together, Chairman Kim used the next three days to change completely the perceptual and rhetorical impression of himself and North Korea.⁴

None of this yet adds up to fundamental change in North Korea's economic and security policy. Paradoxically, Pyongyang's domestic challenges may sharpen, not in spite of, but because of, the conditions of peaceful coexistence. To paraphrase Alexis de Tocqueville, the most perilous moment for an authoritarian government is when it seeks to reform. And how North and South Korea address responsibility for the past (war, terrorism, nuclear processing, missile development) will help determine where and how many U.S. troops remain on the Korean Peninsula and what strategic alignment will hold sway between South and North Korea, as well as

among the Koreans and their Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and American neighbors.

Thus, one can trace the policy roots of Secretary Madeleine Albright's October 2000 trip to Pyongyang—the highest-level U.S.–North Korea exchange in 50 years—to the October 1998 written Japanese apology that South Korea accepted for past historical suffering. Seoul's and Tokyo's efforts at historical reconciliation facilitated President Kim Dae-jung's and Chairman Kim Jung-il's June 13–15, 2000, South-North inter-Korean summit and the subsequent October 9–12, 2000, visit to Washington by North Korea special envoy Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok and the October visit to Pyongyang by Secretary Albright.

Technologies and Strategic Alignment: Surprised by the Past

Modern digital and Internet technologies allow images and sounds to be played repeatedly and over great distances. They bring together images and sounds that give remembering and forgetting issues surprising intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance. Consider the accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade or the hacker attacks on Japanese government Web sites to protest an Osaka conference on the Rape of Nanjing.

The accidental U.S. bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade forcibly demonstrated that in some matters of history, Chinese memory is too long while U.S. memory is too short.

In May 1999, a B-2 bomber lifted off from the 509th bomber wing in Whitman Air Force base in Missouri. It can carry 16 2,000-pound GPS (global-positioning system) aided munitions. Each has a circle error probability of 20 feet even when dropped from 50,000 feet. This particular B-2 carried six weapons. Five were released against a single target, exploding at 11:50 P.M. on Friday, May 7, 1999. The impact area turned out to be the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Belgrade.

The news of the bombing traveled first by Internet, straight from Europe to China's students. Angry, students mobilized. Behind the national mood curve, the PRC government was forced to react to nationalistic contentions that the United States had deliberately destroyed a sovereign diplomatic structure in a direct affront to China.

In protest, pro-Chinese “hackers” from Hong Kong and others reportedly placed skull-and-crossbones images on the White House public Web site and shut down the Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, National Park Service, and other official U.S. government Web sites. According to another account, Chinese “hackers” replaced the homepage text of the U.S. embassy in Beijing with five Chinese characters reading, “Down with the barbarians.”⁵

No doubt the PRC government noted carefully that Chinese students and others used available Web and other communications channels to attack official Chinese government Web sites and to sharply criticize Chinese official corruption as well as Beijing’s perceived weak governmental response to the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade. This combination of globally sourced cybernews and multidimensional cyber attacks underscores how unpredictable emotionally charged remembering and forgetting issues, coupled with new technologies, have already become.

China sought the intent and meaning of the bombing in its past. In that past, some in China saw a history of gunboat diplomacy promoting Western commercial penetration and exploitation. Some labeled Premier Zhu Rongji’s efforts to bring China into the World Trade Organization treasonous. Chinese defense planners worry that younger Western leaders like British prime minister Tony Blair or former U.S. president Bill Clinton in his day may use humanitarian concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan to justify military threats to China’s militarily undefended Three Gorges dam: if attacked, a burst Three Gorges dam would unleash a tidal torrent inundating hundreds of thousand of civilians downstream.

The sharp divergence of U.S. and Chinese perceptions, particularly at the popular level, is a disturbing reminder that global movements of information, capital, and technology may knit us into one world—but one that still has fundamental misunderstandings and misperceptions at its core. Indeed, the global speed of change, combined with divergent historical prisms, may in some cases accelerate international misunderstanding and crisis.

The potent combination of new technologies and deep-rooted historical discrepancies was highlighted as part of the ongoing, highly

political debate between Sino-Japanese interpretations of history. To protest a Japanese citizens' group seeking to convene a January 23, 2000, conference on a sensitive historical issue, hackers attacked official Japanese government Web sites, using anti-Japanese graffiti written in Chinese characters. The conference was called "Verification of the Rape of Nanjing: The Biggest Lie of the 20th Century." The venue was a public auditorium in Osaka.

Although these Web site attacks used rudimentary techniques, they increased Japan's sense of cyber vulnerability and subsequent focus on national cyber security. What began as a group of private Japanese citizens seeking to hold a controversial conference sparked a strong emotional and technological response by what was apparently a Chinese individual acting alone. Yet the issue quickly became a high-level Sino-Japanese matter requiring the personal involvement of Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan and a comparable level of response by Japan's foreign ministry.

Remembering and Forgetting: Popular Attitudes and Global Values

The third "remembering and forgetting" implication for strategic alignment revolves around a dual reality. Each people and country must interpret its past and future within its own unique context, free from external judgment by other peoples and countries. At the same time, continued global expressions regarding past and future justice and other values increasingly link public attitudes, legal precedents, and public policy concerns. This has been true concerning public approaches to remedies for remembering and forgetting issues in Germany, Japan, and the United States. The willingness to overlook traditional sovereign boundaries in the name of political ethical imperatives underscores how deep-rooted international standards of nondiscrimination and international standards opposing crimes against humanity have become in Europe and elsewhere—and that these issues of historical memory are inevitable expressed in remembering and forgetting terms.

In Germany, the politically successful articulation of foreign policy has required a careful calibration of domestic and international atti-

tudes regarding remembering and forgetting issues. A dramatic (and controversial) example of the nexus of domestic and international issues and of the past and future concerns coming together in German foreign policy occurred during the Kosovo war. Flanked by a supportive U.S. secretary of state, Germany's foreign minister gave "No more Auschwitzes" as a justification for Berlin's involvement with the allied war efforts in the spring of 1999. On the one hand, this statement reiterated that modern Germany's foreign policy is constrained by the memory of Nazi Germany's egregious racial and ethnic discrimination, including, at its extreme, genocide. On the other hand, this statement argues that modern Germany's adherence to a contemporary international standard of nondiscrimination can justify, even compel, Berlin's participation in contemporary efforts, even involving war, to limit genocide or ethnic cleansing in Europe.

Germany's ability to involve itself in out-of-area operations included sending technical and logistics support troops to Somalia in 1992–1993 as part of the U.S.-led effort under the legal umbrella of a United Nations Security Council resolution. In summer 1994, Germany's Supreme Court ruled that German forces could join the alliance for collective defense (i.e., under NATO auspices) and could do everything required of an alliance member—all subject to German parliament majority consent. And no German doubts that it was politically easier for a left-oriented, Green Party foreign minister than for a conservative government official to appeal for left-wing support by a statement renouncing any future Auschwitz as justification for German out-of-area military involvement.

In the European Union, a shared standard of European civilization similarly gave rise to the extended concern that no one connected with Nazi crimes against humanity be given political standing. More specifically, it provided compelling motivation for 14 European Union countries to withhold recognition of the otherwise democratic election of an extreme right-wing individual in Austria's elections. For example, significant class action legal suits regarding slave and forced labor have resulted in a DM \$10 billion (U.S. \$4.48 billion) settlement in Germany and a ¥500 million (U.S. \$4.6 million) settlement in Japan. In the German case, roughly 15,000 slave laborers (i.e.,

those forced to work while in a concentration camp) will be compensated. In the Japanese case, the first for a violation of international law with implications for the estimated 50,000 Chinese forced to work in Japan during the war, Japan's largest general contractor, the Kajima Corporation, will compensate some 986 Chinese wartime laborers taken to work at its Hanaoka copper mine and their survivors.⁶

But questions remain. Is justice finally being served so the future moves away from the past? Is the "legal peace" the German government and German corporations think they have negotiated regarding slave and forced labor enduring and enforceable? Do these settlements establish precedents for Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, Americans, and others to begin litigation? Is public outcry about fresh historical concerns only beginning?

Memory, History, and the Concept of "Normal Country"

In Berlin, Tokyo, and Beijing, one can feel remembering and forgetting issues, including what it means to be a "normal country," shaping the domestic debate and thereby the respective international strategic trajectories of Germany, Japan, and China.

A German colleague recently analyzed the coverage of Germany in a diverse sampling of major U.S. media and publications. Surprisingly, 12 percent of U.S. print coverage deals with the holocaust or related issues. The holocaust often receives more coverage than contemporary German politics. Over two-thirds of books dealing with Germany currently available on U.S. bookshelves cover only 12 years of German history. He says the U.S. coverage of Germany remembers only parts of the past. "To be stable," my German colleague said, "a society must have individuals proud of their country, including its past. We must not forget, and we will not forget, but we must also be free to have a normal future, to escape any time warp that destines us to live in a past we left long ago." In conclusion, he said, "We want to be normal. It is time for us to be normal."

The George W. Bush administration is seen by many as encouraging (or being interpreted by some in Japan as encouraging) Japan to become a "normal country." Such a process of "normalization" will

require a reconciliation of Japan's self-image with the images its neighbors hold of Japan's past. This will entail an intensified domestic debate on the constitutional interpretation of Article 9 as a prelude (or not) to Tokyo modestly broadening its self-defense capabilities and responsibilities. Such will likely deepen divergence as a generational shift occurs in Japan regarding historical responsibility and as rising nationalism in China points to greater Sino-Japanese differences on the role of history in their mutual strategic alignments.

In his *Blueprint for a New Japan*, Ichiro Ozawa pioneered discussion on what "normal nation" status might mean for Tokyo.⁷ He defined a "normal nation" as one that, first, "willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community," especially "where national security is concerned," and, second, "cooperates fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people."⁸ One can imagine a third requirement: a normal country establishes a healthy equilibrium of memory and history as perceived internally and externally by which to maintain strategic alignment with its neighbors.

Potential divergence between domestic pressures for Japan to establish itself as a "normal country" and domestic pressures for China to replace a faded ideology with rising nationalism could yet become a major factor of instability in East Asia. At the heart of such potentially divergent nationalisms are dramatically different interpretations of the past. In particular, a rising, nationalistic younger generation in Japan may feel less responsible for actions from which it is increasingly distant in time. In contrast, a rising, nationalistic younger generation in China may feel increasing anger over what it perceives as Japanese unwillingness to accept historical responsibility. Paradoxically, those who did not experience past tragedies may see them in even starker terms than those who actually lived through them and who recognize even their horrors in less than completely black-and-white terms.

That some countries look for their futures in their pasts while other countries look for their pasts in their futures raises a conundrum, particularly for Sino-U.S. relations. As the efforts to settle the bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade forcefully demonstrated,

Beijing and Washington need ways to listen to both the vocabulary and the implications for strategic alignment that issues of history will raise in their mutual relations.

In the case of China, overreliance on history to provide national legitimization could challenge the ability of any Chinese government to satisfy its own people or to engage easily internationally. Chinese oversensitivity to issues of past grievance may make the PRC overly prone to perceive international offense. The democratizing reach of new information technologies in China could unleash populist xenophobic nationalism regarding sensitive historical issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, as well as regarding historical relations with Russia, the Koreas, India, Kazakhstan and the central Asian “-stans,” and the United States. The hope lies in China writing its modern history in a way that outlines a constructive path to a desirable and achievable future. This includes Beijing’s means and timetables for asserting its recognized sovereign claims and territorial integrity.

All this underscores that a broad veneer of cosmopolitan convenience and culture hides deeper memories and patterns based on different ways of remembering, forgetting, and forgiving—not only in East Asia and Europe but also elsewhere where historical interpretation will channel international roles.

CONCLUSION

“Remembering and forgetting” issues are here to stay. A nation’s history is not merely a recounting of its past. What individuals and countries remember and what they forget and why are telling indicators of current values, perceptions, even aspirations. These remembering and forgetting issues may be as important as (though not entirely separate from) economic, political, or strategic factors in predicting a country’s strategic alignment and future direction.

These issues will shape the future—a future in which leading-edge strategic alignments in East Asia, Europe, and elsewhere pivot on issues of history; a future in which new technologies will empower disgruntled individuals to hold countries and companies hostage to

presumed forgotten pasts; a future where how peoples and countries remember and forget will structure the international system, including by defining “normal” status and thereby acceptable international roles for capitals as important as Berlin, Tokyo, and Beijing.

Notes

1. On February 28, 1947, Chinese mainlanders killed native Taiwanese in Taiwan in what has since become known as the “February 28 Incident.”
2. See Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the 21st Century, available at www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.
3. Ibid.
4. See, for example, Dong Bok-lee, “Inter-Korean Summitry: Another Indian Game of Elephant Versus Blind People?” *Korea and World Affairs* 24, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 207–27.
5. See, for example, Gary Chen, “Chinese Websites Buzz with Anti-U.S. Chat as Hackers Attack Official U.S. Sites,” *China OnLine*, May 10, 1999.
6. Stephanie Strom, “Fund for Wartime Slaves Set Up in Japan,” *New York Times*, November 29, 2000.
7. The term “normal country” may itself unsatisfactorily imply an overly narrow historical stigmatization.
8. Ozawa, Ichiro, *Blueprint for a New Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1994), p. 95.



~ TREE *of* LIBERTY SOCIETY

PART TWO

REGIONAL ISSUES AND STRUCTURES



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CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Tatsumi Okabe

CONSIDER FOUR CATEGORIES OF HISTORICAL REMEMBERING and forgetting, drawn from a 2×2 matrix composed of rational/emotional and personal/collective columns. A typical example of rational collective remembering and forgetting is the academic study of history. Scholars attempt to remember the past; historians and archaeologists uncover and examine even forgotten events. Most individuals rationally remember and unintentionally forget the past. Typical emotional remembering and forgetting is a personal means of approaching the past. Here, remembering personal and familial tragic experiences is most typical of this type of memory. Friends and acquaintances also remember and forget events rationally, according to the seriousness of the event or distance from the victim. Others may remember an event if it is particularly sensational.

The last and most important type is collective emotional memory. The most common example of this mode of remembrance is national emotional remembering and forgetting. National emotional memory is often used politically; pride, humiliation, and other feelings play important roles in nationalism and other political activities. The intensity of such collective emotional remembering is influenced by the following factors:

1. the degree to which the memory involves feelings of misery;

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2. whether the national political culture is highly collective or unified;
3. in the case of war, whether the “remembering” nation was a victor or a loser;
4. whether the act of remembering is pursued intentionally (this is closely related to the political nature of the remembering);
5. the degree of subjectivity of responsibilities of the concerned persons or collectives; and
6. the length of time since the remembered event.

It is important to separate the modes and factors related to the intensity of remembering and forgetting from each other in order meaningfully to study the Sino-Japanese case. Rational, academic cooperation between historians of these two countries has already started on events that occurred decades ago, but many of these events are not politically controversial. The most recent historical event that has been jointly studied is the modernization policy of the Kuomintang government in China.¹ Neither Japan nor the People's Republic of China (PRC) participated in the event, and 60 years have muted emotions associated with it. Both sides can approach history from a rational and objective perspective; neither side was a winner or loser in this event. Such a subject commonly makes for a scholarly project. Examining the Nanjing Incident, however, is the most difficult task facing Chinese and Japanese scholars. It will remain so for decades to come.

Memories of the Sino-Japanese war are still highly emotional. Very few wartime events have been forgotten. Atrocities during the war, such as those that occurred in Nanjing, are the major focus of remembering and the remaining impetus of resentment. For the Chinese, the memories of such events evoke great misery. Even though the Chinese defeated the Japanese in the war, the Chinese sense of victory was entirely different from that of the Americans. Chinese leaders have called the victory “a miserable victory (*can sheng*).” The fact that the Chinese technically won the war and still experienced such pain makes its memory extremely intense. Those defeated in war cannot openly com-

plain about their misery, because in the logic of war, such misery is interpreted as being brought about by the losers themselves. A victor, having experienced great misery en route to victory, is often resentful and likely to denounce the loser as strongly as possible. The loser must apologize or remain silent, even if it is not solely responsible for the historical event.

JAPAN IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

A complicating factor in this case is the weakness of collectivism and the absence of nationalism in postwar Japanese society. Japan has not been nationalistic since the war. Nationalistic attitudes are quite rare in defeated countries, unless the citizens of the defeated country remain convinced of the righteousness of their cause. In the case of Japan, American attempts to demilitarize Japan exacerbated such tendencies. Policies were created to turn Japan into the “Switzerland of the Pacific,” to quote one of the catch phrases of the American postwar strategy. Nationalistic education was prohibited and Japanese school children, who now form the core of contemporary Japanese society, were taught that if Japan remained restrained, and focused on its own problems without paying attention to the outer world, the world would become peaceful. Ironically, such education made Japanese society increasingly insular and egoistic. Paradoxically, the outside world, including the United States, now routinely condemns Japan for not fulfilling the international responsibilities it has as an economic giant.

Moreover, the prohibition of nationalistic education did not eliminate nationalism. The egoism created by Japan’s insular society gradually developed into a passive, unintentional, and crude nationalism. In this age, healthy nationalistic sentiments should be based on mutual respect for other cultures and nations. Japanese nationalism, which is passive, unintentional, and crude, lacks this key dimension and has spurred fears of Japanese remilitarization in emerging Asian countries. As egoists, the Japanese are criticized as being improperly or overly nationalistic. China equates this new nationalism with imperial Japan’s old aggressive nationalism. This misunderstanding is

fortunately fading, though “intentional” crude nationalism remains in Japan on a smaller scale.²

Passive and egoistic nationalism is one way Japan has forgotten its prewar culture and national identity. The famous author Naoya Shiga has argued that the Japanese national language should be changed from Japanese to a more logical language such as French. Such efforts are not aimed at forgetting the war itself and Japanese responsibilities for it. Rather, Japanese memories of the war were expressed through the complete restructuring of Japanese society and many aspects of its prewar culture. A remarkable change occurred in Japanese foreign policy. From the Meiji Restoration to Japan’s surrender at the end of World War II, Japan fought wars roughly once every 10 years, whereas it has fought none in the 56 years since the war. The recent revival of some elements of prewar Japanese culture, such as the myth of the birth of the nation, is no more than a healthy effort to regain some of Japan’s lost identity. This is a common practice in much of the world and not an indication of Japanese remilitarization.

I am a fairly representative sample of my generation’s beliefs and experiences. During the war, I avidly supported the war effort. When the war ended, I was only 13, but being politically conscious, I was determined to die for my country as a Kamikaze pilot. After the surrender, I waited for the emergence of anti-American guerrilla warfare, ready to participate in violence against the American occupation force. No such movement arose, however, and the American occupation was surprisingly peaceful. When I entered the university, I was a mid-right democrat. While in school, I became a mid-left democrat, but as I grew older, I returned to the mid-right. In a sense, I belong to the youngest group of the older generation and to the oldest group of the younger generation. I can understand both these worlds, emotionally as well as rationally. As a member of the older generation (although I was just a child), I supported the war and read newspapers every day to follow the war effort. After the war, I learned much about the unspoken truths of the war, especially those regarding Japanese actions in China, and such knowledge caused me to develop a guilty conscience. Most older Japanese have similar experiences, and war guilt has made many Japanese vulnerable to China’s use of emotional

diplomacy. Later, I studied international politics to understand why such a stupid war ever occurred and made China my primary field of study; in doing so, I became “un-Japanese.” For this reason, my arguments in this chapter are atypical of Japanese citizens.

CHINA'S POSITION

In contrast to the Japanese, many Chinese regard the war as an event to be eternally and emotionally remembered. Chinese leaders believe Japan's prewar behavior should never be forgotten. The justification for this is that China experienced enormous suffering during the war, and, as a winner of the war, was not restrained in expressing its misery and resentment for its wartime experiences. China has expressed a national desire to divest itself from its past century of humiliation. A defeated Japan provided an ideal target. For one, China for much of its history was far superior to Japan and many aspects of Japanese culture are derivative of Chinese culture, such as Chinese characters and Confucian ethics. Although the Japanese language is quite different from Chinese, Japan invented special ideas to adapt Chinese characters to a different language (*kana* and *kun*)—both Chinese and Japanese agree that Chinese heavily influenced Japan's written language.

After the Meiji Restoration, however, the roles of the two were reversed. In the late 19th century, Japan, along with the “white people,” invaded China, its former teacher. Until the Chinese victory in World War II, China remained a subject of the Japanese Empire. The post-war environment provided China an ideal opportunity to seek revenge for humiliations suffered at the hands of its former pupil. The establishment of the People's Republic of China and the expansion of communism resulted in an increasingly collectivist and nationalistic Chinese society. At the turn of the 19th Century, Chinese society had been fragmented—economically, politically, and psychologically. For example, Sun Yat-sen lamented that the Chinese people were like “a tray of sand,” meaning the country was poorly integrated and disunified. The Communist takeover, however, greatly accelerated the trend toward collectivism. Unaware of the changes occurring in Japan,

the Chinese in the aftermath of World War II believed the Japanese to be as collectivist as themselves. China's demand for the Japanese to assume collective responsibility for the war stems from its mirror imaging and misunderstanding of Japanese culture.

A COMPARISON OF JAPAN AND GERMANY

It is important to point out differences between Japan and Germany. China always claims Germany has often apologized for its World War II actions, while Japan has not. This is factually incorrect. In the case of Germany, Hitler and the Nazi leadership planned and executed the war to seek retribution for insults and hardship brought by severe punishments imposed on Germany after World War I. Thus, after World War II, Germans distanced themselves from Germany's actions by holding Hitler and the Nazis responsible for the war. President Richard von Weizsaecker exempted ordinary Germans from any war responsibility by denying the existence of "collective responsibility" and by arguing responsibility is always "personal." Thus, Hitler and the Nazis were made scapegoats.

In Japan, however, the issue of war responsibility was more complex. The Manchurian Incident in 1931 was initiated by Japanese military colonels, and only later did the weak central government acquiesce to the military's actions. The emperor did not play a role in the events that led to war. As Shichihei Yamamoto pointed out, "*kuuuki*," or "climate" and "atmosphere," played, and still plays, a very important role in Japanese decisionmaking.³ For many Japanese, Manchurian territory was acquired by the precious sacrifice of 100,000 soldiers during the Russo-Japanese war. Given the blood and treasure expended for Manchurian land, it was extremely difficult for Japan to renounce its Manchurian claims. A similar process occurred at the time of the Lugouqiao Incident in 1937. At that time, the central government attempted to localize the fighting, but unfortunate incidents forestalled efforts to limit the war. Some even assert the Chinese Communists conspired to initiate and enlarge the war, although there is no evidence to support such claims. Still, it is true the Chinese Communists received the biggest benefit as a result of the Sino-Japanese war.

War between Japan and the United States broke out because of the war in China. Japan had a precise military plan to counter the United States, but it lacked national and political plans to deal with the consequences of a war with the United States. The emperor signed the declaration of war, but did not draft it. Tojo, the prime minister at the time of the declaration of the war, was a brilliant military bureaucrat, but he was not an effective mass agitator like Hitler. It is impossible to equate Tojo with Hitler, and for this reason Tojo could not become a scapegoat for the war. No individual leaders existed in Japan, who, like Hitler, could be easily blamed for Japan's actions. Rather, shortly after the war, many referred to "one hundred million confessions," a phrase that implied the individual guilt of the entire population of the Japanese empire. However, such a concept inadequately described Japan's war responsibility; everyday Japanese laborers can hardly be held as responsible for the war as cabinet officials and military generals, even if the common Japanese citizens applauded their country's actions.

Another difference between postwar Germany and Japan is that West Germany became entirely integrated into Western Europe. The Germans learned the lessons of World War II and actively cooperated with their former enemies, such as France. Germany's opponents learned similar lessons, too. Even Poland, for example, was more opposed to the Soviet Union than to Germany. As a result, Europe was united in blaming Hitler and the Nazis for the war. Japan's international situation was very different. Japan's only truly friendly ally was the United States. South Korea, though anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, remained fervently anti-Japanese because of Japan's colonization (or "occupation") of Korea early in the 20th century. China was even more strident in its anti-Japanese sentiment. Southeast Asian countries, except the Philippines, were less hostile, but were too weak to become meaningful allies.

SINO-JAPANESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Japan's immediate postwar psychology was complicated by domestic and international factors. Initially, no symbolic warmongers existed

to assume the blame for the war. Second, because of Cold War conflict in Asia, Japan and the People's Republic of China lacked official contact for 20 years, since the independence of Japan in 1952. During these 20 years, radical structural changes occurred within Japanese society that went unrecognized by the Chinese. The experiences of World War II drastically changed the Japanese people; in fact, even previous hard-liners became pacifists. Now many decades following the war, when some Japanese acknowledge aspects of prewar Japanese culture they consider to be positive, they do not desire a return to the prewar era. They only mean to recover fragments of their national identity lost in the war. Unaware of the deep changes within Japanese society, many Chinese believe the Japanese people still long for the pride and glory of imperial Japan. Compounding this misperception is the fact that the Chinese continue to regard the Japanese as highly "collectivist." Many Chinese fear Japanese memories of the war will result in a resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Because such an outcome is highly unlikely, few Japanese take Chinese concerns seriously. The lack of communication and persistent misunderstandings between China and Japan are tragic, and only now have these misunderstandings begun to be resolved.

Despite their mistakes, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were admirable leaders, and their attitudes toward Japan in the immediate postwar period were quite clever. In the first 20 years after the war, only those Japanese designated "Friendship People" by the Chinese could visit China in any official capacity to express their personal apologies to the Chinese people. (I was an exception, having applied for a tourist visa while in Hong Kong.) Chairman Mao said to the Chinese that the experiences of the past should be forgotten, and argued that both nations should look forward to building a lasting relationship.⁴ The Japanese people appreciated Mao's "generous" comments, which were widely reported, and Japanese visitors admired Mao's China. In retrospect, Sino-Japanese rapprochement was most likely in the 1950s and, to a lesser extent, the 1960s. At that time, most Japanese people still retained very emotional memories of the war and felt extremely guilty for their country's actions. For their part, Chinese leaders faced increasing conflict with the Soviet Union and were

ready to forget the war. The Cold War, however, obstructed the chances for rapprochement.

Twenty-seven years after the end of the war, Japan and China normalized relations and Japan officially recognized the People's Republic of China, rather than the Republic of China (ROC). As time passed, however, the memories of the war became increasingly vague and distant. Indeed, in the years between the war and the normalization of relations with Japan, China was isolated from much of the international community. It remained resentful of Japanese wartime aggression and American containment policies, in which it viewed Japan as complicit.

The joint communiqué normalizing relations between Japan and China was signed 20 years after U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles forced Japan to sign a peace treaty with the ROC in 1952. The joint communiqué states that: "The Japanese side feels the responsibility keenly and regrets [*fanxing*] deeply the enormous damages Japan gave the Chinese nationals during the war." The Japanese believed this apology to be the most sincere that could have been given. Mao and Zhou, like Chiang Kai-shek in 1952, renounced all demands for reparations or compensation for the war. The Japanese thanked Chiang for his generosity in 1952, and also thanked Mao and Zhou in 1972. Despite such exchanges, small but significant misunderstandings remained. Japan and China in the prewar era were quite knowledgeable about each other's society, which were quite similar. However, following the war and during the subsequent 20 years without official contact, Japan underwent extensive Americanization and China intensive socialization. The societal gap between Japan and China widened significantly. Such a cultural divergence resulted in significant misperceptions and misunderstandings. For example, when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka apologized for the war at a banquet on the occasion of the normalization of relations, the translation of his apology (*tian le mafan*) made Zhou Enlai angry. According to Zhou, the translated apology was more relevant to a situation in which one apologizes for inadvertently spilling water on a lady's skirt.

Another misunderstanding I recently discovered was the meaning of a Chinese idiom used during the conference at which relations

were normalized. The idiom: "*Qian shi bu wang, hou shi zhi shi*" is officially translated as "Past experience, if not forgotten, can be a guide for the future."⁵ For a long time after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, however, the Japanese translated the idiom as "Without forgetting the past, let us make it a lesson." The Japanese believed they had promised not to forget the past and to make it as a guide for the future, while the Chinese understand this idiom to be a general principle, which becomes valid "if the history is not forgotten." Therefore, the Chinese side believes repeated apology is necessary to prove that Japan has not forgotten the validity of the principle, while the Japanese believe they have apologized sufficiently and regard Chinese complaints as disingenuous or distrustful.

Further, although the Japanese have not apologized for explicit events, their apologies are still sincere and illustrate an acknowledgment of past mistakes. Chinese who continue to bring up the events of the Sino-Japanese war are regarded as mean spirited. For example, when Chinese leader Li Peng complained of Japan's reexamination of its Official Developmental Assistance (ODA) in protest of China's nuclear test, he argued that, because Japan had failed to pay war reparations, ODA represents a substitute for reparations and must not be revoked.⁶ As previously mentioned, China renounced its claims for reparations at the time of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, a gesture for which Japan was quite thankful. For Li Peng to rehash past events and to demand continuation of Japanese ODA, itself a symbol of Japanese goodwill and moral obligation, made the Japanese feel Mr. Li was less benevolent than his father-in-law, Zhou Enlai, who himself had waived the Chinese demands for reparations.

THE RISE OF HISTORICAL PROBLEMS

In 1982 China radically altered its foreign policy and sought some reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Not by coincidence did the textbook issue come to the fore between China and Japan in that very year. To attack Japan's government, China exploited a false report in some Japanese newspapers⁷ regarding the teachings of certain Japanese history textbooks; China claimed that Japan was obscuring the

realities of history to prepare for future militaristic aggression against its neighbors.⁸ However, Japan's government at the time did not approve textbooks, and many different texts were published and used by different Japanese high schools each year. Various publishers examined the texts for factual mistakes and quality, but Japan's government did not pick the texts high schools used. In 1982, however, newspapers reported that the education ministry changed the word "aggression" (*shinryaku*) to "advance" (*shinshutsu*), a claim later proved false. The only paper to apologize for the mistake was the *Sankei Shinbun*. Other newspapers simply ignored the mistake. In addition, the difference between "aggression" and "advance" in Japanese is only rhetorical. The word "advance" does not always have a positive connotation, as the newspapers alleged. For example, we usually say, "The enemy advanced from the right wing." *Shinryaku* is a clearly negative word, but using such a word all the time would make any document ridiculous. Thus, the false report, even had it been factual, did not make sense.

In addition, at the outset there was a clear misunderstanding on the Chinese side that Japan used national texts and all Japanese pupils studied the same textbook. Actually, the text in question was only one of about ten history textbooks. In fact, Japanese rightists criticized many high school texts for being too "masochistic" in their approach to the history of the Sino-Japanese war. One textbook China criticized had been adopted by only 30 of Japan's 2000 high schools; in any case, it was pulled from publication two years later for economic reasons.

This discussion illustrates Chinese criticisms that Japan was "forgetting" the history of the war were in fact illusions and misplaced accusations. Quite a few Japanese felt the Chinese side to be unreasonable. Some even felt Chinese complaints were an "intervention in the internal affairs" of a sovereign country, to use a favorite Chinese government expression. Most Japanese, however, kept silent to avoid further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. Even at this time, Japanese attitudes toward the Chinese remained quite positive.

The textbook case was the second Chinese criticism of Japan since the normalization of relations, and it followed the controversy about whether the antihegemony clause should be included in the treaty of

peace and friendship between the two countries. At that time, the Chinese considered the antihegemony clause important, because Japanese inclusion of the clause in the treaty was seen as a test of Japan's firm stand against the Soviet Union. Many Japanese, for their part, were reluctant to include the clause; they were afraid it could involve Japan in the Cold War and Sino-Soviet conflict. Foreigners may not understand this mentality, but Tokyo's alliance with the United States made Japan worry it would be an early Soviet target in Asia should conflict arise between the United States and Soviet Union. The same may have been true in the case of conflict between China and the Soviet Union. The Japanese people, subject to the "Peace Constitution" after the war, innocently believed neutrality could be maintained in case of conflict between allies and enemies simply by appealing to the constitution. This was the prevailing psychology nurtured during the occupation, at which time the Japanese accepted the American-made 1947 constitution, which Tokyo has yet to revise. This indicates Chinese criticisms of renewed militarism in Japan (1970) and the textbook incident (1982) were not based on reality. Both postwar Japan and the international situation have changed significantly since the war.

Today, war between China and Japan is inconceivable, at least as seen from the Japanese perspective. Chinese criticisms, therefore, were interpreted by Japanese as unreasonable accusations, and the favorable feelings Japan harbored toward China gradually declined after Chinese criticism became more common. Some Japanese felt betrayed by their own images of a "generous China."

In examining the differences between Mao's and Zhou's attitudes toward Japan in the 1950s and 1960s and the recent accusations of Chinese leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, a shift in Chinese attitudes is noticeable. One possible explanation for such change, except for different Chinese leadership, is as follows. In domestic Chinese politics, after the reform and open-door policies, the prestige of the party and socialist ideology declined. To rally the people, the leadership began to rely on nationalistic campaigns to maintain national unity. An obvious target for Chinese nationalism was Japan—a formerly unambiguous aggressor. In this climate, Japan's "goatability" (ease to become a scapegoat) was high. At that time, when Japanese feelings for the

Chinese were more positive than today, the attack on the Japanese government was effective.

The second reason was related to this Japanese feeling of intimacy toward China. China used historical remembering to obtain a morally righteous position vis-a-vis Japan. Many people in Japan, as in many democratic countries, believed that they themselves were to blame for the contemporary conflict with China. Japanese leftists, who were betrayed by China's domestic change, eagerly seized upon the history textbook issue and criticized the Japanese government. The "China problem" after 1982 thus became a domestic and controversial issue within Japan (Japan-Japan conflict). China misunderstood again that the majority of the Japanese people supported China's "righteous" position and believed that by repeating similar accusations Beijing would gain bargaining leverage over Tokyo. In reality, a few years after the Chinese criticisms began, only a few former leftists supported the Chinese position. I cautioned the Chinese on many occasions that their policy would ruin Sino-Japanese relations, but they believed I represented only a small minority of nationalistic Japanese or, worse, that I was anti-Chinese.

JAPANESE APOLOGIES

Contrary to the irresponsible yet common belief that Japan has made no sincere apology for its actions during the war, Japan has actually made and continues to make both official and sincere apologies. In addition to the aforementioned joint communiqué between China and Japan, the emperor said when he made an official visit to China in 1992, "There was an unhappy period, in the long history between our two countries, in which my country gave Chinese nationals enormous sufferings. This is what filled me with deep sorrow. After the war, our nationals regretted deeply not to repeat such a war again and were determined firmly to walk a way of a peace loving country."⁹ This may sound too mild, but given the fact that the emperor has no political role in postwar Japanese society, this was the maximum he could say "as a symbol of national integration." Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, on the occasion of 50th anniversary of the end

of the war, gave a speech in which he declared, "My country, in the not too far past, made mistakes in our national policy and walked the way to the war. It not only got our people into disaster, but also through colonization and aggression gave enormous damages and pains to peoples of many countries, especially Asian countries. I, in order not to repeat the mistake, face up to the historical facts with humility and herewith once again express sincere regrets and apology from the bottom of my heart. I also express my sincere condolences to the victims of all countries concerned."¹⁰ Is this statement not clear evidence that Japan has officially apologized and accepted responsibility for its actions?

Moreover, Japan has paid reparations to countries that did not renounce reparations claims. According to international laws at the time the peace treaties were concluded, personal war damages were included in national reparations. The recent demands for personal reparation, except unpaid wages, personal debts, and similar obligations, should be met by the nations that originally received Japanese reparations. In addition, the private property of Japanese citizens in Japanese colonies was forfeited to the Allied Powers at the end of the war. Likewise, many German citizens were stripped of their land. If individual reparations are recognized, those Japanese whose private properties were expropriated all over Asia deserve appropriate compensation. Such a spillover of personal compensation claims would cause enormous confusion in Asia, something no one desires. The political use of history in such a highly emotional fashion ignores these facts and proves counterproductive when friendly relations with neighboring countries are necessary. After 56 years, the younger generations of Japanese, which are educated much more individualistically than we, no longer share or understand the older generation's special emotional attachment to China. They cannot feel the collective responsibility China has attempted to place on them. As mentioned above, I belong to the youngest group of the older generation and was criticized as anti-Chinese during the Cultural Revolution. Now I am one of a few pro-Chinese persons among active Japanese (under 70, for example) who has not changed my position. This illustrates that during this period Japanese feelings toward China have

declined rapidly. To be fair, I should add the decline was caused not only by political reasons related to the historical memories of the war alone, but also by the persistent growth of Chinese criminal gangs in Japan.

Recently, small but hopeful changes are occurring. China, at a time when most people who were personally involved in the war have passed away, finally seems aware of the dangers of using emotional collective remembering to criticize Japan. Continued nationalistic education in China could be disastrous; when international crises occur, overly nationalistic Chinese students go to extremes, posing new challenges for China's leadership. Fortunately, there are signs of change among China's leadership, although some Chinese groups outside China still do not understand changes within the PRC. The furor over the book *The Rape of Nanking* is a typical example of collective remembering and emotional resentment that is full of errors and misunderstandings in Chinese society outside of China.¹¹

DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES

Here, let me compare U.S.-Japanese relations with Sino-Japanese relations. The atomic bombing of Japan was a great disaster for many innocent Japanese. The memory and resentment of the American attacks could have formed the core of anti-Americanism in Japan. Of course, personal remembering remains of the bombings, but the collective memory of the event was sublimated into the peace movement. On a stone monument at the Hiroshima Peace Park, it is written, "No mistakes shall be repeated." Some rightists complained about this inscription and argued the Americans had made the mistake. In my mind, this inscription means human being shall not repeat such mistakes. The way I understand it, the Japanese people chose to cope with such a terrible disaster by calling it a product of a human fallibility. Conversely, when I am in Hawaii, I make it a rule to pay a visit to the Arizona Memorial and Punch Bowl. I view my visits as a way for a Japanese who once wanted to volunteer as a Kamikaze pilot to reciprocate American "forgetting." Therefore, during the time when Japan's economy was booming and America's economy was not

good, I felt discouraged when some in the United States started to echo the long-forgotten (collective and emotional) phrase “Remember Pearl Harbor” around the 50th anniversary of the incident.

I remember that only about 10 years after the war, a former American military pilot came to Japan and wanted to see the Japanese pilot with whom he fought over the South Pacific because the American believed his Japanese counterpart to be “really brave.” The meeting took place and was a success. Here I see an example of American and Japanese knighthood. This, I believe, is the right way to resolve the resentments of pre-nuclear war.¹² The same thing could not happen between China and Japan, however. Forty years after the war, someone arranged for a Japanese and Chinese pilot to meet. The arrangements failed. It was reported there was almost no conversation between the two men.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is difficult to forget rational memories and emotional personal memories. But it can be disastrous to employ emotional collective remembering primarily for immediate political gain. Within the political realm, it is best to combine rational remembering and emotional forgetting. Historical, cultural, and situational factors play a significant role in achieving such an ideal combination. Even in the worst case, however, if artificial maintenance of hatred and resentment can be avoided, a healthy balance in historical memory can still be achieved. Looking forward, the passing of generations since a painful event, may also contribute toward creating a peaceful world. Collective emotional remembering is politically quite dangerous. China's leaders seem to be undertaking favorable structural changes in their Japan policy. If this is the case, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be much improved.

Notes

1. The Area Studies Center of Keio University is one of the forerunners in this direction.

2. China seems to have changed its Japan policy from one based on

emotion to one based on common interests sometime during 1999. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's recent slip of words, which in the past would have created a large issue between China and Japan, was not highly publicized in the party-controlled Chinese media.

3. Yamamoto, Shichihei, *Kuuki no Kenkyu (A Study of Climate of Opinion)*, in the Yamamoto Shichihei Library, Bungeishunju Sha, 1997.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and the Central Document Research Section of the CCP, ed., *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong)* (Beijing: Central Document Publishing Company and World Knowledge Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 226, 460ff., 534ff.

5. Beijing Waiguoyu Xueyuan Yingyu Xi, ed. *A Chinese-English Dictionary* (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1978), p. 542.

6. *Chugokuseran (China Biyearly Almanac)* (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1996), p. 140.

7. Akihiko Tanaka, *Nicchukankei 1945–1990 (Japan-China Relations 1945–1990)* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991), pp. 121–25.

8. *Asahi Shinbun* and other major newspapers in Japan, June 26, 1982, and *Renmin Ribao*, July 19, 1982, first commented on the issue. This shows that the Chinese attacks were not reactive ones, but constituted a well-deliberated strategy.

9. *Nicchu Kankei Kihonshiryoushu 1949–1997 (A Collection of Fundamental Documents on Japan-China Relations 1949–1997)* (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), pp. 794–45.

10. *Ibid.*, 819–20.

11. The Japanese translation of Iris Chan's book was not published, though it was printed and ready to market. Iris Chan canceled the contract for the Japanese translation of her book because her same publisher was planning another book that corrected errors in Iris Chan's book. The publisher, Kashiwa Shobou, is a somewhat leftist publishing house but is intent on scholarly rigor. In Japan, there are three schools of thought on the Nanjing Incident. The first is the "massacre" school, which believes the number of victims is over 200,000. The second school is the "medium-sized massacre" school, which believes there were about 40,000 to 50,000 victims. The last one is the "sporadic violence" school, which believes there were thousands or fewer killed. The scholars asked to comment on Chan's book all belonged to the "massacre" school. This shows the motivation of the publication of the second book was merely to correct the errors of Chan's book and not to obscure Chan's critique.

12. Prenuclear wars, including World War II, could be forgotten in some way or other. Nuclear war, which would far outweigh the damages at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, may not be able to be forgotten emotionally. This is one reason nuclear war must be avoided by all means.



CHAPTER FIVE

MEMORY AND PERCEPTION

THE CHINESE THINKING OF JAPAN

Wu Xinbo

CHANGING CHINA-JAPAN DYNAMICS HAVE RECENTLY DRAWN widespread attention from both academic and policy circles. How this important relationship evolves will have a significant impact on East Asia's international politics in the twenty-first century. Different perspectives consider different aspects of the bilateral ties. Realists pay attention to the shifting balance of power between China and Japan to see where respective interests converge or diverge. Liberals stress the growing economic interdependence of the two Asian giants, and social-constructivists argue that ideational variables, such as perception and identity, though not as visible as material ones, are more deeply rooted and more durable in their impact on interactions between Beijing and Tokyo. This chapter takes a social-constructivist approach to see how historical complexity and perception have informed the Chinese understanding of Japan and examines the ramifications for China-Japan relations.

HISTORICAL COMPLEXITY

History is always an important factor, if not the most important one, in the Chinese assessment of Japan. There are actually two kinds of histories in the Chinese memory, one being Japan benefiting from Chinese

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civilization in ancient times, and the other being its aggression against China in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These two histories contrast sharply with each other, leaving Chinese with a deep impression. What aggravates Chinese historical wounds is the Japanese attitude toward the issue of history, namely, its resistance sincerely to repent of its aggression against China, constant efforts by the rightists to defend Japan's militarist past, and failure to address issues left over by Japanese wartime atrocities in the 1930s and 1940s.

The fact that Japan had long been a student of China before the modern era makes China-Japan historical entanglements unique. Sino-Japanese interactions started 2,000 years ago, when Chinese culture was imported into Japan via the Korean peninsula. These one-way interactions culminated during the Tang Dynasty, when increasing numbers of Japanese came to study in China and brought back to Japan advanced Chinese social-political systems, technology, expertise, culture, and arts. Such heavy borrowing from China constituted the most important basis of ancient Japanese civilization and changed Japan's outlook. Up to the mid-nineteenth-century, Japan had been a major beneficiary of Chinese civilization.

A historical turning point in Sino-Japanese relations came in the wake of Japan's Meiji Restoration, when a weak China became the victim of a strong and predatory Japan. In the War of 1894, Japan defeated China, seized Taiwan, and squeezed from China a huge amount of indemnity, which greatly fueled Japan's modernization. The September 18 incident in 1931 led to Japan's occupation of China's Northeast region. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1936, opened the prelude of the Japanese war aimed at conquering the whole of China. Although China had also suffered from the aggression of other major powers in modern history, Japan inflicted China's heaviest suffering. When the war finally ended in 1945, it had cost China a total loss of 30 million lives and \$500 billion in property. The War of 1894, the September 18 incident, the Marco Polo Incident, and the Nanjing Massacre, and so forth, have all become an irremovable, painful memory for the Chinese and inalienable part of their perception of Japan. In fact, so great is the stigma of these events that the Chinese eventually coined the term "the century of

humiliation.” Though once a student of Chinese civilization, but then an aggressor of China, Japan was and is regarded as a country of ingratitude.

The end of World War II did not bring normal relations between China and Japan. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan continued to recognize Chiang Kai-shek’s regime as the sole legitimate government of China. In 1952 Tokyo signed a peace treaty with the Kuomintang government in Taiwan, even though this government no longer represented the people of the mainland. Although Japan and the PRC had maintained economic relations through bilateral trade through 1950s and 1960s, there were no formal political relations between Beijing and Tokyo until 1972. Most Japanese governments in the 1950s and 1960s followed Washington and pursued a policy hostile to China. For instance, Japan consistently voted against the PRC replacing Taiwan in the United Nations. It wasn’t until President Richard Nixon’s trip to China (the so-called “Nixon shock”) that Tokyo felt compelled to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. After half a century of Japanese aggression in China and more than a two-decade absence of diplomatic ties, China-Japan relations finally got back on track.

Normalization of Sino-Japanese ties marked the beginning for China to forgive, if not to forget, the past. In the joint communiqué of normalization issued by Beijing and Tokyo in 1972, both sides declared a termination of the abnormal state of affairs that had existed between them. Japan suggested it “is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” “In the interests of the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples,” China renounced its demand for war reparation from Japan. Both parties agreed to sign a treaty of peace and friendship—for the purpose of developing good-neighborly and friendly relations—that was finally concluded in 1978.

Still, the historical complexity continues to irritate the Chinese even in a new era of Sino-Japanese relations. One reason is the constant effort by some Japanese to whitewash Japan’s past aggression against China and the lack of genuine repentance over that part of

history. Every year since 1975, Japanese cabinet members (sometimes the prime minister as well), have visited the Yasukuni Shrine to pay their respects to those who lost their lives in various wars in modern time—including first-class war criminals sentenced to death by the Far Eastern Military Court at the end of World War II. Quite a few Japanese politicians have repeatedly claimed the war against Asian countries was not an aggression, but rather an effort to liberate Asia from Western colonization. Some have even argued the Nanjing Massacre was a fabrication, as seen at the Osaka gathering by some right-wing academics in early 2000. The rightists criticized those who did tell the truth about that unfortunate history as “masochistic,” and some were even sued by the right-wingers. Furthermore, the right-wingers, on the pretext of pursuing “the liberal historical view,” tried time and again to revise history textbooks by deleting descriptions of Japan’s wartime aggression and atrocities and inserting a distorted historical narrative. In 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Education approved history textbooks revised by the right-wingers and allowed them to be used in Japanese schools. This has evoked strong protest from China and South Korea. The failure to tell students about Japan’s infamous history has rendered the younger generation ignorant of its own past aggression and colonization of neighbors.

In 1995, when many countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, Japan had an opportunity to show genuine repentance for its behavior in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the so-called “no-war” resolution passed by the House of Representatives in the Japanese Diet, which was vaguely worded, appeared to absolve Japan from its past guilt rather than to repent for it, which invited more criticism than appreciation from other countries. Being aware of this, former prime minister Tomiichi Murayama from the Socialist Party decided to make a statement on August 15 (the anniversary of Japan’s surrender 50 years earlier) to express “sincere regrets and apology” for Japan’s past colonization and aggression. This event was by far the most unequivocal and serious apology made by a Japanese prime minister, an overdue gesture toward Japan’s neighbors. Nevertheless, the statement by Murayama was strongly criticized and resisted by many

rightists, and it was far from being accepted as a national consensus on the issue of history.

Another irritating aspect of the historical entanglements is Japan's failure to address appropriately issues left by Japan's war of aggression. One example is the way it treats individual claims for reparation. Although the Chinese government has given up the right to a national claim for war reparations from Japan, people who were forced to do labor or serve as "comfort women" for the Japanese believe that as private citizens they still hold the right to demand compensation for their personal sufferings. These people have struggled very hard to file their claims with the Japanese and expect to receive justice in the remaining years of their lives. But, the Japanese government and related businesses have been extremely reluctant to meet these legitimate demands. Incidents such as these only leave the Chinese with the impression that Japan as a country fails to face up to its past and take responsibility for its actions.

The Chinese are particularly chafed at the way the Japanese deal with history in comparison to what the Germans have done in this regard. From the Chinese perspective, Germany is a nation that has genuinely repented for Nazi atrocities during the World War II and made relentless efforts to settle the account of that part of history. No matter which party is in power in Bonn, the German authorities' attitude toward World War II has been serious, consistent, and responsible. The Chinese found unforgettable German Chancellor Willy Brandt's getting down on his knees before the Jewish Monument, which memorializes those who died in Nazi concentration camps, during his 1969 Poland visit. In the eyes of the Chinese, this was a gesture of genuine repentance on the part of Germans, which brought about sincere reconciliation between Germany and its neighbors. On the domestic side, the German government has always stood tough against the right-wing activities and taken legislative measures to forbid publications and rhetoric defending Nazi Germany. More important, Germany has also satisfactorily settled the issue of compensation with its neighbors and the Jewish people for their suffering and losses during the war. Since modern Germany has done its collective best to face up to Nazi crimes of the past and atone for them, German

visitors to Japan—former chancellor Helmut Schmidt notable among them—have been astonished at the apparent historical amnesia of most Japanese on the subject of the wartime misdeeds of their troops.

The Chinese have noted that the one thing Japanese appear willing to remember about World War II is the United States dropping nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan commemorates this event every year, and by so doing, portrays itself as the principal victim of the war. However, the Japanese do not ask why the United States attacked those two cities with nuclear weapons, and would never admit that those who suffered from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are actually the victims of Japanese militarism, which had inflicted far greater sufferings to Asian people in comparison—especially the Chinese people.

Why have the Japanese been so resistant to facing up to their aggressive past? One reason, in the Chinese point of view, is Japan's failure to completely eliminate militarist and right-wing influence in the wake of World War II. At the very beginning of the postwar period, the United States occupation authority in Japan did try to settle account of the militarism and bring about the social, economic, and political restructuring in Japan. However, the onset of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Korean War caused the United States to change its policy toward Japan. In order to turn Japan into a stronghold against communism in Asia, the United States occupation authority took a lenient stance toward its militarism. As a result, militarists and the right-wingers have been able to keep their influence in Japan. According to some statistics, there are more than 800 right-wing organizations in Japan, with members exceeding 120,000, and as many as 3 to 4 million "latent right-wingers." This populace constitutes a very powerful conservative influence in Japan's social and political life.¹

Another reason has to do with Japan's national character. The Chinese believe Japan is a nation that only bows to its superiors and never takes its inferiors seriously. The Japanese always claim Japan is the most outstanding nation in the world and have looked down on the rest of Asia since the Meiji Restoration.² How can it admit guilt

before other Asian countries that are inferior? Even though at times the Japanese have to make public gestures, in reality they think differently. Also what is significant is the so-called “spirit of the knight” (*bushido*), an important part of Japanese traditional culture. As a class, knights valued highly their reputation and fame, and when necessary, would die for them. To preserve their fame and “face,” they would not admit any wrongdoings or take corresponding responsibilities. Moreover, as a small and isolated island country, Japan has developed a narrow-minded, self-centered mentality that obstructs its seeking genuine reconciliation with neighbors that suffered from its aggressions before and during World War II.

Japan’s pursuit of major political power status also affects its attitude toward history. The economic success in the post-Cold War era has given rise to the Japanese aspiration for political status commensurate to its economic power. In 1982 Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed that Japan should become a major political power. To achieve this objective, Japan would first turn itself into a “normal” country, which meant it would need to get rid of the burden of its militarist past. Against this background, a trend toward reinterpreting and rewriting its aggressive history has emerged in Japan, a trend aimed at absolving itself from past misdeeds and washing away responsibility.

Half a century after World War II, the Chinese still seem unable to overcome bitter feelings toward Japan over the issue of history, not so much because of the unfortunate history itself, but more because of the way the Japanese treat the issue. This has created strong distrust of Japan among the Chinese and constitutes a major obstacle to Sino-Japanese ties. As one opinion poll conducted among Chinese youths in 1996 shows, 93.3 percent of the respondents indicated that the primary factor obstructing the normal development of China-Japan relations is Japan’s attitude toward its history of aggression.³ During a state visit to Japan in November 1998, Chinese president Jiang Zemin highlighted in his speeches Japan’s aggressive past. He did this believing that Japan had failed to take an appropriate attitude toward the issue of history and feeling that he should readdress the situation. This visit was supposed to prepare Sino-Japanese relations for the

twenty-first century, but it turned out to be strongly affected by their differences over the handling of history.

Several factors have contributed to a strong Chinese historical complex. First is the painful individual and collective memory of the unfortunate history itself. Given the disaster Japanese aggression caused the Chinese people and their country, they may be able to forgive the past (as they have been trying to do) but it will be hard for them to forget. That part of history has been deeply rooted in their memory and will be remembered for a very long time. Second is the aversion to the way the Japanese treat the issue of history. Whenever Japanese rightists attempt to whitewash Japan's aggressive past, the Chinese, as victims of Japanese militarism, feel keenly hurt and offended. The third is a genuine concern that if Japan fails to draw due lessons from its aggressive past, it may follow the same disastrous road in the future.⁴

Since the 1990s, Japan has toughened its policy toward China, re-defined its security alliance with the United States, and continued building its military capabilities. Concerned with such developments in Japan, China tried to remind the Japanese of their unfortunate history. Some foreign observers interpreted this as China's attempt to "play the history card" against Japan; however, in Chinese wisdom, history provides a useful tool in reflecting on the past to affect the present. As a Chinese saying goes, "past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future" (*qian shi bu wang, hou shi zhi shi*). The Chinese sincerely believe that in a time when Japan is seeking to exercise more influence in regional political and security affairs, a healthy remembrance of the past will result in good for its people.

CONFLICTING IMAGES

While history tells what Japan used to be, perception of the present Japan tells what it is like today. The Chinese obtained firsthand information about Japan through personal contact with this country and people, and have obtained secondhand information through the media and publications. Varied information leads to different images of Japan. For better or worse, these images have affected the Chinese perception of Japan.

On the positive side, the most conspicuous image of Japan is its status as the world's number two economic giant, a technology power, and one of the world's wealthiest countries. In late 1970s and early 1980s—after almost three decades of a lack of exchanges with Japan—the Chinese were stunned to see a developed, wealthy, and modern Japan, and uneasily realized how far China lagged behind. When China opened its door, Japanese products flowed into the Chinese market. It had been a common dream of residents in major cities to possess Japanese household electronic appliances. For the Chinese public, Japan's image as a past aggressor was overridden by its image as an advanced country. For Chinese leaders, Japan became a model of economic modernization efforts from which China could learn. As people's curiosity and interest in Japan grew, Japanese music and movies were introduced into China and were well received, especially by the youths. Among foreign languages the Chinese chose to study, Japanese became second only to English. Japan also now ranks as the second major country attracting Chinese students studying abroad.

Japan's economic success also has prompted the Chinese to ask why. Chinese leaders, government officials, and business elite have visited Japan, attempting to find out the "secrets" of Japan's success. Many articles have been published trying to provide the answers. The Japanese are the most hardworking people in the world, employees in both government and business all voluntarily work extra hours, and Japanese workers feel uncomfortable if they have to leave the office on time. These were a few reasons given to explain why Japan grew from the ruins into an economic giant within 20 years. Some have also suggested that Japan's success resulted from the conscientious and meticulous attitude of its employees, strict regulations, strict management, and the high quality of Japanese products. Additionally, some have argued Japan's economic success was a result of its marvelous capability to imitate and reinvent, an argument that suggests Japan has a long tradition of learning from other countries, including from China in ancient times and from the West in modern times. In the process, the Japanese have developed a talent for borrowing and remolding other's strong points and making the best use of them. As a result, Japan can always remain one step ahead of

the competition in a cost-effective way. No matter which argument is accepted, however, all reflect a Chinese admiration for Japan's economic achievements.

Also, on the social-cultural level the Chinese have developed some positive impressions of the Japanese. For one thing, the Japanese have a strong sense of collectivity. One popular assumption in China suggests that in a one-to-one context, the Chinese could compete with and defeat the Japanese, but in a group-to-group context, the Chinese would probably lose, because they would be busy fighting each other rather than making concerted efforts. Japanese are loyal to their country, company, and community. They work very well with each other and preserve the unity of the team. In addition, there are positive Japanese character traits to be mentioned: they are very polite in their appearance, pay high attention to sanitation and hygiene, and are self-disciplined and obedient. In fact, in Chinese writings about the Japanese in 1980s, there was quite a lot of praise for Japan and its people, and such positive comments helped the Chinese public take a fresh look at this neighbor.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese have also observed negative traits of the Japanese. The most conspicuous one is Japan's "selfishness." After World War II, Japan adopted an export-led development strategy. It tried hard to open and occupy international markets while keeping its domestic market as closed as possible. This policy created a huge surplus in Japan's foreign trade, and caused trade frictions with other countries—especially the United States. As Japan reaped the benefits from the neomercantilist approach, it also received strong international criticism for its selfishness. The Chinese noted that although its economy was far behind that of Japan, its market openness outran Japan in many aspects. Another aspect of Japan's undesirable economic behavior was its discriminative treatment of China. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese angrily found Japan sold its first-class products to Europe and North America, second-class products in its domestic market, and third-class products to China. For example, while Japanese cars sold in Europe and North America were manufactured with the latest technology, those sold in China were still built with the technology of 10 years previous. This annoying discovery, along with

concern over the heavy inflow of Japanese products into the Chinese market and China's rising trade deficit with Japan, prompted student protest in Beijing in 1985. Shouting the slogan of "boycotting Japanese products," the students forced the government to remove the advertisement of Japanese products from prime commercial districts.

Japan's selfishness is also manifested in its technology transfer to China. Japan lags behind the United States and Germany in terms of investment in high-tech industry in China. Japanese companies are also very stingy in the technology transfer to China in that they hold back the latest developing technologies to keep China dependent on and lagging behind Japan. In fact, many Chinese enterprises have complained that some technologies imported from Japan soon become outdated or not of much use. Overall, the Chinese believe that, as a major economic power, Japan is not generous in its economic cooperation with China, and while Japanese companies are interested in occupying China's market, they have little interest in helping China upgrade its technology.

Another outstanding impression of Japan has to do with the exclusive nature of Japanese society. Japan's geographic isolation and homogenous ethnic background has nurtured a propensity to exclude "outsiders." Chinese students studying in Japan have found communication with the Japanese very difficult and acceptance by Japanese society even more difficult. Foreigners, no matter how long they have lived in Japan, are always outsiders, and are treated as such—a situation comparable to that of the Korean population residing there. A popular assumption suggests that the Japanese seldom say what they really think, except when they are drunk. One interesting phenomenon in China is that those back from the United States usually harbor good feelings about Americans, while those back from Japan are mostly sour about the Japanese. The Chinese tend to believe China and the United States have more in common in that both are continental countries with cultural and ethnic diversity, where people are candid, sanguine, and humorous. As someone in China suggests, China and Japan are geographically close but psychologically distant, while China and the United States are geographically distant but psychologically close.

Chinese unease also stems from Japan's social structure. Japan has long been a hierarchical society in which people deal with each other in a given and delicate way, and the sense of difference is commonly accepted and observed. This has not altered much since World War II, whereas China, which used to be a quasi-hierarchic society, has been transformed into a much more egalitarian society by revolutions and social change. As a result, the two societies operate quite differently, and this has caused some malaise on both sides. According to one Chinese survey conducted in 1997, when asked who was "the least-welcome foreign employer," 51 percent of respondents cited Japanese companies, while those mentioning U.S. or European companies accounted for only 4 percent and 3 percent respectively.⁵ The explanation is that U.S. or European companies promote by work performance, whereas Japanese companies emphasize seniority. Also, U.S. and European managers are more easygoing, while Japanese managers are often arrogant, high-handed, and difficult to work with.

As described above, conflicting images of Japan exist among the Chinese. The question is what factors affect the way people receive them? Foremost is the overall atmosphere in bilateral relations. When bilateral ties are normal and healthy, people tend to view Japan more favorably, as was the case in the early 1980s. However, once bilateral ties go sour, public opinion takes a more negative view, as was the case in the latter 1990s. A second factor is age. Older people, with a stronger memory of the past, are more critical and suspicious of Japan, while younger people are more attentive to Japan's economic success and technological prowess. Third, attitudes vary by geography. In coastal areas, people seem more aware of Japan's strong points, while those in the interior tend to think of Japan more negatively.

CONSTRAINING FACTORS

Obviously, the Chinese perception of Japan is not just shaped by ideational factors, but also by political, economic, and strategic dynamics. These dynamics produce both positive and negative impacts. For political and ideological reasons, the Chinese media has long tended to exaggerate the possibility of Japan reemerging as a militarist power.⁶

In the 1950s and 1960s, China was very critical of Japan's security policy of allying with the United States, and Beijing asserted several times that militarism had been revived in Japan. With normalization of ties with Japan in 1972, however, Beijing turned to encourage Tokyo to strengthen its defense posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, with Japan's defense spending exceeding the ceiling of 1 percent of its GDP, Beijing began to express some concerns, although in the context of the Soviet threat and the relatively smooth development of China-Japan relations, those concerns were aired in a constrained way. In the 1990s when the Cold War was over, Japan chose a more active security policy and passed the Peacekeeping Operation bill. Tokyo also redefined the Japan-U.S. alliance by revising its defense guidelines and further strengthened Japan's military muscle. Most important, Sino-Japanese relations soured over issues like Taiwan, China's nuclear testing, and history.

Under such circumstances, China began to take an alarmist view of Japan. Reports about the rising influence of Japan's right-wing political forces, military buildup, and attempt to seek a dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region ran rampant in the Chinese media. Some scholars, however, did note that Japan's social-political system was quite different from before World War II; democracy and pacifism have been well established in Japan, and while militarist and right-wing thinking still holds some sway in Japan, the possibility of Japan becoming an aggressive military power is seen as very low, if not unlikely.⁷ However, partly because of Japan's unhelpful attitude on the history issue, and partly because of the ideological and nationalistic influence in China, Chinese public opinion still holds, in general, a critical and suspicious view of Japan.

As a matter of fact, if a "love-hate" syndrome describes the Chinese attitude toward the United States, then a "fear-contempt" syndrome applies to their attitude toward Japan. In China, there is a genuine concern about Japan in terms of its capability and intention. Japan is a country with great potential. Given that it only took 20 years or so after World War II to turn itself into the second largest economic power in the world, and considering its strong economic and technological base and diligent and well-educated workforce, Japan undoubtedly

will further expand its overall national strength. As early as in the early 1970s, the Chinese leaders have expressed their concern that Japan, after growing to become an economic giant, would seek to become a major political and military power. In the early 1980s, Japanese prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone formally laid out the objective for Japan to become a major political power, which was thereafter adopted as a major task of Japan's foreign policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, Tokyo has sped up its endeavor in this regard, particularly in the pursuit of permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Japan's active involvement in regional security affairs also raises its political profile. While the Chinese reluctantly admit it is just a matter of time before Japan achieves major political power status, they are more concerned with Japan's military buildup. Although Japan has not developed significant offensive capabilities, the steady increase in its defense budget since the late 1970s has produced a modern and formidable defense establishment. Apart from the United States, Japan has more major warships than any other Asian country or European member of NATO, and almost all of Japan's naval vessels are constructed and equipped with highly advanced technology, such as Aegis. In addition, Japan possesses or is developing advanced conventional naval and air capabilities based on weaponry and technology far superior to that which China possesses or can look forward to developing during the next decade. More seriously, China is concerned about the determination of Japan to develop a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. Japan's interest in plutonium-based nuclear reactors and its advanced-technology civilian missile program indicate Japanese possession of advanced strategic nuclear capability.⁸ In sum, if Japan is not yet a major military power, it is at least a latent one.⁹

In light of this reality, how will a politically and militarily strong Japan affect China's interests? There certainly exists a geopolitical concern that Japan as such will undermine China's influence in East Asia. As long as China is mainly a political-military power and Japan an economic power, each has its advantageous weight in the region. However, if Japan becomes a full-fledged power, it could overshadow China. Furthermore, if such a Japan remains a close ally to the United

States, then China will be confronted with a Tokyo-Washington condominium in the regional political landscape. Moreover, Japan as a major military power will exert more pressure on China's security, which is particularly true on the Taiwan issue—a militarily more powerful Japan will be more likely to invoke its alliance with the United States to intervene should a military conflict arise in the Taiwan Strait.

With regard to the contempt of Japan (as is reflected in the saying, “little Japan” [*xiao re ben*], popularly used by the Chinese public), the Chinese believe that in actuality Japan is not qualified to be a major power on a par with China. In terms of territory and population, Japan is a small country compared to China. As a nation, Japan has never significantly contributed to world civilization, and the Japanese are only good at copying and imitating—from China in ancient times, and from the West in the modern era.¹⁰ Most Chinese believe that if there should be a number one power in Asia, China possesses more attributes to fill this role than Japan does. The reason is not just that China is physically larger than Japan, but more important, China is a more benign power compared with Japan given their respective past patterns of behavior. Historically, when China was the center of the Sino-centric world order, China was content with a moral or cultural superiority—showing no interest in territorial expansion or military conquest. When Japan was the most powerful Asian country, however, it tried to conquer others by force. Therefore, China has more credibility than Japan in seeking a paramount position in Asia.

What also makes the Chinese feel uneasy about Japan is the fact that in spite of geographical, cultural, and ethnical proximity to China, Japan has followed the United States since the end of World War II. From a Chinese perspective, Japan should stay equidistant between China and the United States, if not closer to the former. Even though Japan physically is an Asian country, psychologically it is oriented toward the West—especially the United States. This makes it hard for the Chinese and some other Asian countries to accept Japan as a major power that is supposed to represent the Asian nations and defend their interests in the international arena. In addition, there is a palpable envy in the Chinese attitude toward Japan. A country that

had long lagged behind in the ancient period as China's student, committed aggression against China, and lost World War II, has now achieved great success in its national development and leads far ahead of China.

Still, there are some factors that prevent Sino-Japanese ties from being overstrained. One is economic interdependence. Japan is now an important market for Chinese exports, a major source of foreign direct investment and technology transfer,¹¹ and the number one provider of official developmental assistance to China. China ranks second in Japan's trading partners. The growing benefits of economic interactions provide the bilateral relationship with a kind of grease that can smooth any friction arising from political and security issues. In fact, in comparison to Sino-U.S. relations, which have a strong base in political-security dynamics, Sino-Japan relations are more economically oriented. When Beijing handles political and security disputes with Japan, there is a constant consciousness not to let the quarrel spill over into the economic field.

Another preventative factor is the concern over domestic political stability. One good example is the Diaoyu Island dispute in 1996, when Japanese rightists built a lighthouse on the island. This ignited strong response in Taiwan and Hong Kong, where people launched vigorous movements to defend the island (*bao diao yun dong*). On the mainland, college students tried to take to the street to protest, but Chinese leaders, fearing student protest against Japan would somehow evolve into a political movement against the Chinese government and undermine China's social-political stability, forbade any organized student protest within or outside the campus. Another example is the issue of individual Chinese reparation claims with Japan, as mentioned earlier. Although Beijing does not try to stop people from filing their claims, it has dispelled several organized protests in front of the Japanese embassy in China, worried that they may encourage other people to launch protests for different purposes. As a result, the concern over Chinese domestic social-political stability has served as a cap on the outright expression of public sentiment against Japan.

A third factor lies on the diplomatic front. In the post-Cold War era, trilateral relations among China, Japan, and the United States

have gained preeminence in the Asia-Pacific region. From Beijing's perspective, the best scenario is to maintain stable and harmonious relations with both Tokyo and Washington, or at least with one of the two, while the worst scenario would be to have relations with both the United States and Japan go sour. In a time when Sino-U.S. relations are still very unstable because of disputes over human rights and security, China needs to keep normal ties with Japan and should avoid driving Japan completely into the arms of the United States against China. One example is Chinese president Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in November 1998. The Chinese were not happy because Japan failed to express "remorse and apology" for its past aggression against China in the joint declaration, while it did use those words in the joint declaration with South Korea when President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan in October. Also, Japan declined to make a "three nos" commitment on the Taiwan issue, which President Bill Clinton had stated during his visit to China in July 1998. Out of dissatisfaction, Jiang continually mentioned the history issue during his six-day visit to Japan and made the Japanese feel "slighted."¹² Being concerned that bilateral relations may deteriorate, Beijing played down the history issue during Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi's trip to China in the summer of 1999, when Sino-U.S. relations were seriously hurt by the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

Since the meetings with Obuchi, Chinese leaders have taken a forward-looking posture toward bilateral ties. This does not mean China has reconciled with the way the Japanese deal with the history issue, but in a time when the relationship with Japan has gained more importance in a China-Japan-United States trilateral context, Chinese leaders do not want to overstrain it.

CONCLUSION

One major challenge confronting Sino-Japan relations in the years to come is growing mutual distrust. In late 1996, *China Youth Daily* conducted an opinion poll among the young Chinese with regard to their impressions of Japan. A total of 41.5 percent of the respondents said "not good" and 43.5 percent said "so-so." Almost at the same time,

an opinion poll conducted in Japan in February 1997 on Japanese impressions of China, showed 51 percent of respondents replied "not good."¹³ Behind these mutually negative perceptions is a growing mutual distrust. On the Japanese side, the need to pursue major political power status has led Tokyo to transform its "low-profile" diplomacy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s into a "high-profile" one. The younger Japanese generation feels much less sense of guilt for Japan's aggressive past. Nationalism has become an appealing symbol to the youths in the post-Cold War era for the first time since the end of World War II. Japanese domestic politics are turning more and more conservative, and concern is growing over the so-called "China threat." All of these conditions make the Chinese feel increasingly uncomfortable. For the Japanese, factors like the rise of Chinese material power and nationalism, drive toward defense modernization, vigilance at Japan's effort to seek a major political-military power status, criticism of the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance, continuous tensions in the Taiwan strait, and so forth have aroused its distrust of China.¹⁴ Increasing mutual distrust will not only aggravate existing mutually negative impressions, but could also fuel potential geopolitical competition between Beijing and Tokyo.

The future of Sino-Japan relations depends very much on how successfully each side adapts itself to the evolving context of bilateral ties. It requires development of new perspectives on and exploration of new areas of growth for bilateral relations. Each side should learn to view the other through a new lens that accurately reflects changing realities in respective domestic settings and external environments. More important, political leaders in both countries should try to make their respective national interests mutually accommodative rather than mutually exclusive.

The Chinese should take a forward-looking posture on relations with Japan and avoid bringing the history issue to the center of the bilateral agenda. Beijing should also realize that, under new circumstances, the basis for relations with Japan is no longer "friendliness" but "mutual benefit." It can be more sympathetic to Japan's aspiration for major power status and encourage Japan to play a constructive and responsible role in regional political, economic, and security affairs.

For their part, the Japanese should manifest more sensitivity in handling the history and Taiwan issues. Tokyo has not had to deal with a strong China in modern times; however, Japan should acknowledge the inevitability of the rise of China and work to nurture a partnership with Beijing in regional affairs. As the 1997–1998 East Asian financial crisis indicates, the interests of regional members have become more deeply intertwined and their destinies have been bound together even more tightly. A healthy and constructive relationship between China and Japan, the two major countries in East Asia, will advance not only the interests of the two, but also those of the entire region.

The United States is a crucial factor affecting China-Japan ties. From a political-strategic vantage point, both Beijing and Tokyo wish for closer ties with Washington. Each side is sensitive to any major progress in relations between the other side and the United States. In 1995 and 1996, when the United States and Japan worked closely to strengthen their security relations, China was concerned they might join hands to contain China. In 1997 and 1998, however, when Presidents Jiang and Clinton exchanged state visits and Sino-U.S. relations warmed, Japan was worried it might be neglected by Washington. If the United States can maintain balanced ties with both China and Japan, this will help create a healthy environment for Beijing-Tokyo relations. This will not only assuage the mutual distrust and concern between China and Japan, but it will also reduce the momentum for Sino-Japanese rivalry in Asia.

Things may go off track, however. If Japan seeks to turn itself into a traditional political-military power rather than a civilian power, it will revive all the Chinese memories of Japan's militarist past and aggravate their concerns over Japan. More alarmingly, should Japan adopt an aggressive preventive strategy toward China, a geopolitical competition—and even confrontation—may occur between the two. This is not a groundless concern. As a matter of fact, the notion of a “China threat,” stirred up by some media people and academics in the mid-1990s, originated in Japan.¹⁵ In 1995 and 1996, some influential Japanese think tanks proposed that in view of China becoming a full-fledged major power in early twenty-first century, Japan should

place its security policy on such pillars as maintaining and consolidating the Japan-U.S. security alliance; deepening cooperation with regional members, including Russia; and strengthening Japan's military muscle.¹⁶ Obviously, Japan's security policy has been following this line in recent years. If Beijing believes Tokyo is pursuing a policy of constraining China, then all the ideational factors about Japan—memory of history, negative images, distrust, and strategic concern—will drive China's Japan policy in a direction Japan does not want to see it go.

With all kinds of historical, perceptual, and realistic baggage, China-Japan relations are doomed to be complex, delicate, and difficult to handle. Management of this relationship will always stand as a test to the political wisdom of both leaderships in Beijing and Tokyo. And as long as Sino-Japanese relations are not placed on a healthy and solid basis, East Asia will remain a geographic term rather than a political-economic power, and cannot expect to play a due role in the world arena.

Notes

1. Xiao Jiwen, et. al., *Japan: a Country That Never Admits Guilt* (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 1998), p. 274.

2. For instance, in an opinion poll conducted in 1993 about "whether Japanese nationals are more outstanding than other nationals," 62 percent of the respondents said "yes." In 1983, 71 percent of the respondents had answered the same question with "yes." Quoted from Wu Jinan, *Japan on the Threshold to the New Century* (Shanghai: Shanghai Education Press, 1998), p. 52.

3. Xiao Jiwen, et al., *Japan: A Country That Never Admits Guilt*, pp. 234–35.

4. Zhao Jieqi, "Some Problems in Sino-Japanese Relations in the New Period," *Peace and Development* 2 (2000): 17–20

5. Xiao Han and Xiao Yang, *Yes, Clinton, No, Aircraft Carrier* (Harbin: Heilongjiang People's Press, 1999), p. 16.

6. For the evolutions of Chinese views of Japan, see Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, "Against Us or with Us? The Chinese Perspective of America's Alliances with Japan and Korea," (Working paper, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, May 1998).

7. Xiao Han and Xiao Yang, *Yes, Clinton, No, Aircraft Carrier*, p. 16.
8. With regard to China's concern about Japan's real and potential military capability, see Robert Ross, *Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 30, 1996), pp. 5–6.
9. Xiao Weizhong, *The Pacific Crisis*, (Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1996) p. 228.
10. Xiao Han and Xiao Yang, *Yes, Clinton, No, Aircraft Carrier*, p. 21.
11. The two-way trade between China and Japan in 1999 is about \$74 billion, with Japan as China's largest trading partner and China as Japan's second largest trading partner; Japan's cumulative direct investment in China totaled \$24.1 billion by April 1998.
12. Seiichiro Takagi, "In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan-China Relations in the post-Cold War Era," *Japan Review of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 36.
13. Quoted respectively from Gao Yuan, "Facing Reality, Enhancing Exchanges and Building Trust," *Peace and Development* 4 (1998): 9, and Zhao Jieqi, "Some Problems in Sino-Japanese Relations in the New Period," *Peace and Development* 2 (2000): 17.
14. For a review of the security concerns between China and Japan, please refer to Wu Xinbo, "The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations—Warily Watching One Another," *Asian Survey* (March/April 2000).
15. Murai Tomohide, "On the Latent Threat of China," *Shokun* 8 (1990).
16. Wu Jinan, *Japan on the Threshold to the New Century*, pp. 335–36; Zhao Jieqi, "Some Problems in Sino-Japanese Relations in the New Period," p. 19.

CHAPTER SIX

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

JAPAN-KOREA DIMENSIONS

Hajime Izumi

WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL ISSUES, UNDERLYING STRUCTURES, and strategic implications of “remembering and forgetting” that affect relations between Japan and Korea? Answering this question is not easy. There are several points to consider.

The perceptual gap between Japan and South Korea in their recognition of Japan’s 1910–1945 colonial rule of the Korean peninsula has long been a major source of conflict in the two countries’ bilateral relations. In dealing with South Korea, Japan tended to stress present and future cooperation rather than to resolve issues of history. In contrast, South Korea has often emphasized its critical interpretations of the past even in considering the future of Japan-South Korea relations. This results in large part from the distrust South Koreans have toward the Japanese. Koreans not only felt Japan’s apology for past colonial rule has been insufficient, but they also doubted Japan was ever going to justify it.

Because of Japan’s strong tendency to “forget the past” and South Korea’s tendency to “remember,” Japan-South Korea relations have often been confusing in the postwar years. Influenced by their divergent approaches to history, normalization talks between the two countries took more than 13 years before normalization actually occurred in 1965. Even after normalization, Tokyo-Seoul relations frequently took turns for the worse because of continuous differences

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in Japanese and South Korean historical perspectives—an ongoing “perceptual gap.”

The situation, however, has been changing ever since October 1998, when South Korean president Kim Dae-jung visited Japan and announced a joint declaration with Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi. In this declaration, Obuchi expressed “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for Japan’s colonial rule.¹ President Kim responded by saying he would seriously receive and evaluate Obuchi’s expression of historical recognition, and that both Japan and South Korea would endeavor to overcome the unfortunate history of the past and develop a future-oriented relationship.

Japan and South Korea agreed, in this joint declaration, to expand their relations in such comprehensive areas as politics, security, economy, and exchange of cultures and people. They also agreed to push their partnership forward, not on the bilateral level alone, but also for the peace and growth of the Asia-Pacific region and the entire international community. From that time onward, Japan–South Korea relations saw no trouble emerge out of historical recognition. The two countries have come to focus on a future-oriented relationship.

Tokyo and Seoul’s development of cooperation in the security area, as well as their extension of cooperation from mere bilateral to regional and global matters, indicates a new level of Japan–South Korea relations. However, there is no fundamental change in the structure by which Japan “forgets” the past and South Korea “remembers” it. The possibility remains that the historical recognition gap may again become a major issue in Japan–South Korea relations. Japan and South Korea should continuously make efforts to prevent the two countries’ pasts from hindering future cooperation.

Relations between Japan and North Korea are, of course, significant in analyzing questions of Tokyo–Seoul relations. Normalization has not been realized between the two, nor has “settling the past” been accomplished. That is, the perceptual gap between Tokyo and Pyongyang may emerge as a major problem between Japan and North Korea. And any dispute between Japan and North Korea will certainly influence the relationship between Japan and South Korea.

In particular, progress is expected in the relations between North and South Korea following the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Therefore, South Korea will have to become involved if Japan and North Korea begin serious efforts to resolve issues of the past.

Recent developments in Japan-North Korea relations are reviewed below before discussing the previous questions. In particular, the background of North Korea's recent willingness to negotiate with Japan is useful in deliberating the question of how Japan and South Korea should cope with North Korea.

RESUMPTION OF JAPAN-NORTH KOREA NORMALIZATION TALKS

Talks toward establishing normalizing diplomatic relations between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) resumed in April 2000 after a seven-and-a-half-year hiatus. After North Korea abruptly suspended bilateral talks in November 1992, several attempts were made to restart the dialogue, but all failed because Pyongyang was so intent on getting economic assistance from Japan that it paid little heed to other concerns. Resumption of the talks, however, is now seen by North Korea as a central element to its own security.

North Korea's fresh approach toward Japan, revealed in summer 1999, went beyond usual economic considerations to include other concerns such as assuring the continuance of the Kim Jong-il regime and easing the perception of Japan as a "military threat." This suggests Pyongyang is more serious and committed than before in negotiations with Tokyo. Indeed, North Korea has stepped away from its earlier inflexibility in approaching Japan to resume normalization talks, even going as far as opening new possibilities for compromise.

One specific example is the suprapartisan mission of Japanese Diet members to Pyongyang in early December 1999 in a delegation led by former prime minister Tomiichi Murayama. The joint statement issued by those involved from Japan and from the Korean Workers' Party stated in part: "Based on the talks and exchange of views conducted over past years between political parties and between the

governments of Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the two sides have agreed on the importance of resuming talks between the governments with a view to normalization of diplomatic relations, and have decided to urge their respective governments to resume negotiations at an early date."²

This agreement contained nothing new. Missions by representatives of Japan's three ruling coalition parties in March 1995 and November 1997 had also agreed with their North Korean counterparts to urge their respective governments to reopen negotiations at an early date. No government-to-government negotiations were later held in either case, however, because of North Korea's refusal to accept the premise of "unconditional resumption of talks."

The eight rounds of talks that took place between the Japanese and North Korean governments in 1991 and 1992 involved four major themes: basic problems, economic issues, international issues, and other matters. The Japanese government insisted, therefore, that those four topics should be on the negotiating table if the bilateral talks unilaterally suspended by Pyongyang were to be restarted.

While this seemed a reasonable request, Pyongyang had insisted the agenda be changed if the talks were to restart. Pyongyang sought to avoid dealing with questions regarding its nuclear program, its missile development, Pyongyang-Seoul relations, and other "international issues," as well as "other" topics that included allegations agents from North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens. The North Korean insistence stymied resumption of talks between the two governments, despite the agreements of 1995 and 1997 between the ruling Japanese and North Korean parties.

Since the December 1999 mission led by Murayama returned to Japan, however, North Korea has presented a much more positive posture. In a meeting of the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross organizations held toward the end of December 1999, for example, the North Koreans promised to conduct a thorough investigation into the issue of the "missing Japanese." In March 2000 it said it had resumed the investigation. Back in 1997, when the Japanese delegation from the three coalition parties went to North Korea,

the delegates had also agreed that there should be investigations into the "missing persons" issue. However, in June 1998 Pyongyang abruptly declared the investigation had ended and claimed there were no "missing Japanese" in North Korea. So far as Pyongyang was concerned, the issue was closed. But recent developments show its stance has now changed.

Such a change does not necessarily mean North Korea will aggressively pursue the issue of the suspected abductions. Officially, Pyongyang still insists there is no merit to the issue. But Pyongyang's willingness to compromise on this point helps strengthen the impression it is serious about reopening normalization talks with Japan.

North Korea made another compromise by agreeing to place all four of the previous discussion topics on the agenda. While the 1995 and 1997 missions did not lead to bilateral talks, the resumption of talks this time seems attributable in large part to changes in the North Korean attitude. But what is behind these changes? The answer may be found by examining the changes that have occurred in Pyongyang's foreign policy over the past year.

PYONGYANG'S ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE

In mid-May 1999, Kim Jong-il summoned Wan Yongxiang, the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, for lunch. It was Kim's first meeting with a Chinese ambassador since the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in July 1994. Restoration of relations between Pyongyang and Beijing began to show substantial progress from that point. During the lunch, Kim Jong-il applauded the achievements of China's "reform and open-door" policy and requested that China receive a "mission of high-ranking government representatives" from Pyongyang. He then explained North Korea's foreign policy objectives at considerable length, emphasizing restoration and normalization of its relations with the United States, Japan, and the European Union.

This commitment expressed by Kim Jong-il led to a statement in early June 1999 by Chinese president Jiang Zemin when a mission led by Kim Yong-nam, the head of North Korea's Supreme People's Assem-

bly, visited China. Jiang stated that China would support North Korea in restoring and ultimately normalizing its relations with the nations of the Western world: the United States, Japan, and the European Union.³ Jiang made the remark because Kim Jong-il had made the point, and China regarded it as a serious commitment. In return, China declared its support for North Korea's normalization endeavors.

These events demonstrate North Korea's resolve since early 1999 to pursue an active and thoroughgoing foreign policy initiative. The origin of Kim Jong-il's efforts probably stems from the U.S.-North Korea talks held in March 1999. During the talks, Pyongyang agreed to allow a U.S. inspection team to visit a suspected underground nuclear site in Kumchangri. It assented, moreover, to at least three such "site visits" and agreed that after the third, scheduled for 2001, the United States and North Korea would start studying how to convert the Kumchangri underground facilities to "civilian use."

From Pyongyang's point of view, extraordinary resolve was necessary to conclude such an agreement with the United States at the time. Pyongyang's willingness to allow U.S. visits to its military facilities and possible future "joint development" of the facilities suggested that Kim Jong-il had been able to assuage dissatisfaction and concern within the North Korean military. This suggests the stability of his regime and supports a strong sense that Pyongyang had decided to stop being confrontational with Washington and to move toward settling problems through negotiation.

From that point, Kim Jong-il began giving priority to improving foreign relations and restoring relations with the international community. Pyongyang's recently renewed interest in bilateral talks with Japan should be viewed in the context of Pyongyang's drive for "restoration and normalization" of relations with Japan. At least these were among the foreign policy objectives Kim Jong-il explained to Chinese ambassador to North Korea Wan Yongxiang, seemingly a clear indication that Kim Jong-il desires better relations with Japan within North Korea's overall foreign policy objectives.

NEW ELEMENTS BEHIND PYONGYANG'S POLICY SHIFT VIS-À-VIS JAPAN

Of course, there are other factors behind North Korea's policy shift toward Japan. As plainly shown in the 10 August 1999 North Korean government statement of policy toward Japan, Pyongyang also wants a guarantee of continuation of the Kim Jong-il regime (seeking to ensure Japan will abandon what is seen as a policy to force North Korea to crumble); financial compensation (demanding substantive reparations for the suffering inflicted during Japan's colonial rule); and easing of Japan's military threat (expressing strong apprehensions about Japan's increasing military capability). North Korea concentrated until recently on financial compensation from Japan. Since the summer of 1999, however, in addition to compensation, North Korea has considered "obtaining a guarantee for the Kim regime" and "easing the military threat" as crucial agenda items. Japan's effort to enhance its defense capabilities over the past few years has become another important element behind North Korea's recent attitude change toward Japan.

Kim Jong-il undoubtedly perceives Japan to be second only to the United States as a threat to his country's security. Pyongyang has sensed a change in Japan that began with the reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. security relationship in 1996. Japan's activities to increase security since North Korea launched its Taepodong ballistic missile in August 1998 have underscored North Korean concerns. Japan adopted several measures in the past year and a half that have added to North Korea's apprehensions:

1. the decision domestically to produce intelligence satellites;
2. commencement of Japan-U.S. joint research on a theater (ballistic) missile defense system;
3. coast guard action to counter North Korea spy ships;
4. Diet approval of legislation supporting new Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines;
5. movement to establish laws to prepare Japan for emergencies involving military confrontation;

6. the decision to introduce airborne refueling planes; and
7. establishment of a research commission on Japan's constitution within both houses of the Diet.

Among these moves, North Korea feels most strongly threatened by the introduction of tanker planes, which it believes would give Japan the capability to attack directly military bases in North Korea.

Pyongyang has apparently become more earnest about dialogue with Tokyo because it regards Japan as a new military threat. North Korea would be less serious about the talks if only economic factors were involved, as is obvious from the ease with which it suspended the normalization talks with Japan in 1992. Pyongyang now sees Japan's defense efforts and its commitment to the alliance with the United States as formidable impediments if North Korea should use force against South Korea—a grave “threat” from the North Korean point of view.

One of the three basic issues addressed in the August 1999 North Korean government statement of policy toward Japan—the growing military threat from Japan—was intended to intimidate Japan with an ultimatum, declaring that if Japan attempts to justify its desire for military aggression and ultimately uses force against North Korea, North Korea would have no choice but to retaliate in kind. By deeming such a provocative remark to be necessary, Pyongyang unintentionally revealed its perception of Japanese defense efforts as a threat.

This assessment is supported by analysis of the tone of opinions expressed against “Japan's military buildup” in *Rodong Shinmun* (Labor Daily), North Korea's party newspaper. Pyongyang's behavioral pattern is such that once it decides a certain country presents a military threat, it seeks serious talks with that country. This can be deduced from the fact Pyongyang has consistently sought serious talks with the United States. As a result of the change in North Korea's apparent perception of Japan, ironically, Japan seems to have gained new leverage. Normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea would give Pyongyang the guarantee it wants for the Kim Jong-il regime and ease Japan's military threat, while supporting its campaign for financial compensation. Pyongyang has not emphasized the

necessity of diplomatic normalization at official meetings yet, but there is a good possibility North Korea could eventually advocate normal relations with Japan in conjunction with a reparations settlement.

JAPAN'S DILEMMA OVER THE QUESTION OF THE PAST

As has been described, Japan and South Korea agreed, in their 1998 joint declaration, on promoting security cooperation and on dealing with North Korea. In an environment in which no negotiations were occurring between Japan and North Korea or between North and South Korea, Japan and South Korea could easily promote cooperation to counter North Korean military threats.

The situation, however, has changed since spring 2000. The negotiations between Japan and North Korea have resumed, and the North-South summit has become reality. Economic cooperation will likely grow in the future between North and South Korea. These changes may complicate Japan-South Korea cooperation.

It is expected that North Korea will persist in demands for “settling the past” (apology and compensation)—the same attitude as in the past—in its negotiations with Japan. South Korea did not always support such North Korean claims. With the June 2000 North-South summit as a turning point, however, the prospect for better North-South relations has increased the likelihood that South Korea will indirectly support North Korea’s arguments. Because South Korea does not have sufficient funds to provide large-scale economic assistance to North Korea, it would welcome Japan’s earliest decision to give “compensation” and economic assistance to the North. There is a significant possibility that the South would also ask Japan to assist the North economically even before normalizing Tokyo-Pyongyang relations.

If this behavior becomes an actuality, Japan will be placed in a difficult position. Unless progress is made in Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear weapons program as well as the alleged abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents, Japan cannot launch large-scale economic assistance to North Korea or normalize relations with the North. However, if Japan continues to reject the North’s

demands, its relationship with South Korea might change slightly. Improved North-South relations always hold the possibility of creating new tensions in Japan-South Korea relations.

If South Korea gives priority to North-South economic cooperation over the reduction of Korean Peninsula military tensions, the situation will become more complicated: differences between Japan and South Korea will expand and affairs related to the perceptual gap of history could resurface between Japan and the South.

This scenario is not likely. However, it is a possibility we cannot ignore. Therefore, we need to work on Japan-South Korea alignment for the twenty-first century.

WHAT JAPAN HAS TO DO NOW

Based on the above discussions, let us consider key tasks Japan and South Korea should carry out in the future. Japan's first urgent step is to resolve difficulties in Tokyo-Pyongyang relations. This requires convincing Pyongyang that Japan is not only ready but also willing to make a "settlement of the past" (i.e., an "apology" and "compensation"). Pyongyang should in return solve the "abduction" question and eliminate its military threat against Japan. One problem is that Pyongyang is reluctant to strike such "deals" because it doubts Japan can settle past issues even if North Korea takes favorable actions to resolve the issues of North Korea's abductions and threat.

North Korea does not hesitate to call Japan a "century-old enemy." Because of such deep distrust and rivalry, it is natural that North Korea holds doubts about Japan's stance. However, Japan should not leave these tendencies intact. Tokyo has to remove North Korea's misunderstandings as early as possible and induce Pyongyang to grapple with questions in regards to abductions and missiles. For this, conveying Japan's intentions directly to Kim Jong-il and cultivating his understanding are essential. Practically, the Japanese prime minister can express, by means of an "open letter," that Japan has the will and preparations for settling the past, or the Japanese government can dispatch the prime minister's special envoy to explain it directly to Kim Jong-il. Japan needs to consider these possibilities without delay.

As to its settlement measures regarding an apology and compensation to North Korea, Japan must also give sufficient explanations to South Korea beforehand. When it normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965, Japan executed economic cooperation, which corresponds to “compensation” but included no apology in its official document. Therefore, Japan would show a different attitude toward North Korea from that toward South Korea. And, because of this, getting South Korea’s understanding and consent in advance will become an extremely important step for Japan.

The Japanese attitude toward the question of “apology” has changed greatly in the past 35 years. Particularly since 1995, the Japanese government has come to express its apologies more clearly toward Asian countries. For instance, in October 1995 (the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific war) then-prime minister Murayama said the following in his statement announced in the form of a “special talk”:

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regret, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.⁴

In October 1998, the “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” the Japanese prime minister stated toward Asian countries was repeated specifically to South Korea, as has been described in the opening of this chapter. Considering this sequence of occurrences, it will be reasonable for Japan to include its apology to North Korea in its official text at the time of normalizing relations with the North. But before this apology, it is essential for Japan to give a sufficient account and obtain a good understanding and the assent of South Korea. The con-

sent of the South Korean public is especially a prerequisite. Japan's "settlement of the past" with North Korea is only possible after it is welcomed by South Korea.

Second, Japan promptly needs to plan the exact form of compensation it will provide North Korea. In the August 2000 round of Japan-North Korea normalization talks in Tokyo, Japan presented the idea of applying the same "economic cooperation" formula as it did in 1965 for making "compensation" to South Korea. North Korea has not yet accepted this Japanese idea, but since 1991 it comprehends "economic cooperation" is the only way for "compensation" from Japan to materialize. It would be safe to estimate that North Korea will accede to the "economic cooperation" formula before long.

For this reason, Japan must make out the details of its "economic cooperation" program promptly. After normalization in 1965, Japan provided South Korea with \$300 million in grants and \$200 million in government loans, both by means of Japanese products and services, as well as an additional \$300 million in commercial loans. If this model were applied to North Korea minus the commercial loans, the "grant" would account for 60 percent, the "loan" 40 percent. If the "grant" portion is increased, the total scale of "economic cooperation" that Japan could afford will be reduced relatively. Pyongyang may not be satisfied with this, but thinking of Japan's relationship with South Korea, the Japanese government has to adhere to the idea of 60 percent grant and 40 percent loan. Even if the form of "economic cooperation" to North Korea differs from what once went to South Korea, Japan may have consent from South Korea at the time of practice. However, these issues may cause discontent and criticism in the South in the future.

Nevertheless, in a way, some difference is desired. For example, providing Japanese products and services as a "grant" and a "loan" just as has been done with South Korea is not recommended. In the "loan" program for North Korea, the Japanese government should earnestly consider only bearing expenses and accomplishing most of the program by using South Korean products and services. Anticipation for that style already exists on the part of South Korea. If Japan

adopts such practices, South Korea can support North Korea in part by using Japan's money. This system of cooperation, at any rate, would lead to further progress in North-South relations, as well as advance Japan-South Korea relations. It may represent the best formula for all parties concerned.

NEW FORM OF JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA COOPERATION VIS-À-VIS NORTH KOREA

Apart from the above, Japan and South Korea can jointly take two further steps. The first is strongly to urge North Korea to enter into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although Japan and South Korea agreed on this need in the annex of their joint declaration of 1998,⁵ it has not been stressed. North Korea's attitude has been negative, especially regarding to the CWC, which imposes "verification" obligations. Nevertheless, both Japan and South Korea should strongly ask North Korea to conclude the CTBT and CWC. Japan must explicitly specify it as a precondition for normalization between Japan and North Korea.

Second, Japan and South Korea need to help North Korea understand that simply joining international financial organizations, such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, will not necessarily make their financial resources immediately available to Pyongyang. For example, North Korea's unpaid trade account vis-à-vis Japan amounts to nearly \$1 billion, but if the North were to renege, it will experience difficulties in gaining loans from international financial organizations. Both Japan and South Korea must firmly advise Pyongyang on the need for an agreed repayment plan with Japan, or at least for repaying the interest owed Japan.

It is also important for South Korea to take measures to fulfill the "Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" signed in 1991. This would eliminate the possibility of North Korea developing or owning nuclear arms, and subsequently would facilitate Japan's normalizing relations with North Korea.

The process for implementing the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization previously came to a deadlock in 1992, in part because of

North and South Korea discrepancies over “mutual inspections.” The situation, has now changed. The North-South summit was realized, and North-South exchange and cooperation is advancing. The environment for implementing mutual inspections is better ordered than it used to be. The time has come for South Korea to act for the implementation of the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization.

However, South Korea currently is quite reluctant to implement this declaration. This may reflect South Korean considerations about a future “nuclear option.” Since South Koreans worry Japan may seek a future nuclear capability Seoul may want to hold a nuclear development option in reserve against such Japanese movement. In any case, North and South Korea need “institutionalizing denuclearization” to implement the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization completely, and Japan is called on to join that effort.

Therefore, I have continued to insist on international arrangements to establish a “Northeast Asia Nuclear Nonproliferation Zone” and to position North and South Korea and Japan as “nonnuclear nations.”⁶ Now that the North-South dialogue has resumed, a golden opportunity exists. Earnest discussions could open between Japan and South Korea to examine how the North-South Joint Declaration of Denuclearization could be implemented.

If the above proposals are realized, these possibilities could become unprecedented reality:

- the Korean Peninsula will be denuclearized;
- North Korea’s missile program will be restricted extensively;
- North Korea will respect international norms;
- North Korea and Japan will “settle the past”;
- North Korea’s economy will recover;
- North and South Korea will establish “coexistence and coprosperity”; and
- the Korean Peninsula will know permanent peace and stability.

Cooperation in this direction is what is most strongly expected of present-day Japan and South Korea.

Notes

1. "Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership toward the Twenty-first Century," October 8, 1998, Tokyo.
2. "Joint Statement between Japanese Political Parties Delegation and Korean Workers' Party," December 3, 1999, Pyongyang.
3. *Xinhua*, June 5, 1999.
4. "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama," August 15, 1995, Tokyo.
5. "Annex: Action Plan for a New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership toward the Twenty-first Century," October 8, 1998, Tokyo.
6. On this point, see Hajime Izumi, "Japan and the Korean Peninsula: The Idea of a 'Northeast Asia Nuclear Nonproliferation Zone,'" in *U.S. and Japanese Nonproliferation Export Controls*, Gary K. Bertsch, et al., eds. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1996).



CHAPTER SEVEN

REMEMBERING JAPAN AND NORTH KOREA

THE POLITICS OF MEMORY IN SOUTH KOREA

Hahm Chaibong and Kim Seog-gun

ANTICOLONIALISM AND ANTICOMMUNISM ARE THE TWIN PILLARS on which modern (South) Korean self-identity has been built.¹ To be sure, the Korean people have a recorded history that stretches back some 1,500 years. However, since Korea's encounter with modernity and its nearly simultaneous colonization by Japan at the turn of the twentieth century, the memory of the struggle for independence has provided a vast reservoir of narrative and discursive practices by which Koreans have come to articulate their modern self-identity. In the modern era, Japan became the "other" of the Korean "self." Then, during the second half of the twentieth century, the struggle against communism became the formative historical experience by which South Koreans came to construct their identity. Before they scarcely had time to celebrate independence, Koreans found themselves in the midst of the Cold War. The devastation and suffering caused by national division and the Korean War that followed in rapid succession, and the ideological and armed confrontation that continue to this day, have provided a vast pool of memory and a powerful narrative structure upon which to build South Korean identity.

However, the discourses of anticolonialism and anticommunism have not coexisted comfortably. In fact, understanding the complicated

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interplay of the memory of these two formative historical experiences is one of the keys to understanding the modern Korean mind-set. In this chapter, we will first attempt to delineate the history and logic of Korean attitudes toward Japan. Subsequently, we will show in what ways the end of the Cold War and the more recent South-North Korean summit meeting affect and restructure Korean self-identity and strategic posture.

ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN: THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Seoul is the only major metropolis in the world in which it is difficult to find Japanese cars. It is not often that Japanese movies are shown in Korean movie houses or that Japanese songs are heard on the radio, even though the ban against them was recently lifted. None of the top universities in Korea has a department of Japanese language or literature. The greatest hero of Korean nationalism and struggle for independence from Japanese rule is Ahn Joong-kun, who assassinated Ito Hirobumi, the architect and hero of modern Japan. None of this is to say Korean society is immune from Japanese economic and cultural influence. On the contrary, Korea is continuously exposed to, and deeply influenced by, things Japanese. The bilateral relationship runs deep and is crucial in all respects. South Korea's economic takeoff beginning in the mid-1960s could scarcely have been possible without a massive inflow of Japanese technology and capital. Korean steel, shipbuilding, automobile, and computer chip industries, symbols of the Korean economic miracle, all had their beginnings with Japanese input. To the chagrin of many Japanese business leaders, Korean industries that now compete head-on in the global market with Japanese counterparts were built with a great deal of Japanese help.

The situation in the cultural realm is quite similar. Korean adults are perhaps the greatest connoisseurs of Japanese popular songs, while Korean youngsters are the most avid fans of Japanese cartoons, animation, and rock bands, not to mention computer games. One revealing episode has it that during a soccer match between the two national teams—always a major national event—Korean fans started to

cheer their team by singing a popular theme song from a television cartoon. They were joined in the chorus by the Japanese fans, who to their surprise and delight, found Koreans to be singing a tune also very familiar to them. Of course, the cartoon was Japanese, but when it was shown in Korea over the years, it was never acknowledged by the TV stations as being Japanese, although even the theme song was kept, with only the words changed to Korean.

However, such help and influence is rarely acknowledged. If Japanese cultural influence is acknowledged at all, it is done only as a way of expressing negative approval ("too much Japanese influence in our popular culture," "bad influence on children and teenagers," and so forth). In the economic sphere, Japan is regarded only as Korea's foremost competitor, the enemy to beat in the global marketplace. If Japanese help is acknowledged at all, it is seen as just compensation for their exploitation of Korea during the colonial years. A common joke in Korea is that the best thing that ever happened to the Korean economy was to be situated next to Japan. Because Japan was so close, it was easy to do business with what for a very long time was one of the most vibrant economies in the world and now is its second largest. But perhaps more revealingly, it means that Koreans always felt that they had to compete against, and ultimately beat the Japanese, a goal that drove them to work very hard, indeed. It is said Koreans are the only people who make the Japanese look lazy by comparison, or Koreans are the only people in the world who have the "temerity" to think they can beat the Japanese at the economic game.

Such an ambivalent or conflicted attitude toward Japan is clearly revealed in the opinion surveys taken in Korea on popular attitudes toward Japan. The results from a survey undertaken by *Dong-a Ilbo*, one of the largest dailies in Korea, are typical.² When asked to name the country within the region they disliked the most, some 68.9 percent of the respondents chose Japan. (Interestingly, in 1984 the figure for the same category was only 38.9 percent and 50.6 percent in 1988, showing an increasing percentage of Koreans saying they dislike Japan most among neighboring countries.) Japan was also picked as the country to be most guarded against (62 percent), with North Korea running a distant second (16.2 percent), United States third (11.3

percent), China fourth (7.5 percent), and Russia fifth (2.8 percent). However, in the same survey, when asked which country Koreans should learn the most from, fully 67.4 percent of the respondents chose Japan. In this category the United States was the distant second (24.1 percent), followed by China (5.3 percent) and Russia (2.3 percent). Interestingly, older respondents were more likely to choose the United States and younger respondents, Japan. Also revealing was the finding that Koreans think the Japanese are most likely to oppose Korean reunification (53.0 percent). It is widely believed among Koreans that the Japanese have gained the most from the division of the Korean peninsula into two warring camps and thus are least enthusiastic about Korean reunification.

THE DISCOURSES OF THE COLD WAR AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Such conflicted attitudes toward Japan are the result of a combination of anti-Japanese sentiment arising from the colonial experience on the one hand and the logic of the Cold War and the exigencies of economic development on the other. The Cold War introduced an immediate threat to South Koreans, namely the North Korean Communists. As the world came to be divided not along "Korea v. Japan," or "nationalism v. imperialism/colonialism," but rather "left v. right," or "communism v. capitalism/democracy" lines, South Koreans suddenly found Japan to be a major ally in the ideological struggle. Under the U.S. umbrella, both nuclear and ideological, Korea and Japan together became the bulwark against communism in East Asia.

Under the new alignment, Korea was quickly forced to make amends with Japan. In addition to pressure from the United States, the growing competition with the North forced South Korea to seek economic aid and assistance from Japan in exchange for normalization of relations. Thus in 1965, against massive opposition from the public, then recently elected president Park Chung-hee restored full diplomatic relations with Japan. Of course, North Korea was in a very different situation and felt no pressure or need to normalize relationship with Japan. This was to become a major burden on South

Korean memory or its attempts to come to terms with it, as we will see later.

Thus began a bilateral relationship that to this day has been the source of stability in the region but perhaps not as stable as one would think and hope. That Japan maintained a steady conservative course under the long rule of the Liberal Democratic Party fit perfectly with what South Korea was seeking from Japan, despite Japan's unwillingness or inability to apologize for the past and minor conflagrations resulting from some very politically incorrect utterances made by an occasional Japanese politician. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, anti-Japanese feelings in South Korea remained strong, leading to bans on Japanese cars, consumer electronics, movies, songs, and the teaching of the Japanese language in universities. However, South Korea never allowed any of this to get in the way of emulating and playing catch-up with Japan in the economic sphere, or to seek Japanese cooperation in the security arena.

Under this arrangement, South Korea prospered. Even while devoting up to a quarter of the national budget for national defense and maintaining constant vigilance against North Korean armed provocations, South Korea achieved stunning economic growth. During the past decade, it also made a successful transition to democracy. All this would have been scarcely imaginable in the absence of the security arrangements and economic cooperation with the United States and Japan. To be sure, the security arrangements reflected the unease South Korea felt in forging a direct military alliance with Japan. Thus, it was a series of bilateral security treaties with the United States, rather than a direct one between South Korea and Japan, that undergirded the alliance structure of the region. Communism and its Northeast Asian "proxy," North Korea, became the common enemy whose threat became the glue that bound South Korea and Japan in a most unlikely alliance.

With the end of the Cold War, however, Korean perceptions of Japan increasingly came to be colored by nationalism once again. Even though the Cold War did not quite end on the Korean peninsula, even with the fall of the Soviet bloc, the South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship so dependent on the Cold War conflict began to lose its

mooring. Within Japan, the political demise of left-progressive political forces removed what restraining influence it had on the ruling conservative coalition's extreme right wing. From the South Korean perspective, it was another no-win situation. The fall of Marxism vindicated its decision to pursue capitalist and democratic development, unlike the rival North, which suddenly, found itself isolated ideologically, politically, and economically. However, it also decimated the Marxists, the only political force in Japan that openly disavowed her imperialist past. Not coincidentally, the 1990s witnessed an alarming increase in the number of pronouncements by Japanese political leaders with distinctly militaristic overtones, attempting to justify Japan's past aggressions against her neighbors. Revisionist Japanese history textbooks, Japanese politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, comfort women, disputed territory of D'okdo/Takeshima, issues hitherto kept under the lid in the interest of ideological bond and strategic alliance, have become major thorns in the side of the bilateral relationship. All this, of course, while the U.S. military presence in both countries came under increasing criticism by the respective public of the two countries.

THE TWO KOREAS AND THE DISCOURSE OF NATIONALISM

As the ideological standoff became a moot point with the demise of the Soviet bloc and the overwhelming economic and political success of the South, the nature of the competition between the two Koreas also began to change. Once the urgency of Cold War rhetoric began to lose its force, the discourse of nationalism—hitherto relegated to a secondary status—resurfaced. However, with the return of the nationalist discourse, it was the South, ironically, that found itself on the defensive, vis-à-vis the North. Let us see why.

The appeal to nationalism has always been the weapon of choice by the North Korean regime in its struggle against the South. North Korean propaganda tried to portray the South-North competition in terms not only of “decadent capitalism v. socialism,” but also of nationalism. They argued that Kim Il-sung, the founder of the regime,

was a legendary independence fighter. The myth has it he began to organize armed resistance against the Japanese as a teenager. The point here, obviously, is not the historical accuracy of these allegations, but that such propaganda reveals the extent to which the North Korean regime's claim to legitimacy was built on anti-Japanese nationalist rhetoric.

The North has always emphasized the fact that while they purged their society of all the Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese colonial government, the South failed to do so. In its effort to shore up Seung-man Rhee's regime, which had little support from the Korean public after independence, the U.S. occupying forces enlisted the aid of the police and the military, both of which were built by the Japanese and headed by Korean collaborators. Hence, while in the North Kim Il-sung undertook bloody purges of collaborators in the process of building his regime, Seung-man Rhee built his with their help. Here we see the beginnings of an argument that would receive its full articulation in the ideology of *juche*, or self-reliance.

According to this line of argument, the Korean people of both South and North were collective victims of the superpower confrontation. The Korean people had to suffer national division because of deals between superpowers that were more than willing to use weak people such as Koreans as pawns in their superpower games. The Korean War was not a war between Communists and those who tried to defend freedom. Rather, it was a nationalistic war to rid the nation of foreign influence and a puppet regime supported by it. Kim Il-sung was not a war criminal who started a fratricidal war at the beckoning of the Soviet Union and with the help of Communist China, but a leader of the people who tried to liberate his southern brethren from imperialist aggression. The reunification of the nation was thwarted by the intervention of American imperialists, who saw Korea as the linchpin of their grand strategy to dominate East Asia.

If this line of argument is followed, North Korea comes out the winner. As the regime in the North argues, North Korea does not have a foreign military presence on its soil, while the South does. Regardless of the reasons, it is a fact that the North Korean regime has full

command of its military forces, while the South Korean government does not. Unlike the South, the North did not capitulate to the Japanese by hurriedly normalizing relations with the former colonial aggressors. Despite poverty, the North was able to maintain its sense of national pride and independence, while the South sold its soul to capitalism and American imperialists, even though it came to enjoy economic prosperity by doing so.

There is an inexorable logic to this virulent form of nationalism. And if nationalism becomes the sole criterion by which to measure political legitimacy in Korea, it is unclear the South could win. Even its vaunted economic success and democratization does not seem to help much. The close security alliance forged between South Korea, the United States, and Japan also suddenly takes a rather sinister tone. Is the U.S. military presence in South Korea a tripwire to deter Communist aggression or a barrier to reunification based on the principles of national reconciliation and self-determination? Should the South continue to maintain a close alliance with Japan, its unrepentant former colonial master?

Such arguments found increasing acceptance among radical students and intellectuals of the South in the 1980s. Faced with military-backed authoritarian regimes, which, they thought, were in turn backed by the United States through the powerful South Korea-U.S. security alliance, many began to employ the rhetoric of national self-determination. Works by "revisionists" such as Carter Eckert and Bruce Cummings found a wide audience among students and intellectuals in South Korea.³ Eckert argued that capitalism in South Korea had its beginnings during the Japanese occupation and that those of the current economic elite in South Korea are direct descendents of those who collaborated and prospered under Japanese rule. Cummings argued that the right-wing leaders of the post-independence period in South Korea, including Seung-man Rhee and Kim Koo, had little, if any grassroots support from the people. They consolidated power only with the backing of the U.S. military government, which had no other consideration than fighting the Communists and which felt no compunction in hiring the Korean remnants of the Japanese colonial

regime. Nationalist discourse needs imperialist aggressors. Japan, the former colonial master that continues to be an overwhelming economic presence, and the United States, which maintains ground troops on the South Korean soil, are the imperialists of choice.

Ironically, such arguments are finding increasing acceptance once again in postdemocratization, post-Cold War South Korea. Those who argue for continued vigilance against North Korean aggression and call for maintaining strategic alliances with the United States and Japan are branded as Cold War warriors unwilling to accept the changing reality and loathe to let go of the status quo because of their own stakes in maintaining it. Furthermore, they are seen as being antinationalist or unpatriotic.

The ease with which the rhetoric of nationalism came to take over in the South has as much to do with problems of legitimacy with South Korean political discourse as with the South-North relationship. South Korea's economy was built by former military leaders who came to power through coups that overturned democratically elected governments. President Park Chung-hee came to power through a bloodless coup in 1961. He subsequently started the program of rapid industrialization that laid the foundations for the modern South Korean economy. However, in doing so, he suppressed opposition political leaders and movements. When he was assassinated in 1979, despite all his accomplishments, his rule and regime had been fundamentally scarred by 18 years of human rights violation and political repression. The brutal suppression of the Kwangju uprising in 1980 by General Chun Doo-hwan, who later on assumed the presidency, undercut what remaining legitimacy the military-backed regimes had. Ever since, the "original sin" of the military leaders made the succeeding regimes of Presidents Chun and Roh Tae-woo "illegitimate" despite an economic success that became the envy of the world. The goals of security and economic development were reached at the cost of political legitimacy.

The election of President Kim Young-sam brought to power an individual who had staked his political fortune and fate on the struggle against authoritarian regimes in the name of democracy. Although he

had allied himself with former president Rho to form a conservative political coalition that put him in the Blue House, President Kim's rule was distinguished more by his efforts to distance himself from the authoritarian regimes of the past than by an interest in achieving reconciliation. The election of President Kim Dae-jung, another champion of the struggle for democracy in 1997, even more emphatically shifted the basis of political legitimacy in South Korea to democratization from economic development and national security. This, despite the fact that he also forged an alliance with Kim Jong-pil, one of Park Chung-hee's closest associates and a symbol of the authoritarian era, to win the presidency. Moreover, President Kim had made known from early on his desire to bring about a reconciliation of the two Koreas. The terms of the debate shifted unmistakably from national security and economic development to democratization and reconciliation with the North.

THE SUMMIT

The historic summit between the two leaders of the Koreas was an event masterfully staged by Kim Jong-il to appeal to and strengthen the ultranationalist rhetoric always employed by the North that is now finding increasing acceptance in the South. When he personally came out to greet President Kim Dae-jung at the airport, Kim Jong-il showed himself as a leader who transcended memories of past hostilities between the two Koreas in the interest of the Korean people as a whole. The surprisingly forthcoming and "rational" manner in which he greeted the visitors from the South, all accentuated by past rumors of dissolute lifestyle and questions regarding his ability to even think and communicate normally, left an indelibly favorable impression on the South Korean public.

The personal popularity of the "Dear Leader" aside, troubling enough in itself, the summit was portrayed in both South and North Korea in terms much closer to the rhetoric of the North than the South, namely, ultranationalism. It is very difficult for a Korean to resist the deep emotional appeal of the idea of national self-determination. All schoolchildren in South Korea learn the greatest moment of

national pride came in March 1, 1919. It was then the people of Korea rose up in a peaceful demonstration against the brutal Japanese colonial government, which put down the nonviolent protest with every imaginable form of brutality. They also learn that the movement was inspired by the principles of "National Self-Determination," pronounced by President Woodrow Wilson that same year. When the two Korean leaders embraced each other and celebrated the event as the first time in a century that Koreans came together to determine the fate of the nation and the people without foreign intervention, few eyes were left dry in the South.

The fact that the North Korean regime has sponsored terrorism, flaunted all internationally accepted norms of conduct, and starved its people to death were all forgotten, and maybe even forgiven, the moment Chairman Kim Jong-il embraced President Kim Dae-jung in the name of the people. Calls to help North Korea recover through massive economic and humanitarian aid from the South began to surface. Talk of the removal of the U.S. army in the South and the dismantling of the stringent National Security Act also began to be heard almost immediately in the South.

THE FUTURE

Given fundamental shifts of the terms of political discourse in the world, the region, and within Korea, many of the norms and conceptual schemes that undergirded the security arrangements in East Asia are also undergoing fundamental change. Even though the alliance structure forged between South Korea, the United States, and Japan, which have hitherto served to bring stability to the region, is still intact, the rhetoric that used to legitimate it is rapidly losing its grip on reality. The ascendant nationalistic sentiment in both Koreas and Japan, a natural consequence of the erosion of the Cold War terms of discourse, does not bode well for the maintenance of the region's current strategic arrangements. If the rapprochement between South and North Korea proceeds as rapidly as it is now widely assumed, the future will only become harder to forecast. The discourse of the Cold War may finally end. Strategic thinkers who built the world around it

will have to articulate a new vision for future security arrangements in the region. However, building a new strategic balance in the region will require a breadth of vision and depth of historical knowledge even greater than those possessed by the architects of the earlier order.

Notes

1. The research for this chapter has been partially funded by the Brain Korea 21 Project. The authors would like to thank Mr. Cho Jinman for his research assistance.

2. *Dong-a Ilbo*, July 29, 1995.

3. Carter Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'Ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996); Bruce Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).



CHAPTER EIGHT

INDONESIA AND THE PROBLEM OF REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

Rizal Sukma

THE STORY OF INDONESIA IN THE POST-SUHARTO ERA is a story of a nation's painful encounter with the paradox of hope and despair resulting from the legacy of three decades of authoritarian rule of the New Order and of its inability to march toward a clear future path. The fall of President Suharto in May 1998, on the one hand, has paved the way for Indonesia to move toward a period of democratic transition. During a brief interregnum under President B. J. Habibie, who succeeded Suharto from May 1998 to October 1999, Indonesia for the first time in 45 years managed to conduct a free and fair general election in June 1999 and a democratic presidential election that brought Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency in October of the same year. The once omnipotent military was retreating to the background, and economic recovery showed signs of gathering speed. Indeed, with the fall of Suharto's New Order authoritarian regime, and its replacement by the Wahid-Megawati government, many expected (or hoped) Indonesia's new leadership would build a solid foundation for the creation of an *Indonesia Baru*—a new Indonesia.

On the other hand, the devastating impact of a regime change that had taken place against the background of a massive economic collapse, huge riots, and political turmoil, continues to be felt even today. After the birth of democracy, Indonesia remains unsettled.

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Wahid's government has barely been holding off national meltdown. Wahid has been disputing with parliament over a number of potentially explosive scandals, while separatist or ethnic unrest shows no sign of being on the wane. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy in Indonesia has also been far from ready for the regional devolution of power that was meant to have begun on January 1, 2001.

Maybe it should have been clear from the onset. The success or failure of Indonesia's struggle to move toward normalcy will depend on the ability of the nation to come to terms with the legacies both of Suharto's authoritarian rule and Habibie's transitional government. Both left the nation with shaken self-confidence, wounded national pride, and a tainted international image. As the process of political transition continues to stall, however, a sense of despair is increasingly growing among both the political elite and the society. Indeed, the biggest challenge facing Indonesia at the present is how to make peace with itself so that it will be able to face the world with a renewed self-confidence and restored status as a respected member of the international community. In addition, the fact that no one was groomed for power in the 32 years of Suharto's rule also means that the nation continues to lack the leadership needed to lead itself out of a potentially violent impasse.

In that context, Indonesia has no choice but to come to terms with its recent past if it is to succeed in moving to the future. Here, three issues are paramount. First, Indonesia needs to come to terms with the problem of "domestic trauma" stemming from state-sponsored and communal violence. Second, it needs to recover from a sense of "national humiliation" caused by a heavy dependence on external help. Finally, Indonesia needs to cope with a sense of anger resulting from the inability to uphold territorial integrity. These three issues—domestic trauma, humiliation, and anger—are indeed central in Indonesia's recent "remembering and forgetting" history. However, current developments suggest post-Suharto Indonesia remains a nation unsettled with the past, confused with the present, and uncertain about the future.

This chapter examines how Indonesia's recent experiences in historically significant "remembering and forgetting" events affect Indonesia's

self-perceptions and its role in the region. The discussion is divided in four sections. The first section discusses the problems in Indonesia's dealing with issues of human rights abuses and prospects for a national reconciliation. The second section examines how Indonesia's dependence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—a source of great national humiliation—shapes the current period of introspection. The third section discusses the impact of the “loss” of East Timor, Australia's high profile involvement in the event, and Indonesia's perceptions of itself vis-à-vis the outside world. Finally, in the conclusion, the chapter touches on how the United States might contribute to the process of “remembering and forgetting” history in Indonesia.

THE DOMESTIC TRAUMA: THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Suharto's New Order came to power after the physical destruction of Indonesia's Communist Party (PKI) in 1965–1966. An anti-Communist wave spread rapidly across the country after the army led by then General Suharto concluded that the party was behind the abortive coup that took place in the early morning of October 1, 1965. At least hundreds of thousands of Indonesians suspected as members or sympathizers of the PKI became victims of horrific summary executions during the event. Other estimations put the number of victims of the army-encouraged PKI-member witch-hunt at approximately 2 million. The circumstances surrounding the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto were not only bloody and chaotic, but also economically bankrupt, with a negative growth rate, 600 percent inflation, nonfunctioning banks, and no foreign reserves. In other words, Suharto's New Order regime emerged in a context of political violence and deep economic crisis.

Upon his inauguration as Indonesia's second president, Suharto moved quickly to build a platform for political ascendancy and dominance through a combination of rational economic development on the one hand and skillful and ruthless ways of exercising power to the effect of maintaining order on the other. Within such a

system, Suharto and his military-backed New Order government employed a calculated display of rewards and punishments to ensure acquiescence and loyalty and deter defiance and challenge. What emerged out of this combination of development and order, and of reward and punishment, was a strong authoritarian state with an impressive record of economic growth that lasted for more than three decades.

However, the other side of the New Order's success story of economic development was disturbing. First, as the economy continued to boom, memories of the carnage and political turmoil of the 1965–1966 period that preceded the birth of the New Order seemed to fade from the limelight. In one sense, Indonesia under the New Order seemed to suffer a collective amnesia when it came to the question of the 1965–1966 killings. It can also be argued the episode was so painful that remembering it might jeopardize the nation's attempt to strive for a better future. Second, a high political price went with the attainment of order and economic development. To ensure political supremacy and complete control over society, the New Order's government frequently resorted to state-sponsored violence. Demands for political rights, seen as anathema to economic development and order, were severely and violently suppressed. Therefore, when the New Order collapsed, the country was soon exposed to countless cases of human rights abuses to be remembered.

Indeed, within weeks after Suharto's departure in May 1998, state-sponsored human rights abuses came to light. Demands have grown for human rights violations to be solved soon. In this regard, at least six major cases receive the most attention from society: namely, East Timor, Aceh, Papua, incidents surrounding the fall of Suharto in May 1998 (especially the killing of four students, kidnapping of pro-democracy activists, and May riots, including the alleged mass rape of Indonesian Chinese women), the Tanjung Priok (Jakarta, 1982) and Lampung (Sumatra, 1990) incidents, and the 1965–1966 killings. In all these cases, public opinion suggests the military, especially its leadership and also former president Suharto himself, are two main parties who should be held responsible and brought to justice. Indeed, the Wahid government, especially the attorney general's office, has

been under constant public pressure to take necessary actions to solve these problems.

Even though public debate on human rights abuses has been extensive, the question of the 1965–1966 killings remains the most sensitive and delicate issue in the context of remembering and forgetting. When President Wahid raised this issue by publicly apologizing for what had happened, and then proposing the revocation of a People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) decree banning the PKI and the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, he immediately faced strong resistance. Angry reactions came from both the political elite and mass organizations. Many still consider the killings of Communists in 1965–1966 justified, and revoking the ban on communism could still present a severe threat to Indonesia's state and society. Some fear the opening of these cases would trigger a chain of revenge from family members of victims, and consequently threaten the unity of the nation. Wahid's proposal and the subsequent negative response from society suggest a degree of reluctance in Indonesia to open old wounds.

The public debate on past cases of human rights abuses in Indonesia also reflects questions of priority. For Wahid's government, its handling of those cases should be understood in the context of pressing needs to prevent national disintegration (threatened by secessionist movements), maintaining national unity (the need for a national reconciliation), and restoring Indonesia's international image (after the East Timor destruction). The fulfillment of these three needs, unfortunately, is not always compatible with each other. They define how cases of human rights violations should be handled, and even complicate the choices the government must make in terms of which cases to "forget" and which to "remember." In the context of preventing national disintegration, for example, the government has not surprisingly given more attention to the cases of Aceh and Papua. Meanwhile, in the context of restoring Indonesia's international image, it feels the case of East Timor should be given first priority. However, investigation and legal process on these issues could hamper the process of national reconciliation, and therefore pose a risk to the maintenance of national unity.

The task of prioritizing these issues becomes even more complex when, as mentioned earlier, the main culprits involve key elements of the military. There are two contradicting views in this regard. First, it is feared that severe punishment against the military might invite strong resistance and force it to create further instability. It is widely believed, for example, that ongoing instability in some parts of the country is related to the attempt by elements of the military to send a clear signal to the government that actions against the military could backfire. To the contrary, the second view maintains it is time for Indonesia to break the circle of impunity by punishing the culprits. This view also argues that such action could deter possible future repetition of human rights abuses by the military or the state.

The military's position on this issue is also problematic. It argues that past violations of human rights should be understood in the context of the political atmosphere at the time. It argues the military did not participate in making political decisions that led to the violations of human rights, but merely carried out decisions made by the government. In that context, it argues that the military as an institution cannot be held responsible. Therefore, it maintains that only those who committed the actual violations can be brought to justice. The implication of this position, therefore, is that the investigation and the legal process on cases of human rights violations cannot reach the highest level of the military leadership. Former commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), Lieutenant General Djadja Suparman, for example, publicly warned that "the investigation against some generals will make soldiers angry and act wantonly."¹ In other words, it is expected the ongoing investigation would stop at low-level officers and soldiers.

All in all, post-Suharto Indonesia is still faced with the dilemma of "forgetting" and "remembering" in seeking solutions to the cases of human rights abuses. On the one hand, "forgetting" those cases would help the government's attempt to prevent abuses of human rights in the future. It might also create further instability caused by the growing pressure that perpetrators be brought to justice. For example, if the cases of Aceh and Papua were "forgotten," the threat of national disintegration would remain serious because of growing

disappointment in those regions. Similarly, if the case of East Timor were ignored, then reaction from the international community would negatively affect the restoration of Indonesia's international image. On the other hand, "remembering" those cases in the form of comprehensive and far-reaching trials could seriously threaten national unity.

In such circumstances, Indonesia clearly needs to find an approach that will prevent national disintegration and restore its international image; such an approach could also serve the interest of maintaining and forging national unity. The current state of the government's handling of these issues clearly indicates Indonesia's inability to solve the dilemma. Ongoing investigations have not resulted in significant outcomes. After more than a year since the election of President Wahid, the government, and also the government-sanctioned commissions, have all been engaged in a strategy of "questioning" suspects without any clear indication when formal charges will be filed in court. Indeed, to date no senior military officer has faced a formal trial, and the judiciary and legal system have been consistently unable to handle high-profile cases. When an actual trial did occur, such as in the case of the killings of more than 50 villagers in Aceh, only low-rank officers were punished. Moreover, it seems President Wahid himself prefers political rather than legal solutions. For example, the president repeatedly maintained he would pardon those found guilty in various cases of human rights violations. Consequently, there has been growing public scepticism of the ability of Wahid's government to deal with the issue. The Supreme Court chief's position, for example, has been vacant since August 1, 2000.

In that context, the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) might also help solve the dilemma of forgetting and remembering. Key political leaders, including President Wahid himself, and various human rights groups in the country have expressed the need for such a commission. However, it remains unclear how and when a TRC will be formed. Again, it seems Indonesia is still struggling to answer three key issues or problems. First, there is a question of how to reveal the truth about past human rights abuses without inhibiting the process of national reconciliation in the

future. As mentioned earlier, resistance from perpetrators, especially from within the military, remains strong. The collapse of the New Order regime has not necessarily meant the departure of all forces associated with it. Despite Suharto's departure, the new government still presides over the system he created, in which the culture of impunity remains strong. Indeed, despite common reference to the emergence of an *Indonesia Baru* (new Indonesia), today's Indonesia has yet to break fully with the past. Especially as unrests mounted in the early months of 2001, many observers begin to predict the return of the military and police.

Second, if a TRC is established, the commission could face a Herculean task in making the process work. It has been warned, for example, "if an Indonesian commission attempted to allow individual victims to give statements to the commission or to testify before the commission in a public hearing regarding the abuses they suffered, the commission could be faced with hundreds of thousands of cases."² Indeed, Indonesia's vast geography, large population, extreme heterogeneity, and extensive human rights abuses over more than three decades, would pose daunting challenges to an Indonesian TRC. A wide variety of cases that occurred under the New Order period would also challenge an Indonesian TRC. In the case of missing persons alone, for example, it is estimated 16,000 cases need to be solved.³ The task of such a commission will also be complicated by the fact that the political scene in the country is still characterized by ongoing struggle between old and new political forces and also between defenders and challengers of democracy, within both the elite and the society.

Third, it is not yet clear which model an Indonesian TRC should follow, what functions it should serve, and how broad its mandate should be. Moreover, a solid and legitimate TRC can only be attained if there is a common consensus by all national components on the need to support such a commission. Without such a common agreement, a TRC cannot function properly. In the Indonesian context, insufficient public debate has left the requirement for consensus unfulfilled. However, Indonesia's efforts to create a TRC have thus far been encouraging. Unlike in other countries, Indonesia intends to

establish a TRC through a law, unlike Bolivia, Argentina, and South Africa, which established their TRCs by presidential decrees. It is expected the proposed bill on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Indonesia, drafted by a nongovernmental organization (NGO) and submitted to the Parliament by the government, will have strong legitimacy. The law, if passed, will certainly reflect an agreement between the government and representatives of the people in the Parliament.

Another problem Indonesia faces in dealing with its past is continuing crisis in its judiciary and legal system. The attorney general's office, for example, has been unable to take on the vested interests of the Suharto era. Tommy Suharto, the youngest son of Suharto, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on September 22, 2000. But the government failed to recapture him after he went into hiding while his appeal was being heard. The case against Suharto himself, at age 79, was also dismissed in September 2000 after doctors testified that a series of strokes had left him permanently unfit to stand trial. The Supreme Court did rule in February 2001 that Suharto must stand trial again if his health improves. The case against Suharto, like other issues of remembering and forgetting, remains open.

In conclusion, the success of Indonesia's encounter with the problem of human rights abuses is of paramount importance to the nation's attempt to come to terms with itself. If Indonesia intends to move forward in the process of democratization, it should be able to cope with a sense of national trauma generated by both state-sponsored violence and other forms of violence committed by various forces in society. It needs to confront and remember its past to clear the path toward the future, not by ignoring and forgetting it. As MPR chairman Amien Rais has stated, "Our nation needs to reckon with those violations [of human rights] to heal our wounds for the simple reason that, as far as violations of human rights are concerned, time does not heal."⁴ Indonesia's confidence as a civilized nation that upholds the value of humanity can only be restored when it comes to terms with the past and moves toward a future that guarantees past crimes against humanity and human rights abuses will never reoccur.

THE PROBLEM OF HUMILIATION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The second problem in Indonesia's recent "remembering and forgetting" history, namely the problem of national humiliation generated by Indonesia's encounter with the IMF, has a strong impact not only on Indonesia's self-perceptions but also on Indonesia's perceptions of the world left in its wake. The economic crisis from 1997 onward has shaken the confidence of many Indonesians in their own government and country. As the crisis suddenly threatened the lives of tens of millions of Indonesians, resentment against the government turned rapidly into a common struggle to topple Suharto. The IMF presence in Indonesia, invited by Suharto to help the government overcome the economic crisis, served as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the IMF's involvement added necessary external pressure in a common national struggle to topple Suharto. The IMF also served as an important source of hope for Indonesia if it was to survive its worst economic crisis in three decades. On the other hand, nationalism constitutes an important element in Indonesian domestic politics. In that context, excessive dependence on external forces, such as the IMF, also attracts strong domestic response.

In other words, Indonesia's experience in dealing with the IMF during the Suharto era and beyond has been marked by ambiguity. While registering their reservations concerning the IMF's attitude, many Indonesians acknowledged that their country had no choice but to rely on the IMF's aid package. Amien Rais, for example, remarked, "It is not without ground if we suspect the IMF's good intention to help Indonesia, because when we really need the help, the IMF always postponed [the package] with obscure reasons and seems to interfere in our sovereignty."⁵ Amien, however, also acknowledged the IMF's importance for Indonesia when he stated, "If we say goodbye to the IMF, and try to look for other alternatives, this [attitude] could bring negative [consequences for us]. Because, if the IMF no longer trusts Indonesia, of course other financial institutions will not trust us also."⁶

Before he was elected as president, Wahid had also warned the IMF not to link the aid package with Indonesia's domestic political

problems.⁷ Many economists voiced similar criticisms. Economist Didik Rachbini, for example, criticized the IMF, saying that “after almost one year following the idea suggested by the IMF, Indonesia’s economy had not improved, but worsened.”⁸ Another economist, Rizal Ramli, warned that inviting the IMF could worsen Indonesia’s economy. He pointed out that the experience of some countries suggested that the IMF helped bring about negative impacts, such as economic contraction, the fall of purchasing power, and an increase in poverty. According to Ramli, there was no guarantee the IMF could function as a savior.⁹ Some NGO activists shared similar skeptical views.¹⁰

However, the tendency to denounce the IMF strengthened only when it postponed the disbursement of the money. When the IMF decided to release U.S. \$1 billion in mid-July 1998 and the same amount the following August, the decision was welcomed with relief. This clearly suggests that what was being questioned was not simply Western or international financial institution dependence, but also perceived “domestic helplessness,” which foreign forces (such as the IMF) might exploit and manipulate. Because such common feelings were widely expressed primarily in the context of economic crisis, the attitude reflected probably represents nationalism more than xenophobia. Nor did it reflect an inherent and deep-seated anti-Western or anti-American attitude. This, however, does not mean feelings of distrust and suspicion of the West in general, and the United States in particular, are totally absent in Indonesian society.

Despite such ambiguity, it is difficult to deny that Indonesia’s dependence on the IMF has also created a sense of national humiliation. Like many other postcolonial states, Indonesia began its life as a young nation with a strong sense of nationalism defined in terms of independence and self-reliance. As a postcolonial state and a young nation, Indonesia strongly feels that independence and self-reliance serve as the most important values by which it creates national identity and preserves national dignity as a sovereign state—especially in the eyes of the international community. Indeed, for postcolonial states, the preservation of state sovereignty, defined in terms of the government and nation’s exercise of full control of their own affairs,

becomes the primary national objective. In other words, independence becomes meaningful only when the state can manage its own affairs without excessive dependence on external help. In this regard, Indonesia is no exception.

When Suharto was photographed with an imposing IMF official, the event was widely seen as Indonesia's total submission to an external force. For many Indonesians, it was a symbolic reminder that after more than five decades of independence, Indonesia still needed an imposing order from an outside force to discipline itself. For others, the picture represented a symbol of the West's unassailable capitalist power that happily imposed its will on a helpless developing nation. In the end, the extent of the economic crisis and the limits of internal sources left Indonesia with no choice but to swallow the bitter reality of heavy dependence on the IMF.

Under Wahid's government, that feeling of national humiliation has been reflected in a foreign policy agenda aimed at restoring Indonesia's dignity. In his inauguration speech on October 20, 1999, President Wahid strongly pledged to restore Indonesia's dignity as a sovereign state. He clearly stated that his government "would do its best to . . . preserve Indonesia's dignity in a world marked by a fierce competition among nations."¹¹ Wahid's foreign policy is also marked by a declaratory intent to develop a "balance" and "equidistant" relations with all nations. Both "the policy of equidistance" and "balanced relationship" reflect Wahid's intention to register a spirit of nonalignment in Indonesia's foreign policy. It also reflects the strongly held principle of *bebas-aktif* (independent and active) in Indonesia's foreign policy.

Such a foreign policy agenda indeed reflects domestic concern of the new government over pressing domestic issues. The emphasis on the need to restore Indonesia's dignity as a sovereign state is very much linked to the recent historical context of Wahid's taking power. When Wahid assumed the presidency, Indonesia was facing a serious challenge in preserving its status and identity both as respected member of the international community and as sovereign state. The economic crisis, and its attendant political turmoil, undermined Indonesia's image and pride within the international community. As mentioned earlier, Indonesians were frustrated and resentful when

their country had to rely on help from the IMF and World Bank for economic recovery. When international pressure was imposed on Indonesia in the case of East Timor—especially the Australian-led humanitarian intervention—many felt Indonesia's sovereignty had been compromised. In that context, many Indonesians resented the fact that their country had become so helpless in the face of international pressure and intervention. At a time when national pride was seriously hurt, the new government was understandably obliged to reinvigorate a sense of dignity as the basis of legitimacy.

The rhetoric of a "policy of equidistance" in Wahid's foreign policy also reflects the need to invoke a sense of independence at the time when objective reality points to heavy dependence. A few days after his inaugural speech, President Wahid declared his government would embark on an "Asia first" policy. He declared that Indonesia intends to work closer with Asia's other major powers, especially the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India. He then called for the establishment of a coalition of Asian major powers, an idea some observers have called "Asia's Central Axis."¹² Wahid maintained that such a coalition is necessary to revive a "nonaligned coalition" between Indonesia, China, and India to "counter American hegemonism." He also contended such a coalition would help correct the "imbalance" in international relations favoring the West.¹³

Domestic political crisis also requires Wahid's government to invoke domestic confidence by displaying independence in dealing with the outside world. While his advent to power has been based on a strong legitimacy resulting from a democratic election, that legitimacy alone would be insufficient without a sense of purpose and direction in handling the country's pressing economic and political problems. In that context, the new government is obliged to display a strong commitment to restore the nation's dignity and state sovereignty. Wahid's proposal on the establishment of an Asian coalition among Indonesia, India, and China (which might also include Japan and Singapore) clearly reflects Indonesia's dissatisfaction with the West's dominant international role. In other words, the move corresponds with a domestic requirement that the government exercise a degree of independence in dealing with the outside world.

However, the intention "to make Asia Indonesia's primary economic and political partner to reduce dependency on the West" appears more as "form" rather than as "substance."¹⁴ The substance of Wahid's foreign policy remains the reality of dependence on the United States and the West. Indonesia's economic recovery, for example, is still very much under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. To cover the deficit in the 2000 state budget (an estimated 5 percent of GDP, or approximately Rp. 45 trillion), Indonesia continues to rely on borrowing from foreign sources. For example, it expects to receive around U.S. \$4.1 billion in new foreign loans from the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)¹⁵ as well as from the IMF. This amounts to approximately Rp. 29 trillion, or 75 percent of total budget deficit.

Moreover, Indonesia's external debt in the second quarter 1999 was estimated at around U.S. \$142.4 billion. A large portion of this debt is owed to Western sources.¹⁶ Indeed, substantial efforts are being devoted to secure such financial support from the West and its financial institutions. The acknowledgment of the paramount significance of America's role in Indonesia's economy was also evident when Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, in the context of justifying the government's plan to establish direct trade ties with Israel, stated that "we are opening trade ties with Israel, but our final aim is really the American investors."¹⁷

Indonesia's dependence on the IMF was clearly demonstrated in late May 2000, when the IMF postponed the disbursement of a U.S. \$400 million loan. The failure of Wahid's government to make concrete progress in implementing the IMF program it agreed to in January 2000 was cited as the main reason for the delay. The government immediately called an emergency cabinet meeting and admitted it had fallen behind in 42 items.¹⁸ On that occasion, several ministers repeatedly stated that the government was still committed to implement the IMF-guided economic reforms. President Wahid even bent to the IMF's demand that Indonesia take concrete actions in implementing a set of key reforms and brought forward the deadline from April 12 to April 8.¹⁹ The episode clearly demonstrates that Indonesia did not really have any choice but to comply. Indeed, as an IMF repre-

sentative in Jakarta put it, “without an IMF programme, a lot of sources of funds dry up.”²⁰

EAST TIMOR, EXTERNAL INTERVENTION, AND NATIONAL (DIS)INTEGRATION

As with Indonesia's encounter with the IMF, the loss of East Timor also serves as a painful reminder of the country's vulnerability to external pressure and “intervention.” The result of the August 1999 direct vote (which gave the pro-independence voices a sweeping victory) and subsequent intervention by the international community left many Indonesians feeling bitter. An increased sense of sensitivity to “outside interference,” both within the political elite and among ordinary Indonesians, was inevitable. More important, the events in East Timor seriously damaged Indonesia's image, credibility, and reputation as a responsible member of the international community. Indonesia's relations with the West in general and Australia in particular were also damaged. Worse, the crisis in East Timor aggravated regional anxiety (especially among ASEAN countries) about Indonesia becoming a serious problem that could affect regional security and stability.

Thanks to heavy pressure from the international community, Indonesia was saved from being a pariah state when the government—especially the military—finally agreed to allow the UN-sanctioned international force intervene and restore order in East Timor. Nevertheless, strong public opposition remained to the International Force in East Timor (Interfet) and international intervention. Waves of demonstrations against the government's decision were staged in the streets of Jakarta and other major cities. Many regarded the arrival of Interfet as a slap in the face of Indonesia's national sovereignty.

However, the focus of the opposition and resentment against the Interfet was directed more toward Australia's leadership role than toward the Interfet per se.²¹ Many at the time pointed out that Indonesia had in fact no choice but to agree to international intervention; Indonesia's armed forces were unable or unwilling to prevent the orgy of destruction being carried out by pro-Indonesian militia with

tacit support from “rogue elements” of Indonesia’s military. Many in fact saw what happened in East Timor as a major embarrassment to Indonesia. However, it was widely argued that an international force should be neutral. Here, Australia was not regarded as a neutral party because it had supported pro-independence forces in East Timor. More important, many in Indonesia believed Australia’s government had not shown a “friendly” attitude, or was “too hostile,” to Indonesia.

Indonesia’s attitude toward the Interfet can also be understood in both domestic and international terms. Domestically, Indonesian resentment of the Interfet and international intervention reflected opposition to Habibie’s government. Many Indonesians maintained it was Habibie’s inability and failure to solve Indonesia’s own problems that had created the conditions for outsiders to intervene. Meanwhile, the military’s resentment against the Interfet reflected its inability and weakness in assessing the situation, the implications of East Timor’s destruction, and the reactions that followed. Moreover, many feared East Timor’s separation from Indonesia would embolden other provinces with similar independence aspirations to step up their own attempts to secede from the Republic of Indonesia.

Internationally, Indonesian apprehension and resentment toward the Interfet reflected dislike of Australia’s attitude and role. Indonesia felt betrayed. Australia recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor after Jakarta annexed the territory in 1976. Thus, Indonesia was unprepared to face Australia’s lead role in mobilizing the international community on East Timor’s Independence. Indonesia was also offended by what it perceived as Australia’s arrogance. However, many Indonesians likely failed to see that it was the subsequent human rights violations and humanitarian disaster after the ballot that drove Australia’s strong and tough response.

How has Wahid’s government dealt with the legacy of the “loss” of East Timor, and what is its impact on Indonesia’s foreign policy? Until the end of 2000, the policy tone of Wahid’s government had been very reconciliatory and positive. He maintains his government would like good and close relations with East Timor. He even stated Indonesia would be happy to be a primary sponsor if East Timor wants to join ASEAN. The Wahid government also allowed an investigation on what

actually happened in East Timor after the ballot. The progress of this investigation, except in the removal of General Wiranto as coordinating minister for security and political affairs, has been limited, and it is still unclear how Wahid's government will handle this issue. Without doubt, the military remains influential within the government, and indeed within the general political structure. Therefore, it is likely President Wahid will try to strike a compromise on the issue. President Wahid also expressed his intent to restore Indonesia's relations with Australia. The meeting between President Wahid and Prime Minister John Howard in Tokyo during the funeral of Japan's prime minister Keizo Obuchi constituted a small step in that direction.

However, the East Timor issue has also served as a factor that sustains Indonesia's adherence to the principle of noninterference, especially within the ASEAN framework. This chapter has argued that East Timor strengthened Indonesia's resentment against outside interference. President Wahid is no exception. In this context, it was not surprising when President Wahid expressed respect for ASEAN's principle of noninterference. According to Wahid, "the only thing that counts is that each state has sovereignty." President Wahid continues to reiterate support for the noninterference principle as an important element of his government's foreign policy.²² Needless to say, the East Timor issue, especially the aspect pertaining to international involvement, has strengthened post-Suharto Indonesia's desire to pursue a more "balanced" foreign policy, including the desire to forge closer relations with major Asian countries such as China, Japan, and India.

Despite Wahid's reconciliatory move, it may take some time for Jakarta and Canberra to get the Indonesia-Australia relationship back on track. Indonesians still harbor bitter feelings toward Australia. Indonesia's military, for example, remains cautious and apprehensive with respect to Australia.²³ President Wahid was twice forced to postpone planned visits to Australia because of strong opposition from his Parliament and other groups. Suspicion lives on. As mentioned earlier, many Indonesians had difficulty understanding Australia's response toward East Timor. This difficulty in turn strengthened suspicions of an international conspiracy to destroy Indonesia by breaking it into several small states.

In Indonesia, as regional aspirations for breaking away from the center strengthen, suspicions of an international conspiracy gain even more currency. Questions of national (dis)integration became closely tied to alleged foreign involvement in helping separatist drives. In this area, Australia is particularly singled out. As tensions grew in Papua following the declaration of independence by Papua's People Congress, some in Jakarta suggested that "foreign forces participated in influencing the decision and outcomes of the Congress."²⁴ Australia has been labeled as one such possible force, prompting angry demonstrators to burn Australia's national flag in front of Australia's embassy in Jakarta.

East Timor's independence reinforces the fear that other provinces with similar aspirations might step up their attempts to secede from Indonesia. In January 2001, meaningful power in all areas except defence, monetary affairs, and foreign policy was meant to have been devolved from Jakarta to the provinces and districts. By supporting regional autonomy, the central government sought to recapture the trust of the people and local administrations. The process has, however, been stalled by confusion over the implementation of the regulations, with more than 150 out of 177 decrees governing regional autonomy yet to be passed. For example, it was reported that 99 percent of the 2.6 million civil servants meant to be transferred from central to regional government posts failed to depart on time. On January 2, 2001, the minister who designed the scheme, Ryaas Rasyid, offered his resignation, citing irreconcilable differences with President Wahid. The ensuing chaos, together with Wahid's corruption allegations, again threw Indonesia into a period of political uncertainty and disorder.

Finally, the secessionist movements in Indonesia will continue to complicate regional relations because of their possible links with foreign elements. In the case of Aceh, for example, Jakarta suspected that weapons used by separatist groups might have been smuggled from Kampuchea through Malaysia and Thailand. Indonesia's military authorities have also expressed suspicion that some elements in Malaysia may have tacitly supported the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Even

though never expressed openly, Jakarta was also unhappy with the fact that some GAM activists have used Malaysia, and especially Kuala Lumpur, as a safe haven. Indonesia's military paid particular attention to reports that some GAM leaders may have used Kuala Lumpur as their base though Jakarta only publicly accused Libya of supporting the GAM, an accusation Tripoli flatly denied.

The breakup of Indonesia would pose serious refugee problems to the ASEAN region. Refugee challenges would be exacerbated if they were accompanied by Jakarta's forceful suppression of secessionist movement. In such circumstances, Singapore and Malaysia—as Indonesia's closest geographical neighbors—would be the first to feel heat. Continuing violence in Aceh, despite the recent agreement on a “humanitarian pause” between Jakarta and GAM, underscores the potential for an influx of refugee from this area to Malaysia. At the end of 2000, after a period of “experimentation” with appeasement, Jakarta began massive crackdowns against the largest separatist movements—the Papuans in the far east in Irian Jaya, and GAM in the far west. Indeed, as the regional tendency to break away from the center strengthens, Indonesia will continue to pose serious security problems for the region.

CONCLUSION

How, then, can the international community, especially the United States, assist Indonesia in its struggle to come to terms with itself and the world? Can the United States contribute to solving the dilemmas of “forgetting and remembering” in Indonesia so that the country's future will not become captive of the past? Should the United States and the international community play a greater role in promoting democracy in Indonesia? Such questions clearly require addressing issues of “remembering and forgetting” history, though doing so without being accused of interfering in the country's internal affairs will be problematic. Can the international community involve itself in Indonesia without creating a sense of national humiliation, minimizing negative repercussions, such as those that occurred in the case of IMF assistance?

These questions are indeed central to any attempt by the international community to help Indonesia cope with its challenges of “remembering and forgetting” history and to move toward a sustainable democracy. The United States, no doubt, can and should take the lead in assisting the process of democratization in Indonesia. Indeed, the United States is already playing a significant role in this regard. For example, the United States has made Indonesia a priority in its democracy program along with three other democratizing nations. In addition, the United States can usefully reiterate its support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and economic recovery. For the international community in general, it is extremely important to recognize the changing shape of Indonesia’s domestic politics and the challenges that it entails. To a certain degree, Indonesia’s future will depend on how the nation reflects on its past. Post-Suharto Indonesia is still in the stage of self-reflection. And the international community can support such reflection so it brings positive outcomes beneficial not only to Indonesia but to the wider international community.

Notes

1. *Media Indonesia*, December 15, 1999.
2. Amien Rais, “Reconciliation and Democratization” (paper presented at the Habibie Centre’s colloquium on “Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Achieving National Reconciliation,” Jakarta, May 22–24, 2000).
3. *Kompas*, April 29, 2000.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Republika*, June 18, 1998.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Bisnis Indonesia*, June 26, 1998.
8. Didik J. Rachbini, “Ekonomi Politik IMF” (“The Political Economy of IMF”), *Forum Keadilan*, July 13, 1998, p. 66.
9. Rizal Ramli, “IMF Belum Tentu Jadi Dewa Penyelamat” (“IMF Is Not a Savior”), *Media Indonesia*, October 9, 1997.
10. See Gerry van Klinken, “Why RI Sees Double on IMF,” *Jakarta Post*, December 23, 1997.
11. *Kompas*, October 21, 1999.

12. Ben Perkasa Drajat, "Skenario Diplomasi Presiden Gus Dur" ("Scenario for President Gus Dur's Diplomacy"), *Panji Masyarakat* 31 (November 17, 1999): 21.

13. *Kompas*, December 1, 1999.

14. Smith Alhadar, "Kebijakan Timur Tengah Gus Dur" ("Gus Dur's Middle East Policy"), *Republika*, November 10, 1999.

15. The CGI is an international consortium formed under the aegis of the World Bank to provide loans for Indonesia. The majority of its members are Western countries.

16. See Rizal Sukma and Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan, *The Future of Political and Economic Reforms in Indonesia* (Jakarta: CSIS, March 2000), p. 55. This is a study prepared for Fujitsu Research Institute (FRI), Tokyo, Japan.

17. *Jakarta Post*, October 27, 1999.

18. *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, April 13, 2000, p. 69.

19. *Straits Times*, April 5, 2000.


20. *FEER*, April 13, 2000, p. 69.

21. *Bisnis Indonesia*, September 18, 1999.

22. Personal conversation, June 3, 2000.

23. *Jakarta Post*, June 9, 2000.

24. *Kompas*, June 10, 2000.



TREE of LIBERTY SOCIETY

CHAPTER NINE

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

DIRECTIONS FOR MALAYSIA'S FUTURE

Abdul Razak Baginda

WHILE NOT EVERYTHING IN A NATION'S HISTORY IS REMEMBERED, nothing appears to be forgotten. At the turn of a century, in a time when the environment is undergoing tremendous changes with great uncertainties, it is important to take a reflective perspective on where a nation stands to understand how it has arrived at this juncture of its history. Malaysia has entered the twenty-first century in a much more sanguine fashion following more than two years of political and economic turmoil. However, despite optimism, it also seems clear the country is undergoing changes that will profoundly affect its future. The present government as well as subsequent leaders will have to deal with new issues brought by political and economic changes. While history is there for all to learn, a relatively young country like Malaysia will have to look hard within itself and search for the nation's soul, which should reflect the views and aspirations of its population.

This chapter is based on multiple perspectives from Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Western countries, drawn from my own family. I was born in Kuala Lumpur of mixed parentage—my father being ethnic Malay and my mother Chinese. My paternal grandfather came from Bukit Tinggi in Sumatra, and my maternal side came from Suzhou, China. During the war, my father joined a voluntary naval cadet force of the Japanese Imperial Navy, which was estab-

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lished by the occupying force. During that time he was exposed to the Japanese way of life, and took up Kendo. The effect of his experience in the war has lasted until today, when he not only continues practicing Kendo and Iaido but also is affectionate toward Japan. He has traveled to Japan on many occasions and has many good friends there. His dedication to Kendo earned him the “Order of Sacred Treasure” award from the emperor of Japan.

My mother, however, does not share these sentiments with my father. The Japanese killed my grandfather during the war, so my mother generally does not speak too positively of the Japanese. But I have developed yet a different perspective from both my mother and father. In a sense, it is the Western perspective. At the age of 13, I left Malaysia for the United Kingdom and attended comprehensive school in Croydon. Educated in a British university, I have spent much time and traveled extensively in the Western world. Today, in Malaysia, I am known to have liberal views and to speak my mind quite openly.

Malaysia is in transition. After going through one of the worst economic and financial crises the country has ever faced, Malaysia is now on the road to recovery. Although figures reflect a confident path, concerns exist about the state of the country as a whole in terms of economics, politics, and society. The country has been independent since 1957, and its population of some 22 million encompasses three generations. The first generation is known as the World War II generation and includes those who were born before the war and who lived through the occupation years. Some 8.7 percent of the population belongs to this group. The second generation is the 1969 generation and includes people who have a living memory of the 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur—a national tragedy that has become part of Malaysia’s psyche. This group makes up some 21.7 percent of the total population. Finally, there is the young generation, which covers a majority of the population at 69.6 percent and includes people born after 1969.

Obviously, how Malaysians view the future of the country depends, to a large extent, on the generation to which they belong. Naturally, there will be views that cut across the generations and

people who are aware of the need for the country to take certain remedial actions to ensure Malaysia continues to be successful.

After more than 40 years of independence, Malaysia finds itself in one of its most challenging times ever. With the profound impact of modernization, industrialization, and globalization, the society is split as to where the future lies. The financial crisis as well as the removal, beating, and subsequent imprisonment and conviction of Anwar Ibrahim, a popular former deputy premier, have aggravated the situation. Furthermore, while the crisis caught many by surprise, what happened to Anwar was shocking and at that time, confusing. To a large extent, the episode struck a chord with Malaysians. The contentious trial made many Malaysians question their government and reduced support for Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO party) and for the prime minister himself. The election results of the tenth general elections in November 1999 showed the ruling party had lost some 50 percent of its support from Malays. This undoubtedly partly resulted from the perceived ill treatment of Anwar. Especially for the young Malay generation, the Anwar episode provided the impetus to react more critically toward the government.

MALAYSIA IN RETROSPECT

Unlike most of its neighbors, Malaysia has had a short history. Before British colonization, the Malay peninsula was made up of various sultanates, with the Malacca sultanate having the most glorious past. It was only when the British began to intervene directly and indirectly with the Pangkor Treaty of 1870 that the sultanates came together to form three entities—the Federated Malay States, the Unfederated Malay States, and the Straits Settlements. Although the various Malay states can be traced back for centuries, Malaysia as a country is a new concept. It was only in 1963 that the Federation of Malaysia was established, and in 1965, with the separation of Singapore, that the present entity was finally configured.

Malaysia's road toward independence was peaceful, and the attitude toward the colonial master was cordial, without any real violent

expressions. Although there was Malay resistance against the British during the colonial era, British presence was generally accepted because of prevailing threats. For instance, three years after the end of the Pacific war, an emergency was declared throughout the peninsula, as Communist-armed insurgency began. As the majority of the Communists were ethnic Chinese, the British played a moderating role among the races in Malaysia.

Although wars of national liberation were fought throughout the region (Indonesians against the Dutch, Vietnamese against the French), Malaysia negotiated for its freedom and adopted much of the British political, administrative, and economic system. This arguably became the basis of the country's subsequent success. Unlike many of its neighbors, Malaysia did not have to reconstruct a country. Malaysia has also seemed stable, especially compared to some of its more volatile neighbors. The Barisan Nasional (BN), a broad coalition of ethnic parties that has ruled Malaysia since 1973, has also been central in efforts to create a sense of national identity. Its developmental policies have been criticized as biased, but it is important to note that BN has been successful in uniting Malaysians.

While nationalism was strong among Malaysia's neighbors, it did not take concrete shape in the country. Throughout Malaysia's history, groups and individuals have been identified as nationalists, but there has been no equivalent of José Rizal (viz., the Philippine's founding father) in Malaysia. There are hardly any national heroes to boast of in Malaysia. Even historical characters such as the Malaccan warrior Hang Tuah are sketchy, so in this respect, Malaysia has very little history of which to speak. This lack of historical detail has resulted in some reinventing and rewriting of history, but in terms of remembering, a number of events have become part of the national memory bank.

The first has to do with World War II. As my family experience has shown, different ethnic races view it differently. On the whole, Malays were treated much better than the Chinese mainly because of the Sino-Japanese war. The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the resistance movement, was mostly made up of ethnic Chinese. Also, the Japanese defeat of the British was welcomed by

some as a way to later end British colonialism in the country. The defeat was seen as shattering the notion of the invincibility of the colonial masters.

The second event (or series of events) was the peaceful road to independence. The nonviolent path was indeed a tribute to both the Malayan leaders and the realistic appraisal of the British on the inevitability of the granting of freedom. This peaceful negotiation reflected the generally nonviolent attitude of most Malaysians and became part of the national character.

The third historical series of events were the racial riots in May 1969. These were a national tragedy and brought violence to the forefront. This traumatic experience left an indelible mark in the history of independent Malaysia and became part of the national psyche. In later years, the government has continued to resurrect the ghost of 1969, thereby perpetuating a fear of racial conflict. While this has helped to keep racial extremism in control, it does sometimes curb freedom of expression and instill fear in the population.

More recently, the Anwar episode has become part of the country's collective memory. As Musa Hitam, another former deputy premier under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, said, "The issue is not so much about Anwar as the way he was treated. However the leadership explained [things], that photo [of his black eye] told a story. Two words expressed the feelings of Malays: *zalim* [cruel] and *kasihan* [pity] for the way a human being was treated. It was perceived as a government misdeed."¹ While there may have been some degree of ambiguity among the non-Malay community, Malays were obviously affected. The event caused some degree of political instability, as we shall later examine.

Finally, there is the financial crisis of 1997. Malaysia was not as badly hit as other countries in the region; for example, Malaysia did not require IMF intervention. However, the financial collapse was seen as a crisis of success. While there was an element of manipulation from foreign funds, the domestic situation was the root cause. No doubt speculators brought many East Asian countries to their knees. However, one wonders to what extent these fund managers represented Asian funds. The crisis brought to the forefront a number of

fundamental problems faced by the rapidly developing countries of the region. It could be argued the crisis was that of globalization.

While there is a need to forget some aspects of Malaysia's historical experiences, there is a compelling need to never forget the lessons. Arguably, "not all from history is worth remembering, but nothing should be forgotten."

THE FUTURE OF MALAYSIA: QUO VADIS?

Before the 1997 financial crisis, the leadership encouraged Malaysians to globalize. Premier Mahathir Mohamad talked about globalization in positive terms and personally became a symbol of a developed Malaysia, then seen as synonymous with a globalized Malaysia. However, with the financial crisis, an optimistic view of globalization has transformed itself to pessimism, and today the Malaysian leadership has become one of its fiercest critics. While much of Malaysia's success can arguably be attributed to globalization, as seen in Malaysia's exports, a new attitude toward development has emerged, together with a deep sense of suspicion regarding the globalization process itself. The jury is still out deliberating the future direction of the country, especially in terms of politics, economics, and society.

In determining the future direction of the country, there is a trend toward "consulting" the people. This could result in either criticism from the press and other media, public forums, or popular dialogue sessions with various lobby groups. Still, because Malaysia is a top-down society, the nature of leadership will be critical in determining Malaysia's future direction.

THE LEADERSHIP SCENARIO

The current premier, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, was appointed the country's fourth prime minister in 1981 and has been in office 20 years. As people anticipate a change in leadership in the near future, eyes are presently focused on the deputy premier, the fourth under Dr. Mahathir. The process of a transfer of power is well entrenched in Malaysia: the president of the ruling party, in this case of UMNO, the

dominant party within the coalition, becomes prime minister. In the event of either death (as the case of Tun Razak) or stepping down (as the cases of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Hussein Onn), the deputy will be sworn in as prime minister. The deputy premier is also the deputy president of UMNO.

There are three scenarios. If the present premier steps down, either because of health reasons or retirement, his current deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, would take over. The second scenario would be vacancy by "divine intervention," in which case his deputy would also automatically take over. The third scenario would be if the prime minister decided to stay on and preside over the country beyond the next general election, due sometime in 2004. In such a prolonged time span, there is much more uncertainty as to who his deputy would be.

There has been an interesting belief among Malaysians about who will become the country's future prime minister based on the letters of the middle name of Malaysia's first premier—Rahman. The first letter stands for Rahman (Tunku Abdul Rahman), the second being Abdul Razak (Tun Abdul Razak), the third is Hussein (Tun Hussein Onn), and the fourth is Mahathir (Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad). The second letter *a* used to denote Anwar, and this has now become Abdullah. The last letter, *n*, is anyone's guess. There is general consensus that Abdullah will become the country's fifth prime minister when the time comes. Although he is not considered to be as strong as Dr. Mahathir, such an assessment is expected considering the powerful nature of the current premier. Being more politically inclusive may also reflect Malaysia's diverse pluralism and the urgent need to address the aspirations of a younger generation of Malaysians.

POLITICAL DIRECTION

It has been argued that while the general trend in the region is toward democracy, Malaysia appears to be either stagnating or even declining. For many years, Malaysia was regarded as one of the more democratic countries in the region, as in the 1970s, when most of Southeast Asia was under dictatorial regimes. In contrast to South Korea under a military regime, to an unstable Thailand, or to the

Philippines under Marcos, Malaysia was seen or regarded as a country with a strong democratic tradition. Although Japan has been considered the most democratic nation in East Asia, Malaysia was not far behind. However, in the 1990s the winds of democracy appeared to have swept across the region. One by one, dictators fell and more democratic systems began to be established. The military regimes of South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines were all replaced with civilian rule. Even the strongman of Indonesia, former general Suharto, collapsed amid opposition to his corrupt rule. Today, these countries are witnessing the growing trend toward more democratic processes, involving institutions such as the legal system (or the rule of law) and a strong and independent press.

Unfortunately, Malaysia appears to be slipping, as its institutions face many challenges. One example is the erosion of public confidence (for a variety of reasons) in the country's legal system and rule of law. The minister in charge of legal affairs has clashed with the chief justice over the issue of his being photographed with a prominent lawyer on holiday. According to the minister, "Such socializing is not in keeping with the proper behavior of a judicial personality."²

There is also much discussion on good governance (with all its paraphernalia) in terms of transparency and open government, as well as the need for greater accountability. There are calls for a better human rights record (though this is not about basic needs, but rather about greater freedom). The government addressed these demands by establishing a human rights commission, with the former deputy premier, Musa Hitam, as its chairperson. The members of the commission are prominent personalities held in high regard and esteem by the public.

While newspapers such as the *Bangkok Post* and the *Nation* of Thailand, and the *Jakarta Post* of Indonesia, become much more critical of their respective governments, mainstream newspapers in Malaysia have remained somewhat tame. While there could be self-censorship, there has also been general consensus that freedom of expression has been somewhat curbed. Evidence of the curb includes the perceived use of the judicial courts by the government, through lawsuits, as a way of silencing dissenting views. There are, however,

many other media, such as the use of the Internet, that provide communication alternatives to Malaysians.

Given political realities, especially based on the results of the 10th general election, the government should be opening up. The main opposition party, the Islamic-based PAS (Parti Islam sa-Malaysia), is clearly much more confident now that it has more parliamentary seats and control of two states, including the oil-rich state of Terengganu. If the ruling party does not reform and restructure itself, support for UMNO could see greater erosion. While current leadership may not undertake meaningful reforms, it is believed future leaders will. The bigger question is the extent to which future leaders will go in reforming the government and the party to win back Malays presently skeptical about their efficacy. In January 2001, Mahathir himself invited selected opposition parties to meet and discuss issues relating to "Malay unity" in order to placate Malay dissent. PAS accepted the invitation, though PAS insisted that the "national unity" agenda should also include issues like the independence of the judiciary and what it described as "UMNO's abuse of power." In February 2001, Khalil Yaakob, secretary general of UNMO, met his counterpart from PAS for "technical talks." The Keadilan Parti Nasional, headed by Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, declined the invitation. Instead, Keadilan called for Chinese and Indian participation in the dialogue, because they also have been oppressed by Mahathir's rule. It does seem Malaysia has a long way to go before any consensus on future paths can be reached.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Immediately after the 10th general elections, the prime minister questioned why the majority of Malays voted against the government despite developmental assistance, and hinted this group was ungrateful. While the prime minister's argument was understandable in light of recent history, the more significant point, that because of development and higher-level education Malays have changed their attitude toward government and development, was not noted. Malaysians think it is the government's duty to bring about economic develop-

ment. In their mind, development is a right, not a privilege. To a large extent, one can argue Malays have “awakened” and that such an attitudinal shift is positive.

There are many reasons for the attitudinal shift. Although the last 10 years have seen rapid economic development, they have also brought economic dislocations, with several groups being marginalized. Malaysia’s development policies have indeed been criticized as lacking regional and ethnic balance. The perception also prevails that the government has become too pro-big business, at the expense and neglect of smaller ones. The wealthiest and most influential businessmen are closely associated with UMNO. Many of them are also Malay, especially the new ones. While Chinese make up 30 percent of population, the role of Chinese capital in Malaysia’s economy has loosened. The perception the government favors big business was aggravated when larger corporations were “rescued” during the financial crisis, including a number belonging to the children of the prime minister. Whatever the justification, the majority of Malays saw this as negative. Rightly or wrongly, former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim was seen as the champion of the Malays and the marginalized group.

Thus, despite the fact that the Malaysian economy is recovering following the Asian financial crisis, with a projected growth rate for the year 2000 at 7.8 percent and the possibility of double-digit growth, questions and issues of concern remain. Although the government has announced its desire to transform itself into the New Economy, its strategies to do so remain unclear, especially regarding how to deal with the old systems, which form the backbone of today’s economy.

THE FUTURE OF MALAYSIAN SOCIETY

Some 10 years ago, a number of Asian leaders, namely Lee Kwan Yew and Dr. Mahathir, began to talk of “Asian values.” While this subject has created much debate and discussion between Asians and Westerners, it has not done so among other countries, particularly those with strong traditional values. It is believed the Asian values concept

may be most apt when addressing Asia itself rather than when debating with the West. East Asia's rapid development in the past three decades has increased the concern in some Asian countries that they will sacrifice their traditions for much more Western orientation. Given their strong historical ties to the UK, for example, Singapore and Malaysia are arguably two of the most Western-oriented countries in the region. Given Malaysia's history of state building, it has not been easy to discuss traditional roots in Malaysia. Singapore sometimes appears to lack a sense of natural cultural tradition, requiring it, on occasion, to reinvent its own cultural values.

Malaysian society is at a crossroads today. It is split between the more liberal segment of the society and the more religious-based groups. There has been a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism among Malays, though globalization has also brought a profound impact on the larger society.

There is a general deterioration of the value system among the country's various ethnic groups. The fear that Asia's future will be the West's present appears to be turning into a reality. Child abuse and divorce rates, for instance, are increasing. And social problems often associated with Western societies are now appearing in Malaysia, especially those involving teenagers. Such could signal breakdown of traditional societal value systems, which appears to affect especially Malay society, given its generally conservative orientation. Hence, any changes are deemed serious. For instance, in Malay culture, the thought of sending old folks to nursing homes has been a taboo. Once unthinkable, even these figures are unfortunately rising, especially among more well-to-do Malays.

It is clear Malaysian society is changing. Calls to retain traditional value systems are particularly poignant in light of Malaysia's history of state building. It is not easy to decide on a particular set of traditional values. Some argue the state should intervene to engineer society, while others say the move toward Westernization/liberalization/democratization is inevitable. In any case, much concern remains about how future Malaysian society will evolve. Will it be more religious or more liberal? Will the society be polarized on economic, ethnic, or religious lines? The future of the society rests on society itself.

FUTURE DIRECTION OF MALAYSIA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

Malaysia's current international characteristics can be identified as being pro-Asia or "Asianist," strongly championing South-South co-operation, and predicating foreign policy on economic linkages—specifically, new markets. Malaysia's international stance has also taken a somewhat critical view of Western countries. For example, Mahathir's harsh words against foreigners and currency speculators during the financial crisis, blaming them for Malaysia's economic woes, did not win Malaysia many allies. It is important to note, however, that Mahathir's willingness to speak out against the West also won him friends in the Middle East. In addition, Malaysia's relations with Japan stay positive, and its prominent position within ASEAN remains stable.

While Malaysia tries to decouple political and economic ties, the path is challenging, especially when it involves bilateral relations. For instance, although Malaysia trades extensively with the United States, Malaysia-U.S. political relations have remained cool, especially since the Anwar episode. While the United States is Malaysia's largest trading partner, Malaysia is the United States' 11th largest trading partner.

However, as Malaysia's anti-West rhetoric is not based on anything concrete, a leadership change could improve relations with Western countries, and not at the expense of Asian or Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia's future international profile will likely reflect a much more balanced view and approach. If foreign policy is an extension of a nation's interests and Western countries are considered our export lifelines, then it makes sense for Malaysia to improve ties with these countries. As such, in the future, Malaysia's foreign policy toward the Western countries, in particular the United States, could see considerable improvement. After all, the foundations of these relations remain strong and could be built upon rather quickly.

CONCLUSION

The historical events and scenarios highlighted in this chapter are based on my own experiences of "remembering and forgetting." To an

extent, these events are chosen through the different perspectives of my diverse family background. In our present moves toward globalization, Malaysia too must view the world through the multiple perspectives of the world and its people. The issues of racial tension, anti-Westernization, and national character need to be resolved to ensure future stability.

Malaysia enters the twenty-first century more confident than it was in 1997 and 1998. This time is both historic and futuristic. As it is important to know the past to see the future, remembering what Malaysia has gone through is timely. At a time when Malaysia and its society are uncertain of their future direction, taking stock of the situation is important. While Malaysia's history is short and not glamorous and though it cannot trace to great empires in the history books, remembering its worth becomes worthwhile. Malaysia has not reached this stage in a void. It has gone through its fair share of trials and tribulations. Compared to some of its neighbors, Malaysia's problems and challenges look relatively less complicated, but there is no doubt that Malaysia's future will be determined as much by its leaders as by its people. This trend is healthy and points to a much more optimistic future.

Notes

1. Reported in *Asiaweek*, July 14, 2000, p. 35.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

PART THREE

HISTORY AND IDENTITY



TREE *of* LIBERTY SOCIETY



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TREE *of* LIBERTY SOCIETY

CHAPTER TEN

COMMUNITY AND ISOLATION; MEMORY AND FORGETTING

CHINA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF

Anne F. Thurston

THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP with their past is not surprising.¹ The superiority of China's 2,000 (or 3,000 or 5,000) years of civilization, culture, and history is universally accepted by virtually all Chinese. So, too, is the belief that their country's decline began with its humiliating defeat at the hands of foreign "imperialists" more than a century and a half ago. It is with the prescription for China's restoration of power and glory that logic goes awry. For most of the twentieth century, Chinese patriots have argued that their country's return to greatness necessitates the destruction of the same Confucian culture that was for so long the source of its superiority. Foreign intrusion and China's superior culture are thus paradoxically both held responsible for the country's fall from grace.

China's relationship with its past is further complicated by the history the Chinese have made themselves. Chinese history is rich with periods of disintegration and turbulence, but the interim since the foreign intrusions began has been particularly violent. Massive rebellions and dynastic collapse, warlords and famines, civil wars and revolution have claimed tens of millions of lives.

But, for Chinese attempting to give meaning to their historical past, it is the most recent Communist period that poses the greatest

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difficulty. Memory has become politicized since 1949. The Communist Party has served as the official mediator of both collective and individual memory. Not only has the party repeatedly revised its own public history (e.g., faces being brushed from public photographs), but it has also claimed the right to determine the individual memories of Chinese citizens. The state's control of individual memory has been remarkably effective, even (and perhaps especially) among intellectuals. As Zha Jianying writes,

The question about the collective Chinese memory lingers and gnaws. This is a country where nobody confesses sins. Massive destructions have occurred, atrocities have been committed, millions have died of starvation and persecution, children have turned in their parents, husbands have denounced wives, people have sold friendships for a casual nod from a Party secretary—yet it has never been popular to acknowledge openly the wrongs you have done to others. . . .

Let bygones be bygones. Let's look ahead. This is not just the Party's motto to fool the population; it is, many feel, something that the population needs very badly to do. There are too many skeletons in everyone's closet.²

Interestingly, intellectuals who continue to claim some responsibility for the direction of their country often buy into the party's version of history more readily than do less-educated citizens—the taxi drivers, the salespeople, the private vendors at open-air stalls, the peasants—the people, in short, so many intellectuals hold in disdain. In the early 1980s, as the educated youths who had been sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution were reestablishing themselves in the cities, a story circulated about the performance of uneducated peasants during a campaign to “compare the bitterness of the past with the sweetness of the present.” During storytelling sessions before the urban youths, some peasants became confused. Instead of remembering (as they were supposed to) how bad things were under the landlords before the Communists came to power, they remembered how bad things were in the early 1960s during the

massive famine that followed the introduction of communes. Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward had left some 30 million people (overwhelmingly rural) dead. Educated youths told the story to mock the naivete of China's peasants. The peasants had remembered correctly, of course, and they had told the truth, but their private recollections differed from the official version of history.

Similarly, in Beijing today, the ordinary man-on-the-street type of residents remain most vocally descriptive of what happened in their city when the army marched in on the night of June 3–4, 1989.

THE PROBLEM OF MEMORY: TIANANMEN 1989

My personal introduction to the power of the party over individual and collective memory began in the months immediately following the military crackdown in June 1989.³ I had spent the month of May in Beijing—in the square, on university campuses, visiting with friends. It had been a remarkable, heady time. The community created in the Chinese capital was almost transcendental, as though all the people of Beijing had joined hands, hugging, singing, dancing, smiling, together. In a city where people ordinarily treated each other with an uncommon rudeness, everyone was suddenly struck with an overwhelming politeness. People loved their new behavior, reveled in it. At night in the square, the youths of Beijing were filled with unbridled joy as the *Internationale* and Beethoven's *Ode to Joy* competed as musical expressions of new exhilaration.

The joy was contagious, and nationality seemed to have been transcended. Foreigners were welcomed into the square, our autographs were eagerly sought, and we were urged to tell the world what was happening there in the heart of China. "They," the Chinese, had become like "us," the Western democrats. They wanted to be like us, wanted what we had and what we wanted for them. We could all join hands.

But at the same time, underneath the joy was something entirely different, a feeling that things could go horribly, terrifyingly awry. At root was the fear that at any time the aging leaders could turn against their young and destroy the best and the brightest of their country—

the hope of China's future. The fear, on the one hand, seemed terribly misfounded. The students were so young and innocent. The Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping had surely turned benign. But China's leaders had always dealt harshly with protest—and with lapses in filial piety.

The first days after the military crackdown were filled with raw, unbridled fear. The episode had officially been declared a counter-revolutionary rebellion, and citizens who had been part of the violence when the army came in could be arrested and jailed. Young male friends who had stood side by side throwing stones with their neighbors now feared to go home. Some sought refuge in other parts of the city. Others fled Beijing altogether, going underground, terrified of what their neighbors might report. The Western press printed stories about how people were no longer pointing fingers and turning each other in as they had in the past. But Chinese had little access then to the outside press, and reports from their media were creating new models of people who were turning in relatives and friends. Television showed accounts of young men who had engaged in violence being arrested and sentenced to death.

Work units that had marched together to the square were filled with tension. Arrests were being made there, too. As friends described the situation in their workplaces, one or two people in each unit were being arrested. Often, those arrested had not been the most active participants in the demonstrations. If they could be arrested, many reasoned, anyone could be arrested, because everyone had participated. A campaign against corruption was launched at the same time as the search for counterrevolutionaries in work units. Strange bargains were struck, less Faustian than at earlier times in the People's Republic, but bargains nonetheless. People were given "pardons" in exchange for silence about corruption. Friends no longer called one another and certainly did not meet. A wall of silence—a bamboo curtain, as one friend described it—went up.

Almost immediately, my own perceptions of what had happened began to diverge from those of my friends. Some of my Chinese friends were willing to grant the government a legitimacy that I could not.

"We lost," one of my friends cried as we hugged shortly after June 4. In her eyes, the government had, by winning through force, reestablished its mandate of heaven. While citizens had the right to rebel against unjust rule in imperial China, legitimacy, the mandate of heaven, could be known only in victory. The winning side was ipso facto legitimate. The separation of nationality also returned. "You must leave immediately," one friend insisted during our first contact after the massacre. "They will think you are CIA." The circle had been broken. I could share their joy but not the roots of their fear.

The government's capacity to reassert its legitimacy became obvious by the fall, when Beijing officials began a movement to buy "patriotic cabbages," even as the city remained under martial law. Cabbage was virtually the only vegetable available during Beijing winters then, and city folk usually began stocking up in the fall, storing the vegetables in huge, reeking piles in hallways and corridors. When farmers on the outskirts of Beijing overproduced that summer, the government called upon the urban dwellers to buy double and triple what they would need. Buying surplus cabbage was an act of patriotism, they said. Even the most disaffected of my Chinese friends purchased cartloads of the patriotic vegetable. The government's word was still heeded, even over issues as mundane as cabbages. No one wanted to be seen as unpatriotic. The gulf between me and my Chinese friends widened further over time. Our stories increasingly diverged.

The *biaotai* was the major cause of our divergent stories. In the months after June 4, all of Beijing had to *biaotai*—to review before colleagues and party leaders within their work units what they had done during the weeks of protest, to confess their wrongs, and to renew their allegiance to the party's version of the truth. True, some work units remained united even in adversity, either all claiming to have participated in the movement in equal measure or uniformly denying any participation at all. But most of my friends had to write "self-confessions" about their activities and tell their reconstructed stories before colleagues and party leaders. The habit of dissembling returned. No longer was it possible to live in truth.

Most of my friends were able to distinguish the truth they knew from the falsehoods they were forced to utter, and our conversations about what had happened at Tiananmen continued with the same intensity. But for a few, the distinctions got lost. A small number of my friends began to believe their newly constructed stories—or at least to act as though they thought the stories were true. Two in particular, who I know with certainty to have protested in the square, began denying that they had ever been there, even in private conversations with me.

One of those friends had spent years in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, separated from family and friends. Yet she had prospered under Deng's reforms and would suffer greatly from a demotion or firing—or a stint of reeducation. I knew her, too, as a woman of remarkable integrity. Lying did not come easily to her. How, then, did she seem to convince even herself that she had not participated in the demonstrations, that she had never even been to the square? How could such a good-hearted and honest individual cover herself in such obvious self-delusion?

My efforts to understand the apparent anomaly of my friend have taken me back both to her own personal history and to recent Chinese history of which she was a part. Indeed, understanding how she came to believe what was so clearly not true also helps explain how the Chinese Communist Party has managed to retain the loyalty of so many people even when so many have suffered grievously at the hands of their government. The explanation also helps us understand both why patriotism has become such a powerful legitimizing tool for the Chinese government and why that tool may ultimately fail.

The explanation begins with the need to belong.

Nationalism and the Need to Belong

Isaiah Berlin tells us that the eighteenth-century German poet and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder virtually invented the idea of belonging. He believed that just as people need to eat and drink, to have security and freedom of movement, so too they need to belong to a group. Deprived of this, they felt cut off, lonely, diminished, unhappy.

Nostalgia, Herder said, was the noblest of all pains. To be human meant to be able to feel at home somewhere, with your own kind.⁴

Herder also introduced the notion of nonaggressive nationalism, based on the need to belong. The fundamental basis of nationalism is the need to belong to a group larger than ourselves and our immediate family.

One of the most powerful tools a government has is the ability to manipulate that need to belong. China does not have the only Communist Party government to have discovered and manipulated the human need to belong. Milan Kundera's description of being kicked from the ring in his native Czechoslovakia is equally the story of Chinese who had first rejoiced in the community of communism and were later expelled from the group. "I, too, once danced in a ring," Kundera writes.

It was the spring of 1948. The Communists had just taken power in my country . . . and I took other Communist students by the hand, I put my arms around their shoulders, and we took two steps in place, one step forward, lifted first one leg and then the other, and we did it just about every month, there being always something to celebrate, an anniversary here, a special event there, old wrongs were righted, new wrongs perpetrated, factories were nationalized, thousands of people went to jail, medical care became free of charge, small shopkeepers lost their shops, aged workers took their first vacations ever in confiscated country houses, and we smiled the smile of happiness. Then one day I said something I would better have left unsaid. I was expelled from the Party and had to leave the circle.

This is when I became aware of the magic qualities of the circle. Leave a row and you can always go back to it. The row is an open formation. But once a circle closes, there is no return. Like a meteorite broken loose from a planet, I too fell from the circle and have been falling ever since. Some people remain in the circle until they die, others smash to pieces at the end of a long fall. The latter (my group) always retain a muted nostalgia for the circle dance. After

all, we are every one of us inhabitants of a universe where everything turns in circles.⁵

The Devastation of Isolation

Isolation is the polar opposite of the sense of belonging and community that both Herder and Berlin see as the underpinning of a healthy, nonaggressive nationalism. Of all the tortures to which human beings may be subjected, isolation is the worst.

During the rule of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party effectively used the concept of class and class enemies to define who among the Chinese people was to be incorporated into the community and who was to be excluded. According to the Maoist formulation, some 5 percent of the population could always be counted as enemies (and hence nonpeople) and thus excluded from the circle, although the actual people excluded varied from political campaign to political campaign. (Landlords were the primary target during the land reform of the early 1950s, “rightist” intellectuals during the antirightist campaign of 1957–58, and “party persons in authority taking the capitalist road” during the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966.)

The Cultural Revolution, while probably not the most violent of China’s series of political persecutions, is nonetheless the best documented. Many of its victims were articulate intellectuals and party members, some of whom told their stories publicly once they had rejoined the circle. These stories attest both to how brutal a punishment isolation can be and the strength of the desire to belong.

The isolation imposed on Chinese who were kicked from the circle during the Cultural Revolution must be seen along a continuum. At its most extreme, isolation took the form of solitary confinement, often accompanied by severe sensory deprivation—a total lack of light and sound. At the other end, many were subject to profound isolation even in the absence of incarceration. Guilt by association was a major determinant in who would be chosen as targets during the Cultural Revolution, and Chinese were struck en masse by what Robert Jay Lifton would call “contagion anxiety,”⁶ as colleagues, friends, and

relatives maneuvered to distance themselves from the accused. Thus those under attack, even when they continued to live at home, were often treated as though they did not exist. Some went years without being spoken to by anyone outside their immediate family. So unbearable was such isolation that many preferred the brutal attacks, both verbal and physical, of the public struggle sessions to no human contact at all.

It was in this state that leading female author Ding Ling described as "a loneliness like a poisonous snake, gnawing away at my heart,"⁷ that so many lost their sense of humanity. It was in stark isolation that so many confessed to crimes they had never committed and betrayed their family, colleagues, or friends. The dramatic increase in the suicide rate can be traced to the effects of isolation. Suicides often occurred just after the last remaining source of solace and support—from a family member or friend—was finally withdrawn.

Madness was another outcome of isolation. The pathways to madness are ordinarily complex, but some psychiatrists and psychologists have regarded isolation as the only factor that, by itself, is capable of inducing mental breakdown. Isolation is even more effective if the isolated individual is also treated as an enemy.

Those survivors of enforced isolation who have written of their experiences, men such as Jacobo Timerman and Alfred Dreyfus, have described themselves in the extremity of their aloneness as tottering between the Scylla of madness and the Charybdis of suicide.⁸ Both literature on human response to extreme situations and on more prosaic forms of daily stress suggest, moreover, that the degree of social support available plays a major role in how well or ill an individual in those circumstances will contend. Literature on the Nazi concentration camps, most notably Terrence Des Pres's *The Survivor*, shows that for those few able in any way to influence their own survival, group solidarity, the binding together in collective, supportive units, was the most positive force.⁹ The pair, a single friend, was the basic unit of survival in the concentration camp.

The series of political campaigns engineered by the Chinese government served to undermine the fabric of Chinese society. Whatever the earlier cleavages of class (and despite the shared hope and

optimism in the early years after 1949), the endless political campaigns often turned colleague against colleague, students against teachers, children against parents, wives against husbands, and friends against friends. The result was often both a profound sense of isolation and a longing for a new community, for participation in a different, supportive group.

Ironically, efforts to rebuild a sense of unity and common purpose have usually been initiated spontaneously by Chinese citizens. The state, which would represent and unite the people, has not often been successful in building communities. The two most significant popular efforts began following the death of a popular leader.

TRANSCENDING ISOLATION: THE CREATION OF COMMUNITY, 1976 AND 1989

The death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 allowed the people of Beijing, for the first time in at least a decade, to transcend their loneliness and isolation and become a community once more. Urban Chinese of a certain age still remember where they were and what they were doing when they heard the news of Zhou's death. It is a memory analogous in incandescence and pain to the American memory of the death of John Kennedy. People wept at the news of Zhou's death, wept bitterly and openly. Their memory of that grief is often accompanied by an equally strong memory that the grief was shared, that the tears, the black armbands so publicly and defiantly displayed, had served, however transiently, to bridge the gulf dividing the Chinese people. "At that time, people often felt frustrated, harassed, agonized," remembers one Beijinger. In buses, people always used to quarrel. In our work units, we were annoyed and humiliated, but we could say nothing. The only outlet for frustration was the bus. So buses were very depressing.

But when Premier Zhou died, many people were weeping—in the streets, on the buses. A mournful silence reigned on the buses. It was uplifting, really uplifting. There was a sense of relief. In the past, for so long in China, there had been no occasion when you could feel your feelings uplifted. But when Zhou died, people were kind, con-

siderate of each other. If people saw you had a black band on your arm or saw you weeping, you found out that other people felt the same way. Before, you didn't know what other people thought. But with Zhou's death, you came to realize when other people were weeping, that your grief was their grief, too. We were isolated before, but then people became close.¹⁰

That closeness and new sense of community blossomed several months after Zhou's death. In late March 1976, with the approach of the annual Qing Ming festival for honoring the dead, people began placing white memorial wreaths dedicated to the memory of Zhou Enlai before the Monument to the Revolutionary Heroes in the center of Tiananmen Square. Zhou, many believed, had still not been properly mourned. As more wreaths appeared and the citizens of Beijing began arriving in the square first by the hundreds and thousands and then by the tens and hundreds of thousands, they learned that they were not alone in their grief. And they learned that beyond the sense of loss they shared over the death of their beloved premier was a greater sense of loss—and a larger sense of suffering.

In early April 1976, when hundreds of thousands of Beijingers marched to Tiananmen Square carrying wreaths and flowers and poems, they were mourning not only Zhou Enlai but all who had died in China without having been properly mourned. They were mourning the unnecessary deaths in the past decade and more of their relatives, friends, and colleagues. They were mourning the values of civility and fairness that so many believed (whether rightly or wrongly) were embodied in Zhou Enlai—values they too had once shared. They were protesting as well against the leaders who had brought them 10 years of great disaster—against the monster that the Cultural Revolution had become. In mourning and in protest, the people of Beijing transcended their isolation and created a new sense of community.

Events in the spring of 1989 paralleled in remarkable ways those of the spring of 1976—the death of a respected leader, the use of mourning to raise political demands, the symbolism of Tiananmen Square, the creation of a new community after a long period of

growing anger and alienation. In 1989 as in 1976, the Chinese people, however briefly and tenuously, seemed united as one, together in a nearly transcendental community.

And both episodes ended tragically, with the government declaring each a “counterrevolutionary rebellion” and then destroying by violence the community the protesters had built. Both were also followed by more than a decade of relative political quiescence.

But there are significant differences between the two events as well. The official verdict on the 1976 demonstrations was very quickly reversed after the death of Mao Zedong, the overthrow of the Gang of Four, the return to power of Deng Xiaoping, and the beginning of the economic reforms. The victims of the Cultural Revolution, the people who had been so viciously excluded from the circle, were rehabilitated and returned to their previous posts. Remarkably, many who had been persecuted for at least a decade, and sometimes two, were often willing not merely to forgive the party and leaders responsible for their suffering, but they were also filled with an extravagant sense of patriotism. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of interviews I conducted with victims of the Cultural Revolution in China in 1981–1982 was how deeply, despite all they had been through, they continued to love their country. Song Wuhao, who had been a middle school student when the Cultural Revolution began and who spent 11 years in the impoverished countryside separated from his family, spoke for many educated Chinese when he told me, “even in those darkest moments, I still loved my country. I was still patriotic. I still loved the Chinese people, the peasants and the workers.”¹¹

PATRIOTISM AS A SEQUEL TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Most remarkable was the case of Liang Aihua. Liang Aihua had been living in the United States in 1964 when she decided to renounce her considerable inheritance and return to China with her husband and two sons. Back in Beijing, she and her family were welcomed enthusiastically as patriotic returned overseas Chinese. Husband and wife were given appointments to prestigious research institutes, where their expertise was valued.

But their lives changed completely in 1966 when the Cultural Revolution began. The entire family came under attack. Liang Aihua lost both her husband and a son to China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. After Mao's death, when victims were being rehabilitated and restitutions were being made, she was visited by senior officials, who gave her permission to leave China, assuring her that they would understand should she choose to go. Liang Aihua decided to stay. This is how she answered when I asked her why.

Why do I choose to stay and work in my fatherland? China is a large country, and its population is huge. But its science and technology, its education and culture, are backward. The standard of living of its people is low. Every Chinese is going to have to work hard for the development of the country. If China could become richer and stronger more quickly, that would be good for the rest of the world, too. I am happy with my work right now. I have had the opportunity to study abroad, and I believe that what I am doing now is still of use to my country. That is the reason I stay. I am Chinese.¹²

Why so many Chinese, intellectuals in particular, retained such a deep sense of patriotism, even when they had suffered so grievously at the hands of their government, is difficult for the outsider to understand. Surely both the power of the circle and the unbearable pain of exclusion are important factors, however. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, scapegoats for the unjust persecutions were identified in the form of the Gang of Four. Blame for the intellectuals' suffering was thus ostensibly assigned. The party-state took the once-suffering intellectuals by the hand and welcomed them back into the circle. With the proclamation of the Four Modernizations and consequent need for expertise, their education and training were heralded once more. In working together to build a new and modern China, their suffering could be vindicated. Some who had long seen party membership as the ultimate symbol of belonging, but who had been refused because of their alleged misdeeds or "bad class background," were finally awarded their party badges. Once welcomed back into the circle, part once more of a group, many who had suffered so

much threw their loyalty to that group—China—with near-fervent abandon. They became avid, devoted patriots.

A new sense of what it meant to be Chinese also emerged as a sequel to the Cultural Revolution. The end of the Cultural Revolution created a new culture of suffering, a recognition that suffering had been shared and could serve as a bond uniting one Chinese to the other. To be Chinese was to have lived, suffered, and survived in China during those bitter years of violence and isolation. To have missed those years was to have lost one's "Chineseness."

"He thinks he is still Chinese," a leading Chinese academic who had been a victim of both the antirightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution said to me shortly after a reunion with an old friend—a leading Chinese-American scholar. The two had been close friends and colleagues before 1949. One had stayed in China; the other had fled to the United States. "But he isn't Chinese anymore," my friend tried to explain. "He wasn't labeled during the antirightist campaign. He didn't suffer during the Cultural Revolution. He cannot know what those years were like. He cannot be Chinese."

Similarly, many considered those who left China at the end of the Cultural Revolution, even those who had been victims, to be both unpatriotic and less Chinese. "I look down on people who go to the United States and don't come back," one senior intellectual told me. "They don't have the same ties of suffering and happiness with our people."¹³

A senior professor when the Cultural Revolution began, You Xiaoli was mercilessly and violently persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Said she:

I would rather suffer together with my countrymen, starve with my countrymen, eat bad food, than be separated from my fellow compatriots. That's a Chinese attitude. You have to be proud of your country, your people. You have to do your part. We have a saying that "a golden house, a silver house, still isn't as good as my own straw house." Even dogs, no matter how poor the family, still never run away to a rich family. A dog would rather starve together with his poor family. I don't think we should be worse than dogs.

That's why I don't like the Soviet writers like Solzhenitsyn. I don't like the Soviet writers who desert their homeland. A person should suffer everything with his own people.

Maybe it's because of all the blood and tears that I have shed for this land. My mother's tears flowed on this land, and her blood, too. My mother's corpse is buried somewhere on this land. This is where my blood was shed, too. This is where I have suffered for more than half a century. My tears have watered this land. So I want to wait and see the flowers growing from it. If I don't work for my people, I would feel as though I had betrayed my mother.¹⁴

That sense of having lost their Chineseness was sometimes shared even by those who returned to China after sojourns abroad. Song Erli had been one of the first Chinese students to be given such an opportunity after the Cultural Revolution. He returned just before the campaign against spiritual pollution in 1983, a campaign that threatened to render him a victim once more. He wrote me in the midst of the campaign. "China, my dear motherland, my lovely country," he said. "I can never tell you how bitterly I love it." But Song Erli was miserably unhappy. "Perhaps you remember the final lines of T.S. Eliot's poem, 'Journey of the Magi'? I love that poem."¹⁵

We returned to our places, these Kingdoms,
But no longer at ease here, in the old dispensation,
With an alien people clutching their gods.
I should be glad of another death.

Thus that fervent patriotism of many Chinese after the Cultural Revolution also contained a sense of the tragic. And coupled with that sense of the tragic was a willingness to forget, not to probe too deeply or ask too many questions about what that tragedy was about. One warning against asking too many questions came in 1981, when Bai Hua's movie, *Unrequited Love*, was banned. Among the reasons for not allowing the film to be shown was the question with which the protagonist's son had challenged his frequently persecuted father: "Dad, you love our country. Through bitter frustration you go on loving her. But, Dad, does this country love you?"¹⁶

Because Bai Hua's question was forbidden, so were the questions that might have assigned more realistic responsibility for the Cultural Revolution and its politics of violence and hate. Many thus began to speak of that episode almost as of a natural disaster, or some impersonal fate, outside the control—and thus the responsibility—of human beings. Young perpetrators of violence and disorder could not be blamed, after all, because they had been too young. They had been manipulated from above. Mao Zedong could not be blamed, because he was China's savior, the red, red son in everyone's heart, the emperor who would live 10,000 years. Surely Mao had not known what was going on, because, of course, he would have stopped it if he had. Professor You Xiaoli was one whose faith in Mao remained intact:

During the Cultural Revolution, I kept thinking Chairman Mao doesn't know how much we are suffering; he doesn't know what is going on here. Actually, I think I didn't really believe that, but it was easier for me to think that. It was more comfortable that way. . . . People destroyed themselves because they loved Chairman Mao so much, because they just couldn't admit that he was wrong.

But I still love Chairman Mao. His motives were good. He wanted to prevent China from becoming like the Soviet Union, from becoming revisionist. If I ever thought that Chairman Mao had done something wrong to harm the Chinese people, something about me would change. I would lose my own sense of self-confidence. All my beliefs would have to change. And my past. All my past experiences. What would happen to them? If I didn't love Chairman Mao, how could I look back over my life?

Surely also, that powerful need to belong again, that fear of being kicked from the circle and isolated once more, must have contributed to the compromises so many made when the Cultural Revolution was over. An implicit pact between the government and the persecuted was enforced, a silent agreement not to probe too deeply, think too hard, or ask too many questions, an agreement to forget. "Let bygones be bygones," as Zha Jianying says.

But the implicit pact China's intellectuals made under reform seems more akin to the Stockholm syndrome of hostages than the psychological settlement that comes through genuine reconciliation and forgiveness. Intellectuals were still wards of the state. They did not have full citizenship. Everyone knew that the bargain did not include full disclosure. Real responsibility for the suffering of the intellectuals, for the suffering of China, had neither been assigned nor accepted. In their desperate need to belong, to reenter the circle, many were willing to forget.

And thus the problem of memory. Thus also the ongoing identity crisis of so many Chinese intellectuals—that lingering fear of losing their identity, the concern that the price of modernity, the price of moving forward, is the loss of who they are. Perhaps those fears too grow out of the bargain they made not to look back, not really to confront the past. So questions of responsibility remain and recur. The truce, necessarily, is uneasy.

Perhaps it is also the power of the circle and the unbearable pain of isolation that allowed a few of my friends, more than a decade after the Cultural Revolution ended, to convince themselves that they had never protested in the square, never joined the demonstrations in the spring of 1989. They had already gone through the Cultural Revolution. They could not bear to suffer that way again. They had too much to lose. Better, perhaps, to forget.

AN EVOLVING SENSE OF PATRIOTISM

But Tiananmen 1989 did introduce new dimensions into the ongoing identity crisis of China's intellectuals. Their understanding of patriotism changed. One of the lesser-noted messages of the popular demonstrations in 1989 was the students' insistence that their movement was patriotic. Students had read the April 26 editorial in the *People's Daily* accusing them of creating turmoil as an attack on their patriotism. Thereafter, the rock-bottom requirement for association with the movement was the recognition of the students' patriotism. (That May, intent on meeting with the student leaders headquartered at the Monument to the Revolutionary Heroes in the center of Tiananmen

Square, I had to work my way through a series of student security guards positioned in concentric circles around them. At each pass, the question was the same: Do you or do you not believe that the student movement is patriotic?)

The students' insistence on their patriotism was anathema to the Communist Party. They were declaring that it was possible to be both unquestionably patriotic and bitterly critical of the corruption and authoritarianism of the Communist Party government. The claim was supported by millions of adults, the citizens of Beijing, who flocked to the square to join the students.

The government's violent rejection of the students' claims created a new diaspora, and the meaning of being Chinese (and patriotic) shifted. If the movement itself and those who led and inspired it were indeed patriotic, then some of the country's staunchest patriots were forced to flee. The Chinese press attempted to manipulate popular judgments on who was patriotic and who was not, and to some extent the media were successful. Wang Dan and Han Dongfang were viewed as more patriotic than anyone who fled, because they went to prison for their beliefs. The patriotism of Fang Lizhi, the country's preeminent democracy advocate, was compromised when he fled to safety in the compound of the American embassy. But judgments on the patriotism of those who fled were generally far less harsh than they had been at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Following Tiananmen, it was possible both to flee and to remain a patriotic Chinese.

My first awareness of how far the notion of patriotism had changed was in the winter of 1989. I had first tried to visit Liang Aihua, the patriotic returned overseas Chinese who refused to leave China at the end of the Cultural Revolution, in late June of 1989. She was not at home, and her neighbors had not seen her for some time. Months passed before I found her. She was in Hong Kong. Chinese authorities had found her there, too, and encouraged her to return to Beijing. They assured her there would be no reprisals, but Liang Aihua refused their remonstrance then, just as she had it at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Her son, then studying in the United States, had joined the Chinese student demonstrations at his university and

often served as an interpreter for the dissidents in exile. He did not believe the promises the authorities had made to his mother, fearing that she could be persecuted for his activities. Liang Aihua said she would not return to China until her country became democratic. She, too, feared for her safety and refused to contribute to a government that had turned against its own people.

The transformation of Liang Aihua's sense of patriotism was not unique. Throughout 1989–1990, as I revisited the people whose stories had formed the core of *Enemies of the People*, I heard my friends excoriate themselves for their stupidity, their blind love and foolish belief. You Xiaoli, who had once spoken so forcefully about staying in China, berated herself for not having left years before, when she had the chance. You Xiaoli considered herself foolish for insisting on staying even after all she had suffered. She had stopped loving Chairman Mao. She believed that she was too old to leave, but she had sent her son to study abroad and hoped he would never return.

Ever-patriotic Song Wuhao had left, as had Song Erli, for whom Eliot's "Journey of the Magi" was a description of his return to China. Song Erli did not want the death that his country had become. Yet all of them continued to view themselves as patriotic—and profoundly Chinese. Some even began to argue that it is easier to be Chinese, and patriotic, while living abroad. They point to people like Liang Aihua—a patriotic leftist educated abroad—who returned to China only to be come under attack and see two members of her family persecuted to death. They point to the irony of the official reception of the more conservative overseas Chinese who had left in 1949. Returning for visits some 30 years later, they were officially honored, even as their families and friends who had stayed in China were still struggling back from years of official disgrace. People also said that fewer bargains had to be struck while living abroad. Within the family and overseas community, traditions could be maintained.

CONCLUSION

In a period of such rapid, sometimes chaotic change, it is no surprise patriotism is becoming the universal value all Chinese can share. But

something about the nature of that patriotism still disturbs. What is it about their country Chinese people love? The rich and glorious history that has stood as such a hindrance to the process of modernization? The community of common suffering? Today's rapid economic growth with all its chaos, disruption, and disparities? Rule by the Communist Party? Shared hate and fear over the possibility of further humiliations by outside forces? Shared shame and humiliation that the country has still not returned to its previous, superior place in the world order? What is it about their history Chinese people remember? And what is it they forget?

No one seems to know anymore, or at least few can agree, what China is or what it really means to be Chinese. How does one explain why so many of China's best and brightest, patriotic individuals who want to work for the good of their country, have fled? How does one explain the continuing paradox between the articulated vision of a modernized China and the ongoing fear that the price of modernity is somehow the loss of Chineseness? The values, the culture, the sense of China as the Middle Kingdom are not, many believe, compatible with the modern world. China as Middle Kingdom was the center of the universe, the embodiment of civilization. Modern, though, is Western and thus a challenge to China's traditional conception of itself.

Thus the moral crisis that has plagued China for well over a century continues today. The Confucian culture that first came under direct attack with the May Fourth Movement of 1919 continued to be denigrated under Mao and again during Deng's reforms—most notably in Su Xiaokang's television series, *River Elegy*. But Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought lost its appeal during the reform period, too. And Deng's four cardinal principles—the leadership of the party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the supremacy of socialism, and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought—no longer make sense in the contemporary world. The universal claims of Marxism and socialism have demonstrably failed. With corruption rampant and crass materialism the norm, the moral authority of the Chinese Communist Party continues to erode. The fear of chaos is pervasive in this period of rapid change.

So the Chinese people's quest for new values, ones that could give order and meaning to their lives while still allowing them to be Chinese, continues. For many, perhaps most Chinese people, this quest is a private, individual pursuit, outside the guidance of the Communist Party. A surprising number are turning to religion for moral guidance. Buddhism, traditionally strong in southern China, is widely practiced. Official figures put the number of Buddhists at 100 million people. The number of Christians now far exceeds the number at the time of the Communists' ascension to power, and unofficial figures (which include the nonsanctioned house churches) suggest that China today has more Christians than members of the Communist Party. Chinese Muslims, the dominant ethnic minority in the northwest, are renewing their faith and interacting again with fellow Muslims in several of the new states that were once a part of the Soviet Union.

The popularity of *Falun gong* is only one manifestation of the burgeoning of traditional folk religions, long (and still) denounced by the party as superstitious and feared as outright dangerous. Traditional rebellions against imperial rule often began with the spread of such unorthodox sects. The Taiping rebellion, whose leader made the decidedly unorthodox claim of being the younger brother of Jesus Christ, is said to have left some 20 million people dead in its wake.

Thus Chinese history is becoming harder to write, especially in its official, party-sanctified form. History, after all, is an effort to explain what happened in the past, and a nation's history is best written on the basis of shared underlying national values, what many today are calling collective memory. History was easier to write during the Maoist era. Even if not everyone would recognize such history as true, the formula was nonetheless intact. Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought was the ultimate good. Confucian, feudal China, with all its superstitions, was evil, as were the shifting congeries of outside enemies. Confucius has not been fully rehabilitated during the reform era, nor has Maoist ideology been thoroughly denounced. But because little about Mao's vision makes sense as China breaks out of the socialist straightjacket and into a larger world of markets and democracies, new values must govern. The problem is that the party has

yet to find or to articulate a new set of values beyond the value of China itself. Hence patriotism has become the ultimate Chinese value, the one universal that all Chinese share, the thread that holds them together and on which their fragile identity depends. To challenge that patriotism is to challenge the very identity of the Chinese people.

Everything we know about individual psychology suggests that the traumas so many Chinese have suffered in the past dozen, 30, 50, 100, 150 years are both exceptionally painful and exceedingly difficult to overcome. We also know that such wounds are ultimately healed only when they are honestly confronted—not through the manipulated *biaotai* that forces memory into boxes that do not fit but through genuine storytelling, letting ordinary people recall, openly and freely, their difficult personal pasts. Only when the story is out, and recognized as real, does the past become easier to accept and gently to put to rest. When, for instance, You Xiaoli finally realized that she did not love Chairman Mao after all, once she concluded that some of her own important life decisions have been wrong, not only could she look back over her life, she could see it with a sense of peace and acceptance.

The party's control of Chinese history and memory, both collective and individual, continues to contort the truth. Those distortions will continue to undermine the party's legitimacy. Private truths have a way of demanding periodically to be heard, after all, and in China such episodic outbursts of truth have had a way of turning violent. There was a truth to the Cultural Revolution, after all—that many party officials at all levels had become arrogant, authoritarian, and self-interested, in obvious violation of the creed they claimed to profess. The protests of 1989 carried similar messages of truth.

There is danger, too, in the party's current manipulation of the complex but genuine patriotism of so many Chinese people. Within China, the party's ability to incorporate love of the party-state into the conception of patriotism is eroding, as the years since Tiananmen have so tellingly illustrated. Claims to patriotism from the Chinese diaspora, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are no less legitimate for being different. But as the moral authority of the party continues to decline, its claims to patriotism become increasingly important. The legitimacy

of the party depends on fostering a perception that the “country” so loved by Chinese patriots must be governed by the Communist Party. Thus the efforts at “patriotic education” that began in the wake of Tiananmen.

Thus, too, perhaps, the perception by outsiders of a rising Chinese nationalism. What better way to ensure party rule remains a tenet of patriotism than the perception of a threat to China that only the current government can repel? The party’s turn to nationalism is an indication of its failure to re-create a Chinese community and fear that the party itself could be excluded from a community the people themselves might create. The rise of Chinese nationalism can be seen as a manifestation of the current crisis of legitimacy of the party.

Without major political reform, the party’s legitimacy is likely to continue to decline. The logic of party rule no longer exists. But the party is still more legitimate than many Westerners presume. For the time being, there is simply no alternative to party rule. A collapse of the current government would plunge the country into the chaos that most Chinese dread—and that we, too, should fear. But nationalism is not patriotism. Ordinary Chinese take pride in their patriotism (*aiguo zhuyi*). They do not, when talking about themselves, make claims to nationalism (*minzu zhuyi*). The distinction is important, and we would be wise to make that distinction too. A China governed by patriots—who love their country and want to make it better—is a China we could work with. To denigrate that patriotism would serve to further the type of antforeign nationalism that could render China a danger to itself and to the world.

But the most difficult task remains within China itself. The multiple crises of identity, morality, and legitimacy cannot be solved without a long period of expiation and reconciliation. That process is China’s own.

Notes

1. Much of the content (though not the analysis) for this chapter is drawn from my own previous research, particularly from *Enemies of the People* and from an article in the *SAIS Review* about the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989.

2. Jianying Zha, *China Pop* (New York: The New Press, 1995), p. 18.
3. Much of this description can be found in my article, "Memory and Mourning: China Ten Years after Tiananmen," in *SAIS Review* 19, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1999): 61–79.
4. Nathan Gardels, "Two Concepts of Nationalism: An Interview with Isaiah Berlin," *New York Review of Books*, November 21, 1991, p. 19.
5. Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 65–66.
6. Robert Jay Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 479.
7. Quoted in Jonathan Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1885–1980* (New York: Viking, 1981), p. 352.
8. See Jacobo Timerman, *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number* (New York: Knopf, 1981); and Louis L. Snyder, *The Dreyfus Case: A Documentary History* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973).
9. Terrence Des Pres, *The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
10. Anne F. Thurston, *Enemies of the People: The Ordeal of the Intellectuals in China's Great Cultural Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1987), pp. 5–6.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 300–301.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 298. Excerpt from "The Journey of the Magi" in *Collected Poems, 1909–1962*, by T. S. Eliot, copyright 1936 by Harcourt, Inc., copyright © 1964, 1963 by T. S. Eliot, reprinted by permission of the publisher.
16. Bai Hua, *Kulian (Unrequited Love)* (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1981), pp. 102, 83.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

JAPANESE SECURITY ORIENTATION

A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

Yoshiya Muto

THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY, such as its exclusively defense-oriented posture and the three nonnuclear principles, are fairly well known. But despite the restrained nature of those principles, some observers outside Japan still voice concerns regarding future Japanese security policy. Their underlying fear is that a new nationalism incorporating some elements of pre-World War II will lead the country in a dangerous direction, toward increased detachment from the U.S.-Japan security alliance and a more "independent" security policy.¹

The reason for this, in my view, is at least partly because that psychological aspects of Japanese security and defense policy are rarely discussed by Japanese policymakers. Such reticence to discuss security matters creates misunderstandings among many non-Japanese, who believe there are unstated but deep-rooted psychological motives behind official Japanese defense policy. The purpose of my discussion is to cast light on the often-overlooked psychological aspects of Japanese defense policy and to emphasize that the direction of such policy is a sound one. Naturally, much of my thinking will focus on Japanese nationalism.

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CYCLES IN JAPANESE NATIONALISM

Japan has always been a nationalistic country, in the sense most Japanese have always been very conscious of their national and cultural identity. To be conscious of one's own nation is not bad; within certain limits, it is a virtue. However, in my view another element of nationalism, the Japanese attitude toward the outside world, needs to be taken into consideration.

Throughout our modern history, the Japanese people have alternated between being surprisingly open and frustratingly closed to outside influences. In fact, Japanese society has shifted between such extremes and has often been considerably volatile. For example, the years after the Meiji Restoration saw tremendous openness; people competed to learn and introduce Western knowledge and culture into Japan, almost to the extent that they neglected positive aspects of their own tradition.

However, generally speaking, such attitudes of openness greatly contributed to Japan's successful economic modernization and prosperity following the Meiji Restoration, a period in which the Japanese people were not immune from nationalistic feelings. In fact, many of the leaders' progressive attitudes at the time were driven by an urgent desire to prevent Japan from following the same tragic path many other Asian nations were then taking. Japan's government officials and private elite were eager to turn the country rapidly into a modern Western-style nation so it would not fall prey to Western efforts to colonize the region. Such devotion to modernization (Westernization) could logically be called nationalism.

As Japan gradually emerged as a great power, Japanese attitudes toward the outside world changed. Japanese citizens became arrogant, convinced that Japanese success resulted from some mystical uniqueness of Japan. Egoistic nationalism replaced the humility of the architects of the Meiji Restoration. Victories in the Russo-Japanese War and other confrontations led to the conviction that Japan was a sort of *shin-koku*, a divine nation that was invincible and destined to prevail in all conflicts. Such close-mindedness made Japanese nationalism very narrow-minded, prone to extreme militarism, and eventually led to the devastation of the whole country in the Pacific war.

A similar cycle of excessive nationalism occurred after World War II, but with drastically different results. Following its surrender, Japan was more than willing to divest itself of its past and to establish a new nation. Again, Japanese attitudes were often excessive, and people often forsook even the positive elements of prewar Japanese culture. Still, such open-minded nationalism was the key to the construction of a democratic and peace-loving country, which in the following decades created tremendous successes, particularly in economic growth and political stability.

As Japan's economic growth reached extremes no one had ever expected, a new arrogance crept into the mind-set of many Japanese, who began to believe the Japanese economic miracle was the result of unique attributes of Japan's economy, business, or even culture. Such beliefs and continued economic affluence at home increasingly weakened the Japanese people's interest in foreign affairs and external economic developments, a phenomenon that contributed to the major economic setbacks of the 1990s and the failure to live up to so-called global standards. This, in my view, is the result of close-minded "nationalism" in the economic field. Now, however, Japanese people in business and elsewhere are struggling for a change, which will likely sacrifice some of the "uniquely" Japanese ways of doing things they once believed to be the secret of the "economic miracle."

What, then, was the relationship between nationalism and Japanese foreign policy in the postwar era? Arguably, a similar movement took place, although developments in security policy were not entirely synchronized with those in the economic arena. After Japan's defeat, Japanese security policy was completely restructured and became pacifistic in nature. Although the occupation forces' general headquarters wrote the original draft of the constitution, the Japanese people welcomed the new constitution, which renounced war and prohibited the nation from possessing military forces.² True, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) eventually established a necessary minimum level of force for self-defense, but Japan's defense policy retained an exceedingly low profile.

Such drastic change was probably influenced by the worldwide euphoria regarding the possibility of achieving lasting peace that

occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Many expected that a new world order under the leadership of the United Nations would, in time, replace security efforts by individual nations.³ As the Japanese people began to feel comfortable with their lack of security obligations and ability to concentrate exclusively on economic growth, the low profile of security affairs was widely accepted by the people as a wise policy to pursue. And, Japanese security policy was not affected, even as it became obvious that the risk of conflict in the postwar world was much greater than had previously been envisaged.

Many Japanese are dismissive or disdainful of military-related aspects of national security. What is troublesome about such notions is that they are not so much based on objective observations of surrounding international circumstances as they are upon unfounded convictions that pacifism is desirable because it was seen as a uniquely Japanese approach to national security. Leftist politicians, in particular, many of whom were quite influential in the early postwar era, believed Japan could and should present to the world a model of pacifism and restraint through giving up all defense efforts. The Socialist Party's unarmed neutrality policy is a salient expression of such a mentality.

Although it may appear counterintuitive, I would characterize such a mind-set of pacifism as yet another example of a close-minded nationalism. In fact, underlying the so called *anpo-toso* (anti-security treaty struggle), which marked the culmination of the leftist movement, was the feeling that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was only extended American occupation of the country, and thus should be abolished to attain true independence for Japan. Such emotions are nothing but nationalist sentiments (though those who hold such ideas may rigorously reject such usage of the word) that were, essentially, close-minded and ignorant of the realities of the world. To paraphrase their mind-set, it would be something like the following; "The Cold War is your business, not ours. We Japanese wish to live in peace, and the best way for us to avoid conflict is to distance ourselves from the American Cold War strategy. The only conceivable reason we could be dragged into war is the alliance with the United States. So

leave us alone, Americans, we do not want this security treaty, which we regard as nothing more than a remnant of the American military occupation of our country!”

Such “nationalism” did not experience the sobering reversals inflicted on the nationalism of imperial Japan or the hard landing of Japanese “economic nationalism.”⁴ Nevertheless, the little appreciation Japan received from the international community for the country’s significant financial contribution to the Gulf War effort was a major embarrassment and setback for those who argued Japan should continue to maintain a low profile in defense matters. That and other embarrassments triggered changes in Japanese security policy, such as introduction of peacekeeping operations legislation, participation in Kampuchean peacekeeping, the Guideline process, and more.

What prompted such undertakings was the recognition that Japan should be more open-minded and ready to engage in the international community in the same manner as other countries. People started to feel that the Japanese Self Defense Forces were deprived of too many of the functions that military forces of ordinary countries routinely performed. Contrary to what some in the United States and elsewhere believe, these movements toward larger Japanese participation in world affairs do not compose a trend toward a nationalism that parallels the Japanese nationalism of the pre-World War II period. If there is a nationalistic element in it, it is a nationalism that points in the opposite direction, toward increased openness and international engagement, not insularity and conquest.

Such an understanding of postwar Japanese nationalism illustrates that the security policy changes now taking place in Japan will not undermine the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In fact, the driving sentiment behind the guideline legislation process was a growing recognition among politicians, as well as the general public, that our past security policy had been blind to the realities of the international environment. (The launching of a missile by North Korea in 1998 reinforced such a recognition.) Thus, to deal with this environment, we must take a more active role in the alliance. Other initiatives not directly related to the alliance—such as participation in

peacekeeping operations—were never based on nationalistic sentiments that deny the importance of a strongly maintained alliance, but rather were intended to complement the existing alliance.

RECOVERING THE VALUE OF THE NATION-STATE

The previous section indicated that cycles of Japanese nationalism exist, and that changes now taking place are sound, headed toward increased openness and moderation. The psychology behind the current trend reveals an evident desire to recover the value that is naturally attached to a nation-state. One characteristic of the narrow-minded prewar nationalism was an exaggerated emphasis on the importance and value of the Japanese nation. For example, a phrase that encouraged people to devote themselves to the war effort was *okuni no tame*, which means “for the sake of the country.” As a reaction to the excessive worship of the nation-state during the war, postwar Japanese era have tended drastically to de-emphasize the value of the nation-state.

To be more precise, nation-states have two different functions. One function is to create a platform for and assist the economic and cultural activities of its citizens. The other function, in which a nation-state plays a more direct role, is to maintain the sovereignty, integrity, and dignity of the state itself. National security obviously falls under the rubric of this latter state function. If the former is identified as an indirect and the latter as a direct function of a nation-state, the indirect function of the Japanese state was not muted in the aftermath of World War II, as is evident by the degree to which the Japanese people took pride in the *keizai-taikoku* (economic giant) status of their country. The hosting of and participation in the Olympic games and other world sport events are further examples in which the Japanese people have not hesitated to express their attachment to and pride in the cultural or economic success of the nation. However, in the aftermath of the war, the Japanese people derided the more direct functions of a nation-state because they regarded the security functions of the nation-state as having been overemphasized before and during the war.⁵

Although such attitudes were a backlash against the attitudes that led Japan into war, they did not disappear quickly. One reason for this is that leftist political parties continued to launch ideological attacks against traditional conceptions of the nation-state, and their tremendous influence in the postwar period helped these efforts. The Cold War international structure and the U.S.-Japan relationship also contributed to a backlash against Japanese defense capabilities, which allowed for such a mentality. This factor has several dimensions.

The first dimension is the relative sense of security in Japan's public. During the Cold War, the Japanese people were relatively free from threats to the territorial integrity of the Japanese state. The Cold War structure, in which the East and West confronted each other as blocs, fostered alliance systems in which the integrity of an individual nation tended to be subsumed by the overall security imperative of the bloc to which it belonged. This phenomenon was not unique to Japan, though, the fact that Japan is surrounded by the sea amplified this effect. The Japanese people felt more secure than people of those countries directly involved in East-West conflict.⁶

Such being the case, in those days the Japanese people's conception of national security was very theoretical. Realists thought Japan should try not to create a power vacuum within the Western camp's line of defense against the East, and therefore advocated a firm commitment to the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the steady buildup of Japan's own defensive capabilities. Pacifists argued Japan itself had no reason to fear attack from other countries (particularly if Japan was totally disarmed and posed no threat to any other country), and that the existence of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty itself was the only possible means through which Japan could be "dragged" into war. The debate between the two political sides often became very heated, but it remained unsettled because no major security crisis occurred in the Asia-Pacific region that would have tested the hypotheses of both sides. And in the context of such ideological contention, the idea of securing the national integrity of Japan as a nation-state attracted little attention, compared to the question of whether Japan should remain a loyal member of the Western bloc.

The second dimension is that Cold War circumstances left Japan with little opportunity, or need, to focus its security policy on the questions of national integrity and dignity. Because the primary role of the militaries of the Western bloc countries during the Cold War was considered to be the deterrence of possible aggression by the East, the only roles of Japan's Self-Defense Forces that received public support were those that provided for Japan's own defense. Therefore, the JSDF had little opportunity to perform international missions that could enhance Japan's national dignity. The Japanese people's mind-set called for maintaining a low international security profile, and pacifism itself came to represent Japan's identity. If security was not the area in which Japan took pride, then there certainly was little need to take military measures to advance the country's dignity.

The first experience that brought a major change in these two dimensions of Japanese aversion to security affairs was the Gulf War. *Kokusai-koken* (international contribution) was the keyword for the new initiative that followed the Gulf War, in which the JSDF was given its first major overseas task—peacekeeping. This was actually performed in Kampuchea soon after the passage of the related law in 1992.⁷ International disaster relief activity was simultaneously added to the scope of the JSDF's mission, although an opportunity for actual operations did not arise until 1998, when a severe hurricane hit Honduras.

To be sure, these international efforts are intended to contribute to a more stable international security environment, thereby fostering peace and the security of Japan. But at the same time, when looking at the psychological side of Japanese attitudes toward the JSDF's new roles, the Japanese have become increasingly aware that these new functions enhance Japan's international status—a goal that had been poorly achieved through substantial financial (nonmilitary) participation in the Gulf War. The addition of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) to the roles of the JSDF in 1994 also had a similar intent. Previously unable to send promptly its own aircraft overseas to evacuate Japanese nationals in crisis and consequently dependent on other countries, Japan sought to redress the problem—a matter of national dignity as much as of national security.

The Taepodong missile North Korea launched in 1998 also tremendously shocked Japan's general public.⁸ Foreigners saw Japan's fearful reaction as excessive, and many non-Japanese were puzzled by its strength. As mentioned, during the Cold War the Japanese people were not very conscious of any threats to Japanese territory, thanks to the double buffer provided by the structure of the East-West confrontation and the existence of surrounding sea. After the Cold War, however, states in the Asia-Pacific region faced each other in a more direct manner, eliminating the Cold War's stable bipolarity. Although the Cold War's end did not geographically change Japan's maritime separation from other countries, ongoing developments in military technology, particularly the proliferation of missile technology, diminished the degree to which the ocean served as a natural security barrier for Japan.

The North Korean missile firing was a very symbolic event. It suggested to the Japanese that the two buffers that had long kept Japan safe and secure were now disappearing. Subsequent incidents like the 1999 infiltration of North Korean vessels into Japan's territorial water intensified Japanese awareness of their growing insecurity.⁹ These events clearly changed the Japanese people's sense of threat and increased interest in ballistic missile defense (BMD) projects, and spurred reviews of Japan's territorial security.¹⁰ Further, the recent cyber attack that targeted many Japanese government ministries and agencies, although in itself not a military operation, underscored another technology development that makes less relevant the geographical buffer Japan used to enjoy.

The third dimension of how the Cold War structure de-emphasized the value of the nation-state derives from international expectations of Japan's role in the security realm. During the Cold War, the Western bloc expected Japan to do little more than maintain a strong self-defense, so as not to create a weak point in the deterrence posture against the East. This was particularly important because Japan is located geographically at the convergence of three important straits (the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits) Soviet submarines might have used to enter the Pacific Ocean. In case of a major East-West military conflict, it was assumed the Soviet submarines would try to

proceed into the outer ocean through those three straits to threaten Western sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the Pacific. To do so, it was believed the Soviets would attempt to occupy Japanese territory adjacent to the straits. Given these circumstances, Japan could contribute significantly to the Western bloc by beefing up its own defense. By doing so, the Japanese people could also feel they were playing a significant role in international security. Japan did not seek a proactive security role during the Cold War, satisfied in part by its role in the defense of Western SLOCs.¹¹

When the Cold War was over, the defense of Japanese territory obviously continued to be vital to Japan itself, but the international significance of Japan's defense in the context of East-West confrontation faded. This is not to deny the fact that a robust defense of a country often serves the stability of the region to which the country belongs. But that remains true only in a general sense, and the specificity it carried during the Cold War was lost. Therefore, if Japan were to maintain, let alone enhance, its feeling of playing an important international security role, it had to engage in some new field of international relations. Japan's recent involvement in *kokusai-koken*, the impetus for which was provided by the Gulf War, has in fact such a psychological background.

The fourth dimension could be found in the fact that many Japanese had only the most remote sense of Japan as a nation-state (and the JSDF as its physical force) playing a national security role through actual day-to-day operations. This was so because the most likely threat Japan faced during the Cold War was a major invasion by the Soviet Union, the outcome of which might have been grave, but the possibility of which was perceived to be extremely low, so long as Western deterrence remained robust. When a country faces a threat with tremendous consequences but a low risk of occurrence, it tends to build deterrence capabilities, with less emphasis on actual operations. This was what was taking place in Japan. As a result, the size of the defense budget and the type and quantity of equipment purchased by the JSDF were the only things that really mattered within the realm of defense policy. The JSDF's engagement in actual missions was kept to a minimum, and even when it did participate in actual

missions—such as disaster relief—the atmosphere among the media and others was that the visibility of JSDF activities should be kept low.

But when the stabilizing structure of the Cold War eroded, and the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region became more volatile, Japan started to shift toward a defense policy focused on smaller but more probable contingencies. Such contingencies inevitably shifted the emphasis of Japanese defense policy from capabilities to actual operational planning. Two examples of this phenomenon are the sending of mine-sweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War and the participation in Kampuchean peacekeeping. The Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995, although in a coincidental matter, also reinforced the trend toward a larger actual role for the JSDF. The lack of smooth cooperation between the local government and the Self-Defense Forces, at least partly the result of society's desire to keep the JSDF as inconspicuous as possible, was widely criticized. But in the disaster relief activities that followed the earthquake, the JSDF proved extremely capable. Eventually, many improvements, including the revision of related laws, were made to secure more prompt and effective JSDF involvement in disaster relief.¹² More important, the incident further eliminated people's reluctance to deploy the JSDF for various social and national needs. A renewed political interest in *yuji-hosei* (emergency legislation, to amend shortcomings in laws concerning the defense of Japan) can also be understood as the result of increased emphasis on operational aspects of the Self-Defense Forces.

Those are the main reasons the value of the nation-state was neglected during the Cold War, and for the move to recover the lost focus since its end. In concluding this argument, a word about the adoption of the national flag and anthem in Japan might be appropriate. The legislation to adopt these two national symbols has been criticized by some as reminiscent of prewar Japanese nationalism. Those in Japan who oppose the adoption of the national flag and anthem maintain these were the symbols of the much condemned nationalism of the past. But the prevailing sentiment that pushed the legislation forward was not that feared by critics of the policies. In fact this is just a matter of recovering the natural behavior of a nation-state and attitudes unjustifiably rejected in the postwar era. In other

words, people started to ask themselves, “Why shouldn’t we pay respect to our national flag and anthem just like people in all other countries? It may be true the flag and anthem once were used to motivate people to participate in the war effort, and we have condemned such wartime activities, but these articles are no longer used to foster aggressive sentiments. Why then should we be reluctant in accepting ‘Hinomaru’ and ‘Kimigayo’ as a flag and song that symbolize the nation-state of Japan?” While such a mentality has already become prevalent among the general public, the suicide of a high school principal under pressure from teachers opposed to raising the flag and singing the national anthem in a school ceremony triggered the legislation. In the nationwide debate that followed the suicide, some of those critical of “Hinomaru” and “Kimigayo” argued people do not have to respect the flag and the song because no law officially states they are actually the national flag and national anthem. The legislation probably came as a simple answer to such arguments, and would be mistaken to attach any further meaning to it.

WILL THE NATIONALISM CYCLE REPEAT ITSELF IN THE FUTURE?

As we have seen, what is happening in Japan now, when regarded from the viewpoint of nationalism, has little in common with the close-minded nationalism that preceded World War II. Today’s trends point toward open-mindedness and target nothing more than recovery of the value of nation-state. One might ask, however, if the cycle of nationalism that once existed in Japan will repeat itself in the future. And if it does, even if the present trend is going in the right direction, won’t a more narrow-minded nationalism reassert itself in Japan in the long run? These are all legitimate questions, but the remainder of this chapter argues that the answer to all of them is no.

Initially, the political system in Japan was fundamentally improved after the war, and under the new system, democracy has solid roots within Japanese society. This is not to say that prewar Japan was completely autocratic. Indeed, under the Meiji Constitution, democracy gradually grew and political parties began to play important roles within the government. Although the emperor had constitu-

tional authority to rule the nation, he customarily accepted decisions made by the cabinet. But there were serious flaws to the Meiji system; particularly problematic was the independence of the military command from the authority of the cabinet. Civilian control of the military was further weakened by a practice that limited those who could become military ministers to generals and admirals in active service. This meant that if either the army or navy was dissatisfied with a cabinet, they merely had to refuse to send an army or navy minister, and the cabinet was virtually forced to resign.

Supported by such institutional independence, the military took a lead in creating a narrow-minded nationalistic fervor, such as that which erupted after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. However, under today's constitution, sovereign power clearly resides with the people, and the cabinet, formed through a highly democratic process, has full control over the Self-Defense Forces. The Diet also has a tight grip on the JSDF through its control of the budget and laws. The military-sponsored nationalism that existed in prewar Japan has little chance of being revived in modern Japan. Yet, it should be noted that although the military played a leading role, the general public and mass media strongly supported nationalistic sentiments in the past. In fact, when the military initiated the Manchurian Incident—disregarding the cabinet policy not to escalate the matter—major newspapers and the public enthusiastically supported the military initiative and criticized the Wakatsuki cabinet, which tried to restrain the process.¹³ This suggests that the democratic system and civilian control alone are not sufficient constraints on militaristic nationalism.

Second, the present international environment, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, does not allow the offensive use of military power to enhance a country's prosperity, though it still can be employed to defend such prosperity. Interdependence and economic globalization are making the world much different from what it was in the early twentieth century. This has important implications for predicting whether militaristic Japanese nationalism will reassert itself in a coming era. Almost any country that places economic prosperity at the core of its national interests will not dare use military force to expand territorial control in today's world. Whatever marginal economic

gain might be won through military aggression would almost surely be canceled out by international sanctions. There may be exceptions, like countries in deep economic trouble that have only threatening military force by which to derive economic assistance from other countries. However, given the size, sophistication, and physical vulnerability of its economy, Japan is unlikely to be tempted to use force to pursue any economic benefit. And, given the primacy of the economic element in Japan, it is similarly unlikely Japan will seek political objectives through military means at the cost of economic prosperity.

But the third, and perhaps most important, reason is that Japan learned much from its historical experiences and memory. After almost 300 years of national isolation during the Edo period, the Japanese people had no idea how they would perform in the international society in which they found themselves, and this uncertainty and ignorance caused the extreme fluctuation of humbleness and arrogance. Even the humility of the Meiji and post-World War II periods, although basically positive, had certain excesses: there were tendencies to accept any outside system or culture without criticism, and the flip side was a tendency to make light of traditional Japanese values.

Some 150 years have passed since Commodore Matthew Perry knocked on Japan's closed door, and the country has since experienced numerous successes and failures. It has learned that its people have some fine talents but are in no sense special and, in fact, have many shortcomings. The Japanese understand the dangers of a resurgence of aggressive nationalism, and moderate and realistic positions have prevailed over extremism in the political and academic arenas as well as in the media. People outside Japan tend to exaggerate the significance of Japan's ultrarightist groups, but their domestic political influence is minimal at best. Their major impact is sometimes outside the country, where their importance is often overestimated. The Japanese people dramatically expanded contact with the outside world through increased access to information and the growing number of people who visit and stay in foreign countries. Such exchanges of culture and knowledge certainly help people be more objective in evaluating themselves and their own country. Thus, the nationalism cycle that showed excessive fluctuation in the past has likely ended.

CONCLUSION

The trend in Japan today, interpreted by some as an alarming rise of nationalism, has little to do with the nationalism of the prewar era. Prewar nationalistic sentiments were close minded and arrogant; Japanese in that era believed Japan uniquely superior to other countries and rejected reasonable observations of the outside world. The current trend in Japan, however, is pointed in exactly the opposite direction—toward increased openness. It is a mistake to think the prewar type of nationalism is inherent to the Japanese people's nature, since the nationalism of the prewar era was the product of narrow and idealized interpretations of Japanese successes following the Meiji Restoration.

It is true that in today's Japan there is an increasing consciousness of national sovereignty and national integrity, but it is not a nationalism that emphasizes Japan's superiority. Rather, it is based on a desire to recover the lost values of the direct functions of a nation-state. The integrity and dignity of Japan's nation-state are the underlying themes of this trend, which involves a process of forgetting the war-time trauma that made the Japanese people believe their nation-state was inherently evil. The effort to achieve a balanced nation implies a nation that does not simply serve as a platform for economic and cultural activities by its people but also acts in its own capacity and with honor.

The nationalistic cycle, which in the past tended to shift from extreme to extreme, will become more stable, as people continue to learn from past mistakes. Here historical remembering is truly important.

Even some who do not predict Japan will become militaristic still seem to worry that Japan will drift from the U.S.-Japan alliance and seek a more "independent" security policy because of nationalistic sentiments. This is not true. In fact, support for the alliance is becoming more solid. One psychological change that U.S. observers may interpret as a desire to distance itself from the alliance is in fact nothing more than Japan's quest for increased equality. Equality does not necessarily mean a symmetric relation, as the Japanese people are still not ready or willing to undertake certain security roles and thus continue to rely on the United States. Equality means increased participation in decisionmaking, backed by enhanced information sharing.¹⁴

Criticisms implying the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty keeps Japan subordinated to the United States can be blunted by creating a more equal, if not symmetrical, Japanese role within the alliance. This was another reason, beyond reaffirming the alliance, that the guideline process is significant. Identifying roles Japan can play beyond just providing facilities, and specifying mechanisms by which both countries coordinate decisionmaking, positively appeals to the Japanese people's aspiration for improved dignity of the nation-state of Japan.

Hence, good reasons exist for optimism for the future of Japan's security orientation and U.S.-Japan alliance. Potentially worrisome, however, is that precautionary American reactions based on misperceptions of the current Japanese trend could foster negative feelings among Japanese politicians and the general public toward the United States. Also, if countries like China continue to espouse alarmist images of Japan on the grounds of similar misunderstandings, similar and unnecessary resentment—particularly from the right-wingers in Japan—may invite a vicious cycle of action and reaction between those countries and Japan. The Japanese people's preference for keeping a low profile in national security matters is changing, but still very persistent. Far-fetched expectations for Japan's security role are likely to be disappointed. A better understanding of the psychological aspects of Japan's security orientation by Americans and others is therefore much desired.



The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author.

Notes

1. For an example of such a concern, see "Japan's Evolving Strategic Calculus" (National Intelligence Council, NIC 508-99, June 16, 1999) p. 4. Also, "Japan's Two Nationalisms," *Washington Post*, June 4, 2000, p. B6. "Japan Discovers Defense," *New York Times*, August 26, 1999, provides a more optimistic view.

2. The process, for example, is briefly explained in Makoto Iokibe, "Nihon no Anzenhoshō-kan wa Ikani Suii shitaka," *Gaiko Forum Kinkyū Zokan* "Nihon no Anzenhoshō," 1996, pp. 69–73.

3. Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Sengo Nihon to Heiwa—Rongi no Fumo to Rinen no Kibo," *Gaiko Forum* (January 1998): 20. Nakanishi, quoting Teruya

expectation that the United Nations would unite the world, or on the condition that all countries will take a similar attitude to Japan's from the viewpoint of international reciprocity.

4. See Shinichi Kitaoka, *Nichibei Kankei no Riarisumu* (Chuko Soshō, Chuo Koron Sha, 1991), pp. 71–72. Touching on the debate in Japan that took place during the Gulf crisis, Kitaoka indicates that a group of people he calls “economic nationalists” believe in Japanese economic strengths and have tried to avoid having Japan play a large military role. He points out that TV particularly had significant influence in spreading a sort of ultranationalism during the crisis; the media used slogans such as, “We have been doing fine with Peace Constitution all along,” “America is not always correct,” or “Never again send our young people to the battlefield.”

5. Takao Sakamoto, “Kokka’ Kannen no Kihakuka no Hate ni,” *Gaiko Forum* (January 1998): p. 27. Sakamoto indicates that in today’s Japan, *kokumin* (people of the nation) is accepted as a relatively benign concept, but *kokka* (nation, or nation-state) is still considered a dubious and dangerous concept. See also Terumasa Nakanishi, “Daini no Sengo’ no Kokka Mokuhyō,” *Chuo Koron* (February 2000): p. 59–60. Nakanishi argues that in postwar Japan, it was always feared that to discuss the importance of a sense of belonging to something surpassing individual being would inevitably lead to much-condemned nationalism and eventually to dangerous militarism. The important point was that such fear came not only from leftist argument, but actually was maintained by a liberal group within the conservatives, who were called “mainstream conservatives.”

6. Seizaburo Sato, “Kokubo’ ga Naze ‘Anzenhoshō’ ni Natta ka,” *Gaiko Forum 1999 nen Tokubetsu-hen* “21 seiki no Anzenhoshō Kiro ni Tatsu Nihon Gaiko,” 1999, p. 14. Sato writes that Japan after World War II was assured of its security by the alliance with the United States, and such a secure status was the fundamental reason of the security debate in Japan after the war was conducted within such an abnormal framework.

7. The process is concisely explained in Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzenhoshō—Sengo 50 nen no Mosaku*, (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), pp. 309–22.

8. Satoshi Morimoto, “*Kyokuto Yuji*” de *Nihon wa Nani ga Dekiru ka*, (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 1999), pp. 18–20. Morimoto argues that the North Korean missile launching caused the Japanese people, for the first time after World War II, to feel a direct threat to the Japanese mainland.

9. How matters like territorial security began to be debated after the North Korean vessels incident is explained briefly in *ibid.*, pp. 204–7. As for the course of events of the incident, see *Defense of Japan, 1999*, English version (Tokyo: Urban Connections), pp. 208–12.

10. According to an opinion poll by the Prime Minister's Office, made public in May 2000, those who answered that there is a danger of Japan being involved in a war marked the highest of all times. See *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 14, 2000, pp. 1, 2. The *Yomiuri* article reports that the Prime Minister's Office considers the launching of the North Korean missiles and the vessels incident the reasons for such results.

11. In Tanaka, *Anzenhoshō*, pp. 309–10, it is pointed out that during the Cold War, building up Japan's own defense posture itself was almost equal to contributing to the safety of the West, and eventually to the stability of the international society.

12. Measures taken to improve the JSDF's involvement in disaster relief are explained in *Defense of Japan 1996*, pp. 145–49.

13. How major newspapers enthusiastically supported the conduct of the military during the Manchurian Incident is described in a high school textbook, *Nihon no Rekishi Kaiteiban* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha 1998), p. 321.

14. See "Kaitei 40 nen Anpo no Kadai," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 23, 2000, p. 1.



TREE of LIBERTY SOCIETY

CHAPTER TWELVE

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Shunji Yanai

I WAS IN FRANCE RIGHT AFTER I JOINED THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN 1961 and studied at the University of Strasbourg.¹ There, I could watch closely the process of reconciliation between Germany and France. Based on my observations, I think there were four factors that facilitated the reconciliation between the two European powers. First of all, the people still remembered very vividly the scars of two world wars in Europe and were determined not to repeat the same mistakes. Second, it was fortunate that in both France and Germany there were very strong leaders—General Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer—who provided very strong leadership to promote the reconciliation between the two great European powers. Third, the two governments promoted personal exchange, particularly to expand the relationship between the people of the two countries. I saw many German students enter France. And fourth, both France and Germany had a very strong vision for the future, that is, to build a unified Europe, which was, I think, a driving force in accelerating the reconciliation. Having said this, I would now like to look at the situation in Northeast Asia.

As we all know, the Cold War ended in Europe in a dramatic way with the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and so forth. But that has not happened in Northeast Asia. The Korean peninsula is still divided and tension is still high over the strait of Taiwan. But in this connection, I welcome the recent historic summit

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between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il in Korea. I think the very fact that the two leaders met for the first time after more than 50 years of separation is very significant. Also, the fact that they signed a joint declaration is another encouraging first step. The joint declaration contains not only a general declaration but also some concrete measures, including the exchange of separated families between North and South. I hope this project will be implemented as soon as possible. It is encouraging to note that already the Red Cross organizations have agreed to lead these exchanges. Also, in the same joint declaration, the two leaders agreed to hold not only this summit but also meetings between the concerned authorities of the South and the North. And, finally, Chairman Kim Jong-il was invited by President Kim Dae-jung to come to Seoul. I hope that summit meetings will be held from time to time to continue the process.

It is not realistic to think that all of the pending issues can be resolved overnight. So we have to watch the development of relations between the two Koreas from now on. There are difficulties, such as how to address the question of the stationing of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea, and the views on how to proceed with reunification, which are quite different. In the joint declaration however, the two leaders agreed that although their solutions are different, they are also a common people. So we have to watch what will happen. Still, we welcome this successful meeting. And, I'm sure it will create a better environment for the reasons I have explained.

As you know, the United States and Japan each has been trying to promote a dialogue with North Korea. Japan resumed talks with North Korea in Pyongyang in May 2000. We agreed to continue our dialogue in order to normalize our bilateral relations. The second session of the resumed dialogue was supposed to be held in Tokyo in late May, but the North Korean side wanted to postpone it. Perhaps they were too busy preparing for the summit in Korea. Then-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori asked President Kim Dae-jung to convey the message that Japan was ready to discuss various issues to normalize our relations, and this message was conveyed by President Kim Dae-jung. We understand that the reaction of Kim Jong-il was a positive one. So we hope to be able to resume our bilateral talks in the near future.

My second point is about the subject of remembering and forgetting. This is a very important and very challenging subject to discuss. But I think that this is the very basis of confidence building, and therefore it is necessary to do the right thing about remembering and forgetting in order to maintain peace and stability in our region. It can be applied to any region, but because I'm talking about Northeast Asia, let's stress this point.

I quite agree with the conclusions Dr. Okabe reaches in chapter 4 of this volume. He concludes that it is disastrous to use emotional collective remembering, especially for immediate political purposes. Here, rational remembering and emotional forgetting is the best combination, and I quite agree. But how to apply this to reality is another question and it is not an easy one. So let me try to share with you what we have done in this regard.

I have brought with me copies of three documents. The first is the statement made by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama that was issued in August 1995. As you remember, 1995 was the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. The second paper is the English translation of the Japan-ROK Joint Declaration that was issued when President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan in 1998. The third is a copy of the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development that was issued when President Jiang Zemin visited Japan in the same year.

I would like to refer to the so-called 1995 Murayama statement. Mr. Murayama was the prime minister in 1995. Contrary to what was believed in many cases, this statement was endorsed by a cabinet decision (so this is not just his personal statement, it is an official statement of the government of Japan) and has been reconfirmed by successive governments.

It reads, in part, "During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard in the spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of

history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.”

This is a very strong statement about past history. This is a very strong remembering process. About forgetting, I think it's rather up to the other countries. This statement was issued in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. As you have seen in this paragraph, the statement was addressed not only to Asian nations, but also to all the other nations that were occupied or at war with Japan in World War II.

Secondly, when President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan in 1998, he and the late Keizo Obuchi, then prime minister, issued a joint declaration. If you look at Section 2 of this joint declaration, it refers also to the remorse and the apology for the past acts of Japan. In Section 3, there are some additional messages. What is new about this joint declaration is that President Kim Dae-jung not only asked for the Japanese prime minister's view on past history but he referred to present-day Japan.

I think it is very important to think about present-day Japan in this case because I served in Seoul in the early 1980s and I got the impression that, at least at that time, many Koreans still had the image of prewar Japan. Most of them did not know about the changes that had taken place after 1945. But President Kim Dae-jung was very clear about that, and before coming to Japan on a state visit, he told the South Korean people that today's Japan is totally different from the Japan that existed before 1945. I think this is a very important point.

So, in Section 3, as you see, after Prime Minister Obuchi “expressed his admiration” for the Republic of Korea, President Kim Dae-jung said he “highly appreciated the role that Japan has played for the peace and prosperity of the international community through its security policies. . . .” Later both leaders expressed their determination that Japan and Korea “further develop their cooperative relationship founded on such universal principles as freedom, democracy and the market economy. . . .” So this point is something new in this declaration. Until that time, whenever Korean and Japanese leaders met, they talked

mainly about the past history, but here there is a clear recognition of the change of Japan after 1945. Although they remember the past, I would say that their approach is much more future-oriented.

Third, you have copies of the Japan-China declaration, which was issued shortly after President Kim Dae-jung's visit to Japan. This was issued by President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Obuchi. In Section 3, of the past and the future, it says they "expressed their resolve to establish a partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development toward the twenty-first century." This declaration was accompanied by another document, which contained a lot of concrete joint projects that were going to be implemented between China and Japan. After recalling past issues, the Joint Communiqué of 1972 and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, they said:

Both sides believe that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China. The Japanese side observes the 1972 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 15 August 1995 statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this.

And then they went on to say, "The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the history and adhere to the path of peace and development. Based on this, both sides will develop longstanding relations of friendship." So this is the remembering part that is directly related to Japan and China.

Here I would like to say that although there are similar expressions, there are of course some differences, and it would not be fair to compare the two declarations directly, because the background of each is different. For instance, in the case of China, the Emperor had already made a state visit to China in 1992, whereas in the case of the ROK, the Emperor has not visited. That is just one important difference. When the Emperor went to China, he also referred to the past

history. Of course, because of his status as the symbol of the Japanese nation, his expression was rather mild. But he said the maximum he could say in his statement as the Emperor. Under the Japanese Constitution, he is not supposed to act politically. I want to cite this point as a difference of background.

Now I would like to refer to Japan-U.S. relations. We all know that during World War II our two countries were archenemies, but after World War II we became very close allies. As to the remembering and forgetting process, of course, there are many subjects that are in question. We have historical facts such as Pearl Harbor; nearly four years of fierce fighting in the Pacific theater and also the ground battle on Okinawa; heavy bombing by B-29 bombers on Tokyo and other big cities; and, of course, the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet I think over time, since the signing of the peace treaty in San Francisco, both nations have, if I may use Dr. Okabe's expression, remembered rationally and perhaps forgotten emotionally.

I think this process has been done well between our two countries. Of course, it does not mean that it has been perfectly done, but this is a good case of remembering and forgetting. And now we enjoy a friendly relationship as close allies.

Finally, I would like to report on the U.S. role in Northeast Asia. As I said in the very beginning, the Cold War has not ended completely in our region. And although there was a very encouraging development between North and South Korea, there are still many uncertainties. So we think that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia is welcome. This is a strong stabilizing force in our region, because the United States does represent a very strong democracy, and it is the only remaining superpower capable of maintaining peace and stability in the region. There is no NATO-like organization in Northeast Asia, but there is a network of bilateral security treaties such as the Korea-U.S. Security Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

I would like to repeat that despite the encouraging developments on the Korean Peninsula, we still need the U.S. presence, including the military presence in Northeast Asia. I had a regular press conference [June 2000] right after the summit in Pyongyang, and some of

the Japanese reporters asked me whether or not we should review the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in view of the new developments in Korea. I answered that it is premature to think about that. We have to watch what will be done after this important meeting. We cannot think that one summit, although it is important, can change the security environment in Northeast Asia.



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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

Lee Hong-koo

IN 1989 THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE CAME TO AN END WITH THE FALL OF the Berlin Wall. Korea is now the last place where the Cold War-type of confrontation continues. Our hope is that the June 2000 summit meeting between North and South Korea is a beginning of an end to that chapter, that is, the last chapter in the history of the Cold War. Whether we can successfully write that chapter and end the era of the Cold War remains to be seen.

The summit in Pyongyang dramatically referred to the fact that we might have finally entered into the post-Cold War era in Asia. In the meantime, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Act promoting China's entrance to the World Trade Organization system. All four countries (North and South Korea, the United States and China) were parties to the Korean War 50 years ago. We are justified in viewing these developments as signs of the beginning of a new era—particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet we have been so accustomed to the Cold War setting that no one has developed a clear vision of what the role of these countries should be in dealing with the problems of the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the post-Cold War era coincides with what is generally called the information revolution. When you combine those two historical developments, basically you have a new set-

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ting in which to discuss the “new world order” and the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.

The theme “remembering and forgetting” could lead into many interesting discussions. I would like to examine the role of the United States in Asia in terms of a vision or dream for a new global order. To do so, we must understand the traditional geopolitical setting in Asia. East Asia has a number of large countries. Starting from the north you have Japan and China, and in Southeast Asia, Indonesia. Also, you should not forget the simple fact that Russia shares common borders with China as well as Korea. So, when President Vladimir Putin says, “I’m going to Pyongyang,” what he’s saying is, “I’m going to the country that shares common borders with us.” Given this type of geopolitical setting, particularly in the context of the age of imperialism and ideology, we have seen numerous cases in history in which an attempt was made by one of the large countries to become a hegemonic power. For example, Japan industrialized itself at the end of the nineteenth century and found itself right in the middle of the age of imperialism. If you wanted to become a big power in those days, you had to expand. In 1895 Japan won the Sino-Japanese war. Ten years later, in 1905, Japan won the war against Russia. Given the geopolitical setting in the age of imperialism, when Japan defeated both China and Russia, the fate of Korea was sealed. So, just five years later, in 1910, Japan took over Korea as a colony, an occupation that lasted for 35 years.

The ideal U.S. role in such a setting has been to try to prevent any single power from becoming a hegemonic power in the region. That is why I have often called the U.S. role an “outside balancer.” Even today, the United States seems to consider itself an outside balancer in Asia. It is natural and legitimate, therefore, for the United States to be concerned about China becoming a hegemonic power, considering her growing economic and military resources. Russia is currently preoccupied with internal problems, and Japan does not constitute any serious problem. Whether the United States desired it or not, it has become the sole superpower preserving the balance of power necessary for peace in Asia. At the same time, the United States has to

assume the leadership in the process of globalization and the information revolution.

I have just spoken about the role of U.S. leadership in Asia, but what are some of its limitations? One is that the United States traditionally has accorded Europe and the Middle East priority over the Asia-Pacific region in the conduct of its foreign policy. During the years I have served in Washington as an ambassador, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright, for example, has given the impression she is primarily concerned with the Middle East. She has spent a great deal of time trying to find a solution to the Middle Eastern crisis. But surely when you consider the size and magnitude of confrontation, the Korean peninsula is equally important and deserves equal attention. On the Korean peninsula, you have approximately 1,750,000 soldiers, including 37,000 U.S. forces, lined up on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), with a tremendous amount of modern armament. Given the precedent of Chinese involvement in the Korean War, if something were to happen there now, there would be a big war. I am really making an appeal that the secretary and the State Department devote a greater share of their time to the problems facing the Asia-Pacific region.

In many ways, the media in the United States also suffers from this tradition of paying less than adequate attention to Asian affairs. For example, in October 2000, there will be the Asia-Europe summit (ASEM)—the third in series. This series of summits began in Bangkok in 1996, gathering every two years all the heads of government of the European Union and ASEAN plus three. Some 26 countries were represented by heads of government at the first meeting in Bangkok. The second meeting was held in London in 1998, and this year it will be held in Seoul. But, I do not expect that anyone in the American media will pay much attention to that summit, partly because the United States is not involved. This is just a reflection of how the American media still are preoccupied with U.S.-centered events and often neglects potentially important developments in Asia. I've been telling some media people this could be a very important summit, because, for example, a big controversy is brewing up right now with regard to the proposed plan for national missile defense in the

United States. In general, no one in Europe and Asia seems pleased with that plan. You can easily guess that when 26 European and Asian heads of government meet in Seoul in October, there will be either formal or informal discussion on this issue and a consensus might emerge criticizing the United States on this proposal.

It is not easy for the United States to be the leader of the global community and, in particular to manage relationships with its close allies in this context. For example, there are very troublesome negotiations going on between the United States and South Korea regarding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). South Korea considers itself perhaps the United States' closest ally in Asia, and it wants to be treated accordingly by the United States. Those who are demonstrating in Korea and shouting anti-American slogans are not really well informed on all the legal details involved in revising the SOFA agreement. Many of them might admit they have not read it. What irritates them most of all is the feeling that Korea has not received equal treatment compared to the other allies who have SOFA agreements with the United States. Japan, for example, also has experienced a great deal of difficulty in the process of revising its SOFA agreement with the United States. What is totally unacceptable to the Korean public is if a gap exists between the U.S.-Japan agreement on one hand and the U.S.-South Korea agreement on the other hand. Thus, it is not simply a legal problem, but primarily is a political problem. The Defense Department lawyers cannot handle this situation adequately, because their primary concern as lawyers is how to give maximum legal protection to American soldiers. So this problem has to be addressed ultimately by political decisionmakers, not lawyers. This case demonstrates again how difficult it is for the United States to manage the alliance system, particularly in Asia.

Whether it wants to or not, the United States has become the sole superpower and the leader in the global village with the end of the Cold War. But, compared to the period following the World War II or the heyday of the Cold War in the 1960s, the idealism in America in general and in the conduct of foreign policy in particular seems to be in decline. If you don't have a vision based on idealism, however, it's very difficult to play the role of a global leader. This could be the

really fundamental limitation to the conduct of America foreign policy and to the United States' leadership role in the Asia Pacific in the coming decade.

There is no easy way to develop the long-term vision necessary for global leadership. We can only suggest a determined effort be made by American leaders to comprehend the nature and problems of the historic transition the world is undergoing at the moment. For example, there no longer are national boundaries when it comes to the capital market. Capital just moves around globally, and with it, technology. So, when you have capital and technology moving rather freely, what impact will that have on the identity of each society? This is a very serious question we should not ignore. Every society would like to maintain or preserve its own identity, but no one knows how to do this effectively at the moment. In the meantime, there is widely spread fear globally that American dominance will create identity crises in many societies. In exercising the leadership role, particularly in Asia, American leaders should take a close look at this problem to ensure long-term success.

On this point, I have reminded some that we have to pay more attention to "social conservation." This is a term I invented in the 1960s when I submitted a doctoral dissertation at Yale. At first, many people, including my advisers, asked, "What is social conservation?" My answer then and now is that if everybody understood the importance of natural conservation, then there should be no problem in understanding the need for social conservation. We have to preserve and conserve nature, but we also have to preserve and conserve social values, including societal identity. This should not be confused with the nationalism manifested in the age of ideology. Unlike that old-style nationalism, which constituted an antithesis to globalism, the principle of social conservation embraces globalization. Only when you have variety does unity have real meaning. Unity without variety would make the world a very dull and poor place indeed. We have to reemphasize social conservation, even though the world has become a very small place. How are we to link social conservation with globalization? Consider it in terms of neighborhood expansion. In the old days, a neighborhood constituted a very small place, perhaps only

a small village. But the advancement of transportation and communication technologies have expanded boundaries of neighborhoods to a phenomenal degree. Going beyond the national boundaries, an entire region could become a neighborhood, and Europe today is the prime example. In this process of neighborhood expansion, we face a tremendous challenge, namely, how our value systems can keep up with the speed at which the world is becoming one neighborhood.

To meet the challenge of neighborhood expansion or globalization, each society has to consciously develop a new spirit of neighborhood transcending national boundaries. One good example of such effort is a joint hosting of the World Cup 2002 by Korea and Japan, the two countries that have fiercely competed for the honor of hosting the biggest sports event in the world community. At the time of the FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association) voting in Zurich four years ago, we Koreans thought we had a few more votes, while the Japanese thought they had a few more. Although FIFA had never awarded the game to two countries, the FIFA leadership suggested it could break that tradition and award the game to two immediate neighbors as cohosts. As the chairman of the bidding committee from the Korean side, I accepted the offer without hesitation. Given the fact that our two countries have had extremely unfortunate experiences during the twentieth century, what better way to start the twenty-first century than to show to the people around the world that our neighborhood is a very congenial neighborhood in which both social conservation and globalization are progressing in an extremely constructive way!

Now, coming back to the United States. What should be its role in building a global neighborhood? Perhaps the most urgent task is to build a global system or network to maintain order and stability in the global economy. In terms of the capital market, New York is the most important center. Some surveys show 42 percent of new technology comes out of the United States. No wonder every country around the world is expecting the United States to assume a decisive leadership in building a global neighborhood.

One important development in the United States is the growing number of Asian immigrants and their contribution to American society.

We have more than 1 million Korean-Americans living throughout the United States. The United States is a nation of immigrants, and the earlier immigrants from Europe shaped the character and quality of America. From this also developed a Europe-first mentality in American society. With a large input from the Asian immigrants, the United States could develop a more balanced vision that would enable it to manage the leadership role in the global neighborhood more effectively.



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