

The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues

Those who assume time heals all wounds are wrong. Accelerated by the collision of information technology with concerns of the past, issues of “remembering and forgetting” are creating history. They are shaping the strategic alignments of the future.

Remembering and forgetting events define what individuals and countries remember and when, as well as what individuals and countries forget and why. Remembering and forgetting issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that direct the future in the name of the past.

They are the personal and policy aftermaths of peoples and countries—including Germany, Japan, and China—whose identities and international roles are rooted deep in history. Remembering and forgetting issues thus encompass, but are by no means limited to, Germany’s Holocaust; Japan’s colonization of Korea and later brutal occupation of China; China’s civil war; and Taiwan’s February 28 incident, when Chinese mainlanders killed native Taiwanese in 1947. Efforts to promote justice and reconciliation are now manifest in issues as diverse as slave and forced labor claims in Japan and Germany, “comfort women” and World War II textbook lawsuits in Japan, and Agent Orange allegations in Vietnam or the Philippines.

In Asia and elsewhere, companies and states should prepare for the intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance of remembering and forgetting events for at least four reasons. First, modern technologies are digitally enhancing our memories and then broadcasting our most passionate personal concerns and most polarized divergences. They are playing and replaying our worst nightmares through cyberspace, with an expanding global and personal reach.

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The Washington Quarterly • 24:2 pp. 45–57.

**Time does not
heal all wounds.**

Reflecting technology's propensity to compress time and to juxtapose images and issues from different time periods, the context for thinking about remembering and forgetting issues is shifting from governments to individuals, who often feel the strongest about history's most sensitive events. For example, as U.S. and South Korean public interest focused on the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War in June 2000, emotional television interviews and current footage of bullet marks from the 1950s at No Gun Ri bridge illustrated the nationalistic Korean concern that U.S. soldiers fired on and killed South Korean citizens at the Korean War's outbreak—an issue which,

had it been mishandled, could potentially have reshaped the U.S. military presence in and strategic alignment with South Korea.

Second, the juxtaposition of memory, history, and strategic alignment in Asia and elsewhere means that key relationships, such as among China, Japan, North and South Korea, and the United States, are destined to be expressed in historical

terms. Issues of history will thus become the international vocabulary to describe shifting strategic alignments during coming periods of watershed change.

For example, the language of remembering and forgetting concerns permeated the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize Committee's honoring of South Korean president Kim Dae Jung for his work to "overcome more than 50 years of war and hostility between North and South Korea," and "for South Korea's reconciliation with other neighboring countries, especially Japan." Kim's efforts, however, were aimed well beyond simple reconciliation. They sought nothing less than to change the images upon which history pivots, thereby broadening constructive strategic alignment in South and North Korea, Japan, China, and the United States.

Not surprisingly, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's October 2000 trip to Pyongyang—representing the most senior U.S.-North Korea exchange in 50 years—had its origins in Japan's 1998 written apology to South Korea for past historical suffering. This apology, expressed in the vocabulary and issues of history, was signed by Kim and Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi. This effort at historical reconciliation by Seoul and Tokyo facilitated Kim's and Chairman Kim Jung Il's June 2000 South-North intra-Korean summit and the subsequent October 2000 visit to Washington by North Korea special envoy Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok and the October 25, 2000, visit to Pyongyang by Albright. These efforts, however, also required U.S.-South Korea consensus about the role of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula.

Third, as cosmopolitan standards of civilization globalize remembering and forgetting issues and values, the stakes for companies and countries increase as issues in one region inspire similar concerns in other regions—and the stakes are becoming very high. For example, significant class-action legal suits regarding slave and forced labor have resulted in a DM 10 billion (\$4.48 billion) settlement in Germany and a ¥500 million (\$4.27 million) settlement in Japan. In the German case, slave laborers—those forced to work in concentration camps—will be compensated. Slightly more than half are Jewish. In addition, a DM 1 billion (\$474 million) fund will be established in Germany to promote understanding, reconciliation, remembrance, and exchange. In the Japanese case, the country's largest general contractor, the Kajima Corporation, will compensate at least some of the 986 Chinese wartime laborers, and their survivors, who were forced to work at its Hanaoka copper mine. The case has implications for the estimated 50,000 Chinese workers forcibly taken to Japan and the estimated 10 million Chinese forced to labor in China during Japan's occupation.¹

Despite these settlements, questions remain. Is justice finally being served so the future can be freed from the past? Is the “legal peace” the German government and corporations have negotiated regarding slave and forced labor enduring and enforceable? Do these settlements establish precedents, which could (as the Mitsui and Mitsubishi Corporations fear) open the floodgates for Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, Americans, and others to begin litigation and a public outcry?

Finally, as these remembering and forgetting issues influence international settlements, they also will shape the domestic debates in Berlin, Tokyo, and Beijing. These debates center on what it means to be a “normal country” in today's international system, and how this perception influences discussion of Germany's, Japan's, and China's regional relations and relations with the United States. In the past, a normal country may have been viewed as one that had no particular international constraints or requirements because of its history, but as this definition is also a product of history, this perception is evolving. For example, in a controversial statement, Germany's foreign minister justified German military involvement with Allied war efforts in Kosovo by bringing past memories and future history together. Germany must participate, he said, “so there will be no more Auschwitzes.”

In Japan, Tokyo may expand its international security roles and missions, especially now that George W. Bush is the U.S. president. This process will require reconciliation of Japan's self-image with its past experiences: domestically, a new interpretation of Article IX of Japan's constitution, promulgated to constrain Japan's military capabilities to limited self-defense

following the Second World War; internationally, a new understanding of its neighbors' still bitter memories of World War II.

Popular Chinese attention to remembering and forgetting issues could fuel rising nationalism. Whether such nationalism will play a constructive or destructive role in China's development and in its international relations may depend on how Beijing reasserts its ancient archeological roots through exhibitions of antiquities and how it revives a faded ideology with potent, current national achievements and symbols.² Yet China must escape the Marxist-Leninist mind-trap: the stronger China's sense of history is, the stronger China's sense of being exploited and victimized may be. This development could result in stronger nationalistic perceptions and responses, frustrating international attempts to engage China.

These remembering and forgetting issues will shape the future—a future in which disgruntled individuals can hold companies and countries hostage to the presumed forgotten past; a future in which leading-edge strategic alignments in East Asia, Europe, and elsewhere pivot on the vocabulary of issues of history; a future in which the way that peoples and countries remember and forget will structure the international system.

Accelerated by Contemporary Technology

Modern technologies, including digital technologies and the Internet, are bringing together images and sounds that give remembering and forgetting issues surprising intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance. Consider a hacker's attack on Japanese government Web sites or the explosion of Internet accusations following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

The potent combination of new technologies and deep-rooted historical discrepancies was highlighted as part of the highly-political debate between Sino-Japanese interpretations of history. To protest a Japanese citizens group seeking to convene a January 2000 conference called "Verification of the Rape of Nanjing: The Biggest Lie of the Twentieth Century," Chinese hackers attacked official Japanese government Web sites using anti-Japanese graffiti written in Chinese characters.

What began as a group of private Japanese citizens holding a controversial conference sparked a strong emotional and technological response by a Chinese individual or individuals. Yet the issue quickly became a high-level Sino-Japanese matter requiring the involvement of senior officials in the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministries.

The accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade demonstrated that, in some matters of history, Chinese memory is too long while

U.S. memory is too short. The news of the bombing traveled first by Internet, straight from Europe to China's students, who angrily mobilized. Pro-Chinese hackers from Hong Kong reportedly placed skull-and-crossbone images on the White House public Web site and shut down sites for the Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, National Park Service, and other official U.S. government agencies. According to another account, Chinese hackers replaced the homepage text of the U.S. embassy in Beijing with Chinese characters reading, "Down with the barbarians."³

The Chinese government was forced to react to nationalistic contentions that the United States had deliberately destroyed a sovereign diplomatic structure in a direct affront to China. No doubt the Chinese government noted that Chinese students and others used all available Web and other communications channels to criticize sharply Beijing's perceived weak governmental response to the bombing.

This combination of globally sourced cyber news and multidimensional cyber attack underscores how unpredictable emotionally charged remembering and forgetting issues coupled with new technologies can become. Chinese citizens saw the accidental bombing in the context of the history of U.S.-China relations. In that past, some saw a history of gunboat diplomacy promoting Western commercial penetration and exploitation. Some labeled Premier Zhu Rongji's efforts to bring China into the World Trade Organization as treasonous. Chinese defense planners extrapolated that younger Western leaders like Tony Blair or Bill Clinton might use humanitarian concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan as a provocation to militarily threaten China's Three Gorges dam, which, if burst, would unleash a tidal torrent inundating thousands of people downstream.

The sharp divergence of U.S. and Chinese popular perceptions is a disturbing reminder that global movements of information, capital, and technology may knit us into one world, but one that still has fundamental misunderstandings and misperceptions at its core. Indeed, the global speed of change combined with divergent historical prisms may in some cases accelerate international misunderstanding and crisis.

Strategic Alignments Turn on History

In East Asia, Europe, and other places where history extends further into the past than in the United States, memory, history, and strategic alignment are inextricably linked. The vocabulary of history will be used to express old and new strategic alignments. Consider how central remembering and forgetting descriptions are to structure strategic alignment among Japan, South Korea, and China.

**Remembering and
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national identity.**

During an official 1998 visit to Japan, South Korean president Kim and Japanese prime minister Obuchi reviewed past relations and exchanged views on how engagement between South Korea and Japan should be conducted in the future.⁴ Specifically, “Prime Minister Obuchi regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.”⁵

This expression of deep remorse and heartfelt apology was not the first apology, though it was qualitatively different in its depth of expression. Some periodically opine that Japan has not apologized for its colonial and wartime past. It is more accurate to say Japan’s apologies, particularly to Korea and China, have evolved through the years.

In this case, not only did Obuchi issue a specific written apology, but Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Obuchi’s recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it. Kim also expressed his view that the present calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.⁶ Kim’s acceptance of Obuchi’s apology reportedly helped facilitate its expression.

Expressed in the vocabulary of past issues and historical reconciliation, these efforts to improve South Korean–Japanese relations broaden future common ground. They subtly shift Northeast Asia’s strategic alignment by forestalling the conventional wisdom that a uniting or united Korea must inevitably find its identity in a nationalistic, anti-Japanese colonial past and must therefore tilt away from Tokyo and possibly from Washington.

Drawing a contrast with Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit to Japan, just a month after Kim’s visit, is instructive. On the historically significant first visit to Japan by a president of the People’s Republic of China, Jiang met the emperor of Japan and conducted an intensive exchange of views with Obuchi.⁷

As has been widely noted, no written Japanese apology appears in the Sino-Japanese joint declaration. Both sides stated their belief “that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China.”⁸ Further, “the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed

deep remorse for this.”⁹ Instead of Japan issuing and China accepting an apology, the Chinese side stated it “hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the history and adhere to the path of peace and development.”¹⁰ Some in Beijing reportedly encouraged Jiang to be more conciliatory with Tokyo on this subject. Domestic Chinese politics, however, apparently compelled Jiang to confront history more directly.

Beijing’s and Tokyo’s mutual desire not to repeat Jiang’s historical impasse undoubtedly motivated the different approach taken by both sides during Premier Zhu Rongji’s 2000 visit to Japan. Japanese foreign minister Yohei Kono candidly asked that issues of history be addressed in a restrained manner during his own preparatory visit to China.¹¹ Through various channels, Zhu clearly signaled that he did not intend to make questions of history a centerpiece of his own Japan visit. Yet, in his initial press statements, Zhu claimed that Japan had not yet apologized, though he later added words of appreciation for Tokyo’s official development assistance and efforts to work through differences on history.

History as International Vocabulary

The fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War recently provided two examples of how a pivotal historical juncture could change the public’s memory. One is the controversy surrounding potential U.S. military responsibility at No Gun Ri and the second is North Korean chairman Kim’s surprise personal role in the South-North summit to rewrite Korean War memories.

Planned commemorations of the Korean War’s anniversary focused public attention in South Korea and among U.S. veterans groups on the simmering contention that, in late July 1950, U.S. soldiers shot and killed South Korean civilians under a bridge at No Gun Ri (and in some other locations). Some individuals, especially in South Korea, argued that the country’s earlier military governments had refused to hear the truth regarding No Gun Ri and related issues, let alone to work for any acceptable justice.

The No Gun Ri controversy underscores the need for context in public debate. South Korean popular sentiment recognized that at the outbreak of the war it was difficult to distinguish North Korean infiltrators from South Korean civilians. Koreans understand the U.S. commitment to South Korean freedom was paid in the blood of U.S. soldiers who fought on the Korean Peninsula and admit how hard it is to judge yesterday in the context of what is known today.

Many Koreans see the process of revealing past wrongs and injustices as a means of moving beyond them. Balancing recognition of past wrongs with compensation in its varying forms is important. Claims for compensation,

however, must be approached appropriately so as not to demean them or to be manipulated by them.

On January 11, 2000, the U.S. Department of Defense released a "Statement of Mutual Understanding between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the No Gun Ri Investigations." In it, official negotiators from Seoul and Washington recognized that, in the early period of the conflict, "young, undertrained, and underequipped" U.S. soldiers "new to combat" fired toward the refugees, killing and injuring an unknown number. Washington maintains that what occurred was an accident of war and not directly ordered. President Clinton also telephoned Kim to express condolences, adding "many Americans have experienced the anguish of innocent casualties of war." The United States will erect a monument to civilian war victims in Korea and provide a scholarship fund for Koreans studying in their homeland or the United States.¹²

Closely following the No Gun Ri controversy were claims that the United States used Agent Orange or other defoliants in the Korean demilitarized zone. Similar claims were made in the Philippines, in what some initially feared might open a potential Pandora's box of past issues and future litigation over compensation claims.

While these concerns were being aired, Pyongyang was making its own preparations for the anniversary date. Kim Jong Il was planning to launch a new image of himself and of North Korea. Long-held South Korean perceptions of North Korean callousness were directly challenged in the widely broadcast scenes of President Kim's arrival in North Korea's capital last June. President Kim's private aircraft was greeted in Pyongyang with a red carpet, welcoming crowd, the prominent display of the Republic of Korea's national flag, and of course, Chairman Kim's warm hugs.

None of this, however, yet adds up to fundamental change in North Korean economic or security policy. Paradoxically, Pyongyang's domestic challenges may swell because of the conditions of peaceful coexistence. To paraphrase Alexis de Tocqueville, the most perilous moment for an authoritarian government is when it seeks to reform. Yet, by personally appearing on the tarmac at Pyongyang to greet President Kim and by riding amicably together in the same car as part of the six hours the two senior leaders would spend together, Chairman Kim used the visit to change completely the world's impression of him and North Korea.¹³

How North and South Korea address responsibility for the past (war, terrorism, nuclear processing, missile development) will help determine where and how many U.S. troops remain on the Korean Peninsula. Addressing the past will also determine what strategic alignment will hold sway between South and North Korea, as well as among the Koreas and their Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and U.S. neighbors.

In other words, history will become the vocabulary and linchpin for strategic alignments in Northeast Asia. In many cases, underlying political, economic, security, and social-cultural trends will be expressed in the vocabulary of historical relations and national identity, including the emotional language of past and future. For many reasons, the upcoming years are critical to Asia's future. Memory and issues of history will provide the vocabulary if not the substance for many events and decisions in the next two years. In turn, these upcoming watershed events and decisions—often expressed in terms of memory and issues of history—will define the structure and strategic alignment of Asia.

The heart and soul of Chinese nationalism will also be redefined in upcoming events including developments in Taiwan (the aftermath of the March 2000 Taiwan presidential election of Chen Shui-bian and the December 2001 Taiwan Legislative Yuan elections), in Hong Kong (the selection of a new chief executive), and in China (the phase-in of China's World Trade Organization obligations and its selection of a new leadership generation at its 2002 sixteenth party congress).

In October 2001, the participation of the new U.S. president at the Shanghai Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meetings will be preceded by visits from U.S. cabinet and other senior officials with an eye to establishing a future-oriented framework for U.S.-Sino relations and for U.S.-Asian regional relations. Prior to the December 2002 Korean presidential elections, President Kim will likely retire, marking the end of the "three Kims" generation (Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Chong Pil) and a whole age of Korean democracy.

Other potential watershed events in 2002 which may turn on historical dates include Japan's reassessment of its past and future roles, coincident with the fiftieth anniversary of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (also the end of U.S. occupation) on April 28; the designation of 2002 as "Japan Year" in China and "China Year" in Japan as part of the thirtieth anniversary of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations; and the May 31–June 30 World Cup of soccer jointly hosted by Korea and Japan (first match in Seoul, last match in Yokohama) at which time the Japanese emperor may visit Korea for the first time.

In sum, throughout the Asia Pacific region, the vocabulary of remembering and forgetting is and will be used to reflect and direct regional strategic alignments, but the use of remembering and forgetting vocabulary to shape domestic and foreign policy is not limited to Asia alone.

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Global Values, New and Old

People and countries must interpret their respective pasts and futures within their own unique context, free from external judgment. At the same time, continued global expressions regarding past and future justice and other values increasingly link public attitudes, legal precedents, and public policy concerns. This concept has been true concerning public approaches to remedies for remembering and forgetting issues in Germany, Japan, and the United States.

The willingness to overlook traditional sovereign boundaries in the name of political ethical imperatives underscores how deeply rooted international standards of nondiscrimination and international standards opposing crimes against humanity have become in Europe and elsewhere. These issues of historical memory are inevitably expressed in remembering and forgetting terms.

In this spirit, a “Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future Foundation” fund was established by German industry and government “to recognize the victims of industrial exploitation during the Nazi era.”¹⁴ With DM 5 billion (\$2.37 billion) each from the German government and German industry, the DM 10 billion total settlement envisions direct compensation to slave and forced laborers, insurance payments for lost property, and the “Future Fund.” Such issues, and the public animation they can suddenly engender, remind governments and others of the need to prepare for surprise. Truly unexpected will be the intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance that remembering and forgetting issues will generate for those unprepared in coming years.

In Germany, the politically successful articulation of foreign policy has required a careful calibration of domestic and international attitudes regarding remembering and forgetting issues. One of the most dramatic (and controversial) examples of this nexus occurred during the Kosovo war. Flanked by a supportive U.S. secretary of state, Germany’s foreign minister gave “no more Auschwitzes” as a reason justifying Berlin’s involvement with the allied war efforts.

On one hand, this statement reiterated that modern Germany’s foreign policy is constrained by the memory of Nazi Germany’s egregious racial and ethnic discrimination, including genocide. On the other hand, this statement argues that modern Germany’s adherence to a contemporary international standard of nondiscrimination can actually justify and compel Berlin’s participation in contemporary efforts, even war, to limit genocide or ethnic cleansing in Europe.

Germany’s involvement in out-of-area operations has included sending

technical and logistical support troops to Somalia in 1992 and 1993 as part of the U.S.-led effort under the legal umbrella of a United Nations Security Council resolution. In summer 1994, Germany's Supreme Court ruled that German forces could join the alliance for collective defense (i.e., under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and could do everything required of an alliance member—all subject to German parliament majority consent. No German doubts that it was politically easier for a left-oriented, Green Party foreign minister, rather than for a conservative government official, to appeal for left-wing support with a statement renouncing any future Auschwitzes as justification for Germany's involvement.

Being Normal

In Berlin, Tokyo, and Beijing, one can feel remembering and forgetting issues, including what it means to be a normal country, shaping the domestic debate and the respective international strategic trajectories of Germany, Japan, and China.

A German analyst recently reviewed the coverage of Germany in a diverse sampling of major U.S. media and publications. Surprisingly, 12 percent of U.S. print coverage deals with the Holocaust or related issues. The Holocaust often receives more coverage than contemporary German politics. More than two-thirds of books dealing with Germany currently available on U.S. bookshelves cover only 12 years of German history. In his opinion, this finding indicates that the United States remembers only parts of the past. The analyst stated,

To be stable, a society must have individuals proud of their country, including its past. We must not forget, and we will not forget, but we must also be free to have a normal future, to escape any time warp which destines us to live in a past we left long ago. ... We want to be normal. It is time for us to be normal.

With Bush as U.S. president, the United States may be seen as increasingly encouraging Japan to also become a normal country. Such a process of "normalization" will require a reconciliation of Japan's self-image with the images its neighbors hold of Japan's past. This adjustment will entail an intensified domestic debate on the constitutional interpretation of Article IX defining the legal parameters of Japan's military self-defense capabilities as a prelude (or not) to Tokyo modestly broadening those capabilities and responsibilities.

In his *Blueprint for a New Japan*, Ichiro Ozawa pioneered discussion on what normal nation status might mean for Japan.¹⁵ He defined a normal na-

tion as one which, first, “willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community,” especially “where national security is concerned,” and, second, “cooperates fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people.”¹⁶ One can imagine a third requirement: a normal country establishes mutually acceptable interpretations of memory and history with its neighbors so those neighbors do not object to that country’s engaging in a full range of international activities and capabilities.

Potential divergence between domestic pressures for Japan to establish itself as a normal country and domestic pressures for China to replace a faded ideology with rising nationalism could yet become a major factor of instability in East Asia. At the heart of such potentially divergent nationalisms are dramatically different interpretations of the past. In particular, a rising, nationalistic younger generation in Japan may feel less responsible for those actions. In contrast, a rising, nationalistic younger generation in China may be angered by perceived Japanese unwillingness to accept historical responsibility. Paradoxically, people who did not experience past tragedies may see them in even starker terms than people who actually lived through them.

Back to the Future

Some things cannot and must not be forgotten. It is normal to remember, particularly attitudes and actions that must never be repeated. It is also normal, over time, to forget—or at least to remember more positively and allow a process of reconciliation to begin.

In some cases, the issue may not be so much remembering and forgetting as remembering and not remembering. When something cannot be forgotten but has been remembered and reconciled, it ceases to be the focus of conscious attention. When reconciliation has consciously occurred, history can reinvent itself. It can begin anew. It does not leave familiar foundations but can build a new future.

The emotional and geographic reach of remembering and forgetting issues is increasing, as is their impact on public perceptions and popularly determined strategic alignments. To make history is, by definition, to describe the past from the perspective of the future. To determine the future is, at some point, to make history. At the crucial nexus of each government’s and each country’s political battle to determine how the past will shape the future, remembering and forgetting issues will provide the vocabulary for and the battlefield on which strategic alignments in the contemporary world will turn. We are witnessing the beginning of a new history.

Notes

1. Stephanie Strom, "Fund for Wartime Slaves Set Up in Japan," *New York Times*, November 29, 2000, sec. A, p. 16.
2. "Sold (to the Soldier at the Back)," *South China Morning Post*, November 22, 2000, Features, p. 1.
3. Gary Chen, "Chinese Websites Buzz with Anti-U.S. Chat as Hackers Attack Official U.S. Sites," *China OnLine* May 10, 1999.
4. See Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership Toward the Twenty-first Century, October 8, 1998.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. See Japan-China Joint Declaration, "On Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development," November 26, 1998.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. See Minister for Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono, "Seeking a True Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation," August 30, 2000 (address during his visit to China).
12. "Army Admits GIs in Korea Killed Civilians at No Gun Ri," *New York Times*, January 12, 2000, section 1, p. 1.
13. Dong Bok Lee, "Inter-Korean Summitry: Another Indian Game of Elephant Versus Blind People?" *Korea and World Affairs* 24, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 207–227.
14. See Ambassador J. D. Bindenagel, U.S. Department of State, "Remembrance and Public Policy," Friedrich Ebert Foundation Seminar "Remembering and Forgetting," October 8–9, 2000.
15. The term "normal country" may itself unsatisfactorily imply an overly narrow historical stigmatization.
16. Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), p. 95.